

# CONFLICT IN CITIES AND THE CONTESTED STATE

Everyday life and the possibilities for transformation in Belfast, Jerusalem and other divided cities

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## Conflict in Cities Research Reports

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## ***Cities and Ethno-National Conflict: Empire, nation and urban spaces***

**James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd**

### **Synopsis**

Ethno-national conflicts have now become largely urban conflicts, though it's usually obscured by the separate literatures on cities and nationalisms. This book is about cities in states whose borders, territory or very existence are seriously contested, not least by groups of citizens. It is based mainly on Belfast, Jerusalem and other ethno-nationally divided cities in Western Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East. But it eschews the usual case-study approach of focusing on individual cities. Instead it attempts a sustained comparative analysis of the processes of ethno-national conflict as they interact across the three main levels of *empire, nation and urban spaces*.

### **The book seeks to understand and assess:**

- the ways in which cities have been shaped by ethno-national conflicts, and
- how cities have shaped these conflicts;
- variations in the degrees of violence, severity and intractability of the conflicts;
- the main factors which exacerbate, intensify or prolong them;
- the factors which help in managing, ameliorating or resolving conflict; and
- the key roles cities play in all this, both for better and worse.

But paradoxically and often confusingly, the same features of urban space which intensify ethno-national conflict (e.g., dense populations, close proximities, the vulnerabilities of urban functionality) may also serve to moderate or help resolve conflict (e.g., close proximities are also opportunities for co-operation; urban functionality and shared infrastructure bring active pressures to co-operate). Things can go either way – the essence of the problem – and actual outcomes depend on wider circumstances. Hence the need to contextualise

- urban spaces and processes, the city's structures and everyday life, in terms of
- contested nation and state building and their failures which produce conflict, and
- empires, 'imperial powers', or 'the international community' which are often decisive.

### **So to understand our 'divided cities' in 'contested states' we have to:**

- combine studies of states, nationalism and imperialism with urban studies, typically fields which mutually ignore rather than cooperate and inform each other;
- complement the growing literature on cities as the victims of various forms of external violence by insisting that cities also harbour internal perpetrators and internal causes;

- focus on a specific category of urban conflict (ethno-national) rather than using 'conflict' or 'violence' as chaotic concepts which lump together very different processes; but also
- recognise that there are significant overlaps between different types of urban conflict (e.g., economic, religious, racial, criminal, environmental); none are 'pure' and our ethno-national focus can both learn from and inform them.



**The Old Bridge - *Stari Most* - of Mostar, Bosnia: built by 16<sup>th</sup> century Ottomans, shelled in 1993 by Croatian forces, it was reconstructed and re-opened in 2004. An international symbol for re-unifying mainly Muslim Bosniak east Mostar (to the left) with predominantly Catholic Croat west Mostar, but local attitudes to it still differ. And the real line of division is the former 'ceasefire line' running a little to the west of the river.**

#### **Four main challenges (Anderson 2011 A):**

1. How to make valid generalisations across 'divided' cities and territories with different cultures and development, in different regions and time periods (instead of assuming incommensurability - see Robinson 2010)? The category 'ethno-nationally divided' is historically fluid with individual cities moving into and (sometimes) out of it. Danzig (Gdansk), Trieste and Helsinki (see Hepburn 2004) were once ethno-nationally disputed but no longer; while currently the Chinese government is creating 'divided' cities on the western edges of its empire in Tibet and Xinjiang (see Pannell 2011). Other so-called 'normal' or 'unified' cities could become 'divided' in the future because of changes in surrounding imperial, state or national claims. Given the wide range of contexts, the analysis will have to be at a fairly high level of abstraction or generality, though with a compensatory need for detailed examples.

2. 'Divided' cities are usually contrasted, explicitly or implicitly, with 'normal' cities. 'Normality' is typically the hope of beleaguered citizens. 'Normal' often refers to processes typical of cities in general (e.g., (sub-)urbanisation, (de-)industrialisation, property (re-)development). They are sometimes forgotten in 'divided' cities with everything 'blamed on the conflict' (Anderson and Shuttlesworth 1998), but some of the most interesting - and conflict-shaping - aspects of divided cities involve interactions between conflict factors and these 'normal' urban processes. However, urban normality also includes all the problems and conflicts of 'normal' cities, and indeed many of these get *worse* as *the* conflict (over statehood) ameliorates. So the concept of 'normal city' is both unavoidable and problematical. It cannot mean simply the absence of violent conflict, often mis-named as 'post-conflict': not all ethno-national conflicts are violent; conflict continues after its violent stages; conflict more generally can be considered inherent to the urban - indeed human - condition. We need more careful specifications, and abstractions which allow a more systemic differentiation between 'normal' and 'divided' cities. One approach focuses on changing state-city relationships, the uneven (often limited, sometimes partly reversed) developmental trajectories of capitalism and nationalism (Anderson 2011 B), and the complex interactions (rather than a simple opposition) between nationalisms and imperialisms (Anderson and O'Dowd 2007). Cities as primarily economic and cultural centres, securely embedded in stable national states and thereby partially 'de-politicised', became a modern capitalist 'norm'; but our 'divided' ones are highly politicised and insecurely located in nationally contested territories (though interestingly they are not the only exceptions). Uneven capitalist and nationalist trajectories will also help meet our first challenge because all our varied cases and contexts have been partly shaped by capitalism and by nationalism.
3. Are ethno-nationally divided cities simply exceptions, locally important (in a Belfast, Brussels or Jerusalem) but really a declining category, 'historical relics', left-overs on the way out, even if it takes time? Or, historically fluid, have they substantial potential for growth as current global turbulence, or developments in central Asia, might suggest? Alternatively, in radically differing from the conventional (primarily Western) norm of 'partially de-politicised' cities, might our 'divided' ones have growing relevance for understanding the increasingly fragmented, territorialised and exclusionary character of contemporary urbanism - and not only in the Global South but also within supposedly 'normal' Western cities (see Alsayyad and Roy 2006). Are 'divided' cities the harbingers of a more general urban future?
4. Back to the present. The question how cities are shaped by ethno-national conflicts is less difficult to answer than the reciprocal question: how have the conflicts been shaped by the cities? 'Not much' or 'not at all' is after all the answer implicit in the usual separation of literatures and studies of ethno-national conflict which blithely deny cities any causal significance. That is perhaps our biggest challenge. More specifically, under what conditions can cities reduce conflict and encourage resolution?

## **Book Structure - brief outlines of the five main sections:**

### **I. DIVIDED CITIES in CONTESTED TERRITORIES**

To establish what has to be explained, we describe demographic patterns and discourses to trace different relations between cities and territories and different ways in which the cities are 'divided', spatially and otherwise (McEldowney, Anderson and Shuttleworth 2010). It provides an overview of the developments of capitalism and nationalism which underlie formal empires becoming informal (Section II)(Anderson 2008; 2012A); the nature of state territoriality and democracy (Section III) (Anderson 2010; 2012B); and the contrasts between the political territorialising and the economic structuring of urban spaces which underlie differences between 'divided' and so-called 'normal' cities (Sections IV) (Anderson 2011).

### **II. CITY, EMPIRE and IMPERIALISM**

Most if not all ethno-nationally divided cities originated at the edges of empire. Here the formal but often insecure imperial powers had usually politicised traditional, *pre*-national and often competing ethnic identities, most typically ones based on religion, and some were transformed into competing nationalisms (Anderson 2008). Our category of city, including the oldest case Belfast, thus post-dates the general arrival of nationalist politics with the French Revolution; and also comes after the arrival of industrial capitalism with the Industrial Revolution. Today the informal empires of 'great powers' remain a decisive factor.

### **III. CITY, NATION and NATIONALISM**

Imperialism-nationalism interactions (Anderson and O'Dowd 2007) have been crucial in state and nation-building, and in shaping ethno-national conflict where these processes have been contested, incomplete, or partial failures. Consequently, imperial and national state policies are often *ethnocratic* rather than democratic, biased in favour of one ethnic group (Yiftachel 2006; Anderson 2013). Conflicts are shaped by the origins and character of the nationalisms and their ideological legitimations, and by related ethnic identities of language or religion which may be 'forces in their own right' rather than simply national 'markers'. All may increase or decrease the severity of conflict.


### **IV. URBAN SPACES and CITY LIFE**

The international and national dimensions of conflict become 'internalised' materially and symbolically in urban spaces – in the internal, infrastructural, physical and social structures of the cities and the everyday lives of the citizens; and also in the 'network spaces' of city-to-city linkages. They are manifested for instance in how the political, conflict-related territorialising of the city differs from more 'normal' capitalist market-structuring; and especially in how they combine and interact to shape the city. As already suggested, what is really interesting (and potentially conflict-ameliorating rather than intensifying) about ethno-national conflict in cities is not so much the conflict or the location *per se* as the conflict interacting with all the 'normal'

urban processes - (sub-)urbanisation, (de-)industrialisation, property (re-)development, etc. It can be seen in demography (picking up on the Section I discussion though now in explanatory rather than descriptive vein): for example, different forms and degrees of *spatial* segregation and mixing (e.g., in housing areas, workplaces, leisure facilities, public spaces) reflect and affect the *social* and *political* relations between groups; and (sub-)urbanisation has differential effects on the 'demographic balance' of particular areas, and hence affect and the scope and limits of ethnocratic policies. (Anderson 2013).

## V. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The reasons causing ethno-national conflict in the cities, already discussed, can be 'turned around' into factors to reduce and end the conflict. We've seen grounds for optimism in the material opportunities and active pressures for inter-ethnic cooperation in cities. There are urban re-development and re-branding strategies for 'divided' cities which rely on general cultural or economic objectives trumping the political ones of ethno-nationalism (O'Dowd 2010; O'Dowd and Komarova 2009 and 2010). And there are more general strategies of conflict management and resolution which have specifically urban dimensions; and ones not specifically 'urban' but constituting the crucial context for what happens (or doesn't happen) in the cities (Anderson 2008; Komarova 2008; O'Dowd 2009). Here too we need to remember all three levels, for whether specific urban factors exacerbate or ameliorate conflict often crucially depends on national and international factors. The conflict is about the wider national territory and 'greater powers' generally have stakes in the outcome. But the city is typically at the 'sharp end' of the conflict, and if not moderated or resolved in the city it's unlikely to be moderated or resolved at all.



**The *Peace Bridge* in Derry-Londonderry: 'Derry' to Irish nationalists, 'Londonderry' to unionists, verbalised as 'Derry-stroke-Londonderry' (a local wit shortening it to 'Stroke City'!) The new (2011) footbridge is a symbol to re-unify the mainly Catholic and nationalist west bank (to the right) with the east bank Waterside where most of the city's Protestants and unionists now live. Costing over £15 million, it improves the city's image, but its grass-roots unification impact remains to be seen.**

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## *J1.4 Borders, Mobility and Spatial Studies*

### **The spatial qualities of contested cities** **Wendy Pullan**

#### **Introduction**

This is an extensive topic that focuses on module *J1.4 Borders, Mobility and Spatial Studies*, but also contributes to modules *J1.3 Landscape and Environment of Conflict* and *J3 Agonistic Urbanism*. The research began with investigations on the changing spatial forms of Jerusalem in CinC 1 and 2 and these extended into a number of studies on frontier urbanism, spatial discontinuities and conflict infrastructures in CinC 3. The effects of the separation barrier (wall) have played a role in Jerusalem, but more than the wall, the configuration of settlements and the segregated road systems are key to understanding the city as it is today. Stage two of the research has involved the extension of the lessons learned in Jerusalem into broader thinking which applies to other cities that are subject to ethno-national and religious conflict. While questions of division and separation, public space, physical infrastructures and mobility regimes are ongoing themes, one overall cluster of questions has motivated the research: are cities that experience extreme levels of conflict qualitatively different than other 'normal' cities, or are they simply more extreme? To what extent can a better understanding of their spatialities contribute to addressing this question? As every city experiences some aspects of urban conflict, will a better understanding of heavily contested cities reveal certain key qualities of urban centres today?

#### **Research questions**

The research focuses on the physical impacts of urban conflict, firstly considering the role of the arsenal of conflict infrastructures – walls, fences, borders, checkpoints, buffer zones, compounds, mobility regimes, etc – that dominate many contested cities. Secondly, it considers these spatially, distinguishing between territorial domains, which focus primarily on borders, sovereignty and exclusion, and spatial topographies which are concerned with location, orientation and situation. Thirdly, temporal issues are brought into question, first of all in terms of change and longevity so, for example, the case of the Berlin wall which was demolished and its path quickly obliterated by the privatisation of most holdings, raises significant questions. And perhaps more significantly, the larger problem of whether temporality has so much come to dominate contemporary understandings of space that mobility and mobility regimes are now the key factor in the space of contested cities.

#### **Key findings**

1. Even with widespread virtual controls and electronic surveillance, where boundaries can be said to be 'molecularised', physical means remain prevalent and have serious impacts upon urban space. This may result in different visible procedures: policies of spatial contiguity and privileged mobility and at the same time of strategic confusion; the physical form of the infrastructure may take on iconic qualities that come to dominate their cities so that even a city with great historical and religious significance, like Jerusalem, may be overwhelmed by its

- wall; and relatively archaic physical means may be left in place as symbols of division and control.
2. 'Divided cities' as a term is increasingly problematic as many of the spatial configurations are far more complex and less static than this term would imply; complex fragmentation where spatial, political and social factors intermingle and overlap in many different ways is increasingly the norm.
  3. The borders of states may, in many cases, have moved into the centre of cities. We must increasingly find ways of making sense of these cities; it is a mistake to think of cities as small states and to see the new urban borders primarily in terms of sovereignty. Rather, issues of spatial order and urban praxis need to be addressed.
  4. I have coined the term 'frontier urbanism' to explain a situation where civilian groups (rather than military) confront each other and are supported by urban spatial features and infrastructures. Far from being restricted to the margins of cities, such frontiers become embedded in the centres, in a variety of ways, many of which are enduring.
  5. Cities that are divided by hard barriers and imposed boundaries do not flourish, and once these are imposed, they are almost impossible to remove. Even if the barriers are removed, much damage may have been done to the populations involved; people tend to vilify the 'other' on the far side of the barrier.

### **Related Outputs:**

The research is mostly reflected in the outputs listed below, both published, forthcoming, and still in the writing stages. The thinking will also be essential to my book *Urban Agonistes*.

Wendy Pullan, 'Contested Mobilities and the Spatial Topography of Jerusalem' in *Contested Spaces: Cultural Representations and Histories of Conflict*, eds., Louise Purbrick, Jim Aulich and Graham Dawson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 49-73.

Mick Dumper, Wendy Pullan, 'Jerusalem. The Cost of Failure', Chatham House Briefing Paper (London: Chatham House, 2010) 1-16; [www.chathamhouse.org.uk](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk)

Wendy Pullan, 'Frontier urbanism: The periphery at the centre of contested cities', *The Journal of Architecture*, 16.1 (2011), 15-35.

Wendy Pullan, 'Strategic Confusion: Conflict infrastructures in Israel-Palestine', in 'Walled Cities? Walled States? Fifty years after the building of the Berlin Wall', ed., Karen Till, in *Political Geography* (forthcoming 2013).

Wendy Pullan, 'Spatial Discontinuities in Contested Cities', in *Locating Urban Conflicts. Ethnicity, Nationalism, Religion*, Wendy Pullan, Britt Baillie, eds., (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2013).

Wendy Pullan, 'Conflict's Tools. Borders, boundaries and mobility in Jerusalem's spatial structures', *Mobilities* 8.1 (forthcoming 2013).

Wendy Pullan, 'The migration of frontiers. Ethno-national conflicts and contested cities', in *Nationalism, Ethnicity and Boundaries*, eds. Jennifer Jackson and Lina Molokotos-Liederman (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming)

## RESEARCH REPORT: Module J.4.2 - JERUSALEM Book in Progress 2012

Mick Dumper

Working Titles:

*The Endless City: Jerusalem and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*

*Jerusalem and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Many-Bordered City.*

*Heaven on Earth? Jerusalem and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict*

### Introduction

This will be my third book on Jerusalem and the need for another to accompany my first two needs some explanation. I have three reasons for wishing to write another study of the city. First, events in Jerusalem move rapidly and it is already ten years since Klein brought out his book - the last significant and sole-authored overall study of the city. The city study of the city is in urgent need of an update, particularly in the light of the impasse in the negotiations between the two sides. What would be useful to policy-makers, researchers, students, the media and activists is a kind of stocktaking exercise which outlines the main directions of travel and the likely obstacles in the way.

A second reason is this project: *Conflict in Cities and the Contested State*. A particular feature of the project is that it is interdisciplinary and insights, drawn from theoretical frameworks and methodologies that are quite different from mine as a political scientist, have opened my eyes to new approaches to and new relationships between the sets of empirical data. For example, my understanding of the separation Wall bisecting Jerusalem was quite conventional. But I now realise that in studying the barrier, what is also important to focus on is the enforced re-orientation of the daily life of the inhabitants in the vicinity away from the barrier. The barrier or wall may be temporary, but the roads and new institutions will lead to lasting changes as people build their lives around it. It has changed by perspective on Jerusalem and has enriched my understanding of the complex dynamics in the city.

Third reason is that I wish to develop and explore a new argument which I believe will contribute to the rational debate over the city's future.

### Main Argument

The main argument of this book will be that Jerusalem is what can be termed as "a many-bordered city". My contention is that the examination of the formal political borders will not reveal the full dynamics of power and control in the city and that a more nuanced approach of disaggregating the functional, political and social borders is required. For example, the Israeli checkpoints, which used to ring the access and egress points to the city and which are now supplemented by the Wall, constitute a security border as impermeable as any international frontier. However, its lack of congruence the political border declared by Israel in 1967 or the provision of municipal services has left many areas of occupied East



- the role of external actors in the history and the future plans for Jerusalem. Examining the role of these external actors at their different levels of operation will both contextualise their engagement but also allow us to evaluate their impact and effectiveness in conflict resolution.

## Outline of chapters

### Chapter One: *Introduction:*

Expansion of above but to also include a discussion on terminology and key concepts such as “hard” and “soft” borders, territoriality, power, sovereignty and control.

### Chapter Two: *Hard and visible borders of the city.*

It will take as its starting point the Wall and examine the debates around its impact on the hinterland and the positive and negative results that have flowed from its construction in both urban and political terms. In order to explain the construction of the Wall, the chapter will then examine the expansion of the city’s borders from 1948, and its establishment of the national capital of the Israeli state, through to the dramatic growth of the city after 1967. The main focus will be the tension between the attempt by the Israeli government to assert its political control over the new borders and its inability to consolidate a hegemonic presence, in a Gramscian sense, in the eastern part of the city.

### Chapter Three: *Soft and invisible borders.*

This chapter will focus on the impact of Israeli development policies on the urban fabric of the city. The main result has been a deep fragmentation of the city and the creation of enclaves. The chapter explores the main features of these enclaves which it argues are more resilient than may initially appear. Electoral voting patterns and the provision of education are taken as case studies

### Chapter Four: *Scattered borders and sovereignties*

This chapter explores the role of the holy places on the politics and urban development of the city. It forms a discrete case study of the many-borders thesis in that it highlights how the religious sites of city have created semi-autonomous enclaves in the city and thus placing restrictions on the exercise of state sovereignty. While this is an argument which has been touched on in my previous books, this chapter will present new research that focuses on how such restrictions on state power have opened up a highly contested political space in which religious groups are competing for control.

#### Chapter Four: *Constraints on Sovereignty: External Actors*

There are very few other cities in the world where the international community, especially US, UN, EU and the Arab and Islamic world, have demonstrated such an interest in how a city is governed. While ostensibly playing the role of facilitators, these important actors are in many ways competing with each other and with the main protagonists, the Israeli government and the PLO, in attempting to frame the agenda for discussing the city's future and its borders. The focus of this chapter will be on the diplomatic manoeuvring that has taken place since 2000 with an emphasis placed on discussion concerning the relevance of previously internationally agreed borders and armistice lines. Debates concerning the re-locating of the US Embassy, the controversial recommendations of the EU Heads of Mission Reports on Jerusalem, the work of UN bodies such as UNESCO's "reinforced monitoring mechanism" and the role of the Organization of Islamic Conferences all reveal the engagement of these actors in the minutiae of the configurations of the city.

#### Chapter Six: *Towards an Open or a Divided city?*

The concluding chapter will analyse developments in political negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians since 1993 in the light of the research presented above. It will include a dissection of the various proposals mooted at both the formal peace negotiations but to link these political discussions to a detailed knowledge of the impact they will have on the ground. The chapter closes by attempting to peer over the horizon, so to speak, in order to sketch out in the light of the analysis above the likely contours of, on one hand, a durable political agreement over the city, and, on the other, of the likely consequences if such an agreement is not reached.

Work to be done:

Most of the data has been collated and four chapters have been drafted, but I need to re-write sections so that my argument is woven more into the structure and also so that I am more consistent in my definitions and use of certain terms. Two more chapters need to be completed, i.e. approximately 30,000 words left. The target date for submission is October 2012. If I take out August for vacation, that is roughly 10,000 words a month, 2000 a week, five hundred a day. Wish me luck!



# CONFLICT IN CITIES AND THE CONTESTED STATE

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Wendy Pullan and Britt Baillie-Warren (eds.) **Locating Urban Conflicts: Ethnicity, Nationalism, Religion** (London: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2013)

## 1. AIMS AND SCOPE

Cities have emerged as the epicentres for many of today's ethno-national and religious conflicts. In twelve multidisciplinary essays, 'Conflict Centres' brings together key themes that dominate our current political, social and cultural attention: emerging areas of contestation in rapidly changing and modernising cities, the resulting forms of habitation and spatial practice, and the effects of extreme and/or enduring conflicts upon ordinary civilian life. Such problems may be generated by larger state and regional issues to do with national identity, borders and territory, but in all cases, everyday life is regularly affected, with strong consequences for the urban arena. Whilst the geopolitics and policy implications of conflict conditions have been well-studied, the role of cities and civic life is less well understood.

With research on Jerusalem, Belfast, Berlin, Guben/Gubin, Ceuta, Odessa, Nicosia, Beirut, Vukovar, Hebron, Beersheva and Jaffa, the essays in this book allow readers to explore these themes across a series of contemporary and historic European and Middle Eastern contexts. The primary relationships are urban and national, yet the place of city centres in transnational settings has become significant, particularly where Europe and the Middle East both overlap and clash. Section themes on Spatial Horizons, Re-enacting Divisions, and Being Modern, cross-cut the broad variety of cities, and identify common concerns against which all of the examples in this volume can be considered. Together the chapters will reveal critical issues affecting ethno-national conflict in cities today.

Just as ethno-national and religious conflict will be effectively revealed through a variety of affected cities, multidisciplinary study will offer an enhanced understanding of complex urban phenomena. The proposed book will draw upon research in: urban studies, sociology, politics, geography, anthropology, history and architecture. While most of the essays are based upon contemporary and often ongoing problems, some probe the issues through a historical lens. The contributors are either native to the cities they write about or have dedicated long periods of research to their subject matter. Some of their work will offer timely insights to well-known urban crisis points; others will pursue new areas of study on cities rarely encountered in academic literature. The over-riding themes of 'Conflict Centres' form a central piece of research for the ESRC Large Grant project 'Conflict in Cities and the Contested State', of which this volume is part. Many of the essays are based upon a project conference held in Jerusalem in 2010; others have been commissioned.

Like the all-encompassing notions of 'wartime' or 'peacetime', what could be referred to as 'conflict-time' takes precedence in contested cities, creating both a condition of limbo as well as a state of heightened potency. By analysing everyday strategies and reflexes, this book will offer insights into how inhabitants of contested cities survive, resist, dominate, cope, ignore and imagine their fraught existences. Most scholarship takes a top-down approach, and focuses on the role of politicians and government officials in the perpetuation or resolution of conflict. However, recent events in the cities of Tunisia and Egypt indicate other means of expression and change. In this volume, we ask who are the real players and what are the settings in which they function? With this focus on contested cities 'from the

ground up', new views of conflict situations will help to adjust our insights for understanding such challenges.

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### **3. CHAPTER SUMMARIES**

#### ***Introduction***

The introduction will establish the overall objectives and aims of the book, focusing on: the contemporary phenomenon of cities as the primary locus for ethno-national and religious conflicts; the implications of conflict in cities on the every day life of urban civilians; the need to look at urban conflict through a multidisciplinary lens that offers ample scope for both spatial and temporal investigation; and finally, the relationship between cities as centres of conflict and larger geopolitical configurations. A brief introduction to each article will be included.

#### ***Section 1: Spatial Horizons***

Various understandings of space inform our thinking about contested cities. We consider how spatial divisions and interactions underlie other modern phenomena such as globalisation, capitalism, democracy and colonialism. Here, the cross-cutting theme is how urban space is defined, shaped and/or transformed by conflict. At the same time, in which ways does space bolster or detract from one's identity, and to what extent do differences in European and Middle Eastern spatial sequences affect patterns of conflict? Borders, walls and buffer zones may characterise the cityscape and help to determine everyday life; at the same time, the notion of a horizon, as a boundary that shifts with one's perceptions and, potentially, offers infinite possibilities, reflects the fluid nature of the urban domain. Ideas and actions deriving from policy makers and ordinary citizens may interact to form conditions of occupation, insurgency, violence or resistance. The crowd, often posited as quintessentially modern, may have a special role to play in contested cities. Yet actions by individuals or small groups may also be significant. Urban planners, activists, outsiders, suicide bombers, academics, youth and the mob or crowd all can play a role in shaping the everyday life of contested cities.

#### **1. Wendy Pullan**

##### **Spatial Discontinuities in Contested Cities**

In studying cities that have experienced prolonged and intense levels of ethnic, national and/or religious conflict, a regular query arises: are these cities qualitatively different from other urban centres that are not characterised by such strife, or, rather, are they are simply extreme examples of what exists at more latent levels in all cities? A definitive answer is complex and elusive, but one fundamental way of engaging the problem is to ask what sort of spatial qualities may be attributed to cities in conflict. This article will consider some of them and their urban impacts.

Contested space is often defined by rigid boundaries that separate populations and identify homogeneous population groups so that divided cities, like Berlin was and Nicosia still is, have become quintessential prototypes of cities in conflict. The Peace Lines of Belfast and the separation barrier of Jerusalem demonstrate that such a crude articulation of the urban terrain remains a highly visible way of structuring overly politicised space. Buffer zones are

often regarded as providing less instrumental solutions, but in the long term they may actually cause more enduring and damaging urban problems. The collapse of the customary and complex reciprocity of centre and periphery seems to be restricted, and frontiers, of varying types, invade primary urban spaces where they can cause harm. We find examples of this both in the present in Jerusalem and over many years in cities like Guben/Gubin on the Polish/German border and in Nicosia. Above all, most of these damaged cities appear to suffer the breakdown of transitional and spontaneous spaces that allow a rich variety of everyday life to unfold. Diverse and well-differentiated space is prone to collapse, creating a limited and intimidating public realm.

This enquiry into key spaces in contested cities in the Middle East and Europe indicates that particular elements of spatial discontinuity and control in contested cities are specific to each city, and yet, recognisable from one city to the next. Contested cities exhibit certain deviations from the usual urban order, including, fragmentation, isolation, the over-significance of infrastructures, and radical frontiers that unexpectedly become centralised. Nonetheless, these aberrations need to be studied as part of that order, and in this way become meaningful.

## **2. Caroline Humphrey**

### **Violence and Urban Architecture: Events at the Ensemble of the Odessa Steps in 1904-5**

This chapter discusses the built structures of the port city of Odessa (Ukraine) and their relation to the revolutionary and pogrom violence in 1905. It argues against the tendency in historical and anthropological literature to see violence as the blank undifferentiated outcome of other causative 'factors' lying behind it (the political, religious, ethnic, etc. social movements that are suitable for analysis). Instead, it is suggested that urban violence is located material action that is both destructive and creative, and that it is always inflected, not least by its interrelation with architecture and city planning.

This differentiation happens in two ways, both derived from the fact that cityscapes are full of meanings to the people who live in them. Violent actions are dissimilar by virtue of the particular intentions of its actors and the discursive categories they entertain, which together produce the designation of targets and human quarry. Buildings, monuments or city locations become objectives, to be 'taken over', marked, destroyed, etc. either because they stand for hated classes of people or political ideas, or because they actually *are* what it is desired to eliminate or appropriate through looting. This is why urban violence should not be seen as 'random' and should be recognised as having meanings inseparable from its locations. For there is also a second movement of meaning, which proceeds in the opposite direction, as it were, from the arrow that points from intention to objective. In this case, because the targets always have a built structure, whatever that happens to be - looming height, full of windows, crannied alleyways, broad horizontal expanses, etc. and these features not only constrict or enable human action but are already given meaning and interpreted - their material-structural impact inevitably differentiates violent acts (in fact, any acts) and adds to them what may be unintended significance.

The city of Odessa will be used to demonstrate these points, in particular its famous giant staircase leading from the ceremonial centre down the cliff to the port on the shore. The steps were not built for a primarily utilitarian purpose, but to complement and augment the significance of the statue of its first Governor, the Duke de Richelieu, which had earlier been built standing on the cliff and looking down on the port. Depicted in toga and crown of laurels, with a vague welcoming gesture towards the sea, the Duke's statue represents the cosmopolitan hospitality of Odessa's early years. Considerable architectural cunning was employed to scale the steps such that from the top they appear foreshortened, while from the

bottom they seem lengthened and heightened. Many of the most dramatic episodes in Odessa's history took place below, above, or on this staircase. With the semicircle of classical palaces behind the Duke and further back the tall statue of Catherine the Great and her generals visible, the ensemble indeed resembles a theatrical backdrop. Representing (in both its form and its explicit meanings) the Russian Tsarist state, it is not difficult to see why this was not only a place of mass state-orchestrated ceremony but also of riot, resistance and killing.

The chapter focuses on three episodes: the arrival in the port in 1904 of the 'hero ship' Varyag from the war with Japan attended with mass celebrations on the steps; the advent of the 'revolutionary' battleship Potemkin in June 1905 and the consequent violence/massacre; and the pogroms against Jews that took place in Odessa in October the same year. Each of these events are analysed in relation to their spatial distribution and the colouring given to them by architectural structures. Unlike in the first two events, the 'objective' of the pogroms was not the Russian state but an ethnic group located in specific parts of the city, yet widely identified with resistance, revolutionary leanings, Zionism, and disloyalty. The consequent identification of 'targets' of pogroms and the different spatial distribution of violence is discussed. Attention is paid to the generalisability of the argument by means of comparison with simultaneous events ('revolution' in June, followed by pogroms in October) in Ekaterinburg, and it is shown that the locations and meaning generation processes of these different kinds of violence were similar in the two cities.

### **3. Felipe Hernandez and Max Sternberg** **Borderlands of the EU: Iconic Architecture and the Spanish Enclave of Ceuta in Morocco**

When Spain signed the Schengen agreement in 1991, Ceuta, an otherwise insignificant city, was converted into the 'external border' between the supra-national body of the EU and Morocco. This Spanish exclave has become one of the prime destinations for African migrants from sub-Saharan countries. Ceuta's border continues to harden through a heavy security infrastructure centred on the 3-meter high Ceuta Border fence, its CCTV, noise and movement sensors, associated guards and the dozens of patrol ships which seek to prevent amphibious immigration. Yet, this system is simultaneously transgressed and re-negotiated on the ground both by the regular flow of workers from neighbouring towns who benefit from visa-exemption due to bilateral agreements and the presence of 'temporary' migrants 'illegally' participating in the labour market. The very territoriality of the city itself is refuted by Morocco which claims the city—this EU land—to be part of its national space. Part 'African-Muslim', part 'European-Catholic' this city has become the first 'Spanish City' to officially celebrate Eid al-Adha since the Reconquista.

Despite the fact that Ceuta has emerged as a prime instance of the 'dark side' of the geo-political re-bordering processes of globalisation, with alarming statistics of exploitation and deaths, the contradictions of the Spanish/EU enclave have attracted remarkably little critical interest. This chapter will add to the few existing studies on Ceuta, which have focused almost exclusively on socio-economic and political aspects. The authors' contribution will draw on their architectural expertise to analyse the role of changes in the physical fabric and architectural image in relation to the border regime of the city. Taking the recently completed Centro Cultural Manzana del Revellin (by star architect Alvaro Siza) as a representative case-study, this chapter examines the way in which the production of iconic architecture is complicit with covert systems of exploitation, which perpetuate colonial hierarchies and contradict policies of international cooperation.

#### **4. Mick Dumper**

##### **Security and the Holy Places of Jerusalem: The “Hebronisation” of the Old City and Adjacent Areas**

Periodic outbreaks of violence and conflict highlight the centrality of the Holy Places of Jerusalem in both the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the stability of the city. This chapter traces the evolution of the security framework for the holy sites of the city since 1967, delineating both the formal agreements and the customary and tacit practices that have emerged. It analyses a number of key events which precipitated changes and an increased Israeli security presence: the fire in al-Aqsa mosque in 1969, the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel, the excavations leading up to the creation of the Marwani mosque under the Haram ash-Sharif and the collapse of the Mughrabi Gate ascent. The chapter then discusses these changes in the light of the broader political context such as the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the activities of the Israeli settler groups, the revived role of Jordan, demographic pressures in the Old City and the impasse in negotiations over the future of the city. In order to understand the underlying pattern of these changes, the chapter examines the changing security regime regarding the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron and probes parallels and specificities. The final section of the chapter examines the extent to which one can delineate a dynamic of increased militancy around the religious sites and questions if an enhanced Israeli security presence is leading towards a collapse of the existing security framework. This in turn might prompt the emergence of a more interventionist Israeli policy with significant implications for the future management of these sites themselves. The impact of this ‘Hebronisation’ of the security framework on the possible outcomes of the negotiations over the future of the city are probed against the background of the normal use of the mosques.

##### ***Section 2: Re-enacting Divisions***

In contested cities, the re-enactment of division and the reification of group identities play a salient role in protracting ‘conflict time’. Re-enactment is mimetic, both a repetition of commemorative acts and simultaneously a creative moment of reinterpretation. Three different forms of re-enactment are explored in this section: 1) memorialisation, 2) intergenerational transmission, 3) ideological re-enactment through political affiliation and activism. Memorialisation enables ‘intangible’ urban conflicts to be physically located in urban space. Intergenerational transmission prevents youths from transcending the divisions ‘inherited’ from their forebears. Restricted by their urban spaces and the urban realities which they have grown up in, conflict becomes (re)located with the young generation. The latter half of the section focuses on the role of political and activist groups. It questions whether they merely maintain the ideological consensus or if they enable the possibility of breaking the cycle of repetition.

#### **5. Craig Larkin**

##### **Remaking Beirut: Contesting Memory, Space and the Urban Imaginary of Lebanese Youth**

Throughout the centuries Beirut has had an endless capacity for re-invention and transformation, a consequence of migration, conquest, trade and internal conflict. The last three decades have witnessed the city centre’s violent self-destruction, its commercial resurrection and now most recently its national contestation, as oppositional political forces

have sought to mobilise mass demonstrations and occupy strategic space. While research has tended to focus on these transformative processes, the principle actors involved and the wider implications for Lebanon's post war recovery (Makdisi, 2006; Khalaf, 2006); little attention has been given as to how the next generation of Lebanese are negotiating Beirut's rehabilitation. This chapter seeks to address this lacuna, by exploring how post-war youth are imagining and spatially encountering their city. How does Beirut's rebuilt urban landscape, with its remnants of war, sites of displacement and transformed environs affect and inform identity, social interaction and perceptions of the past? How are the contradictory impulses of remembering and forgetting, erasure and recovery in the context of this post-war city experienced and interpreted by the city's youth? An examination of these themes will draw on relevant sites, such as the restored Beirut Souks, the Barakat building, a sniper stronghold scheduled to be turned into a war museum; as well as significant temporal moments such as Solidère's redevelopment timeframe, the Lebanese Independence Intifada and the Hizb'Allah led 'Tent City' protest.

The chapter argues that Beirut's central district is daily experienced and spatially encountered by Beirut's youth through a set of three recurring tensions: dislocation and liberation, spectacle and participant, pluralism and fracture. For youth who have grown up along side Beirut's reconstruction project it is the very act of transformation itself, which has raised the spectre of war and stirred debate over issues such as memory, history and architectural vision. In assembling a complex and contradictory urban imaginary of Beirut the chapter also encourages wider debate concerning post-war recovery and inclusive public space, didactic 'negative heritage', and the therapeutic value of global consumerism.

## **6. Britt Baillie-Warren**

### **Memorialising the Martyred City: Negotiating Conflict Time in Vukovar**

This chapter explores the role of 'Homeland War' memorials and exhibitions in the 'Martyred City' of Vukovar. Today, no city in Croatia has a more dense concentration of memorials to the 'Homeland War' than Vukovar. This paper asks who/what is remembered at these sites—who does the remembering—and conversely who/what is (actively) forgotten. Vukovar has transitioned out of wartime. Yet, ethnic divisions persist and tensions continue to run high. Here, a meaningful sense of peacetime remains elusive—instead the city lingers in the limbo of 'conflict-time'—a term defined not by the presence or absence of violence but rather by an on-going sense of unease and contestation. The chapter explores phenomenon of competitive victimhood which dominates Vukovars memory battles. It then unpicks the 'naturalization' of Vukovar's memorialisation and asks: do these new memorials seek to punctuate the past to provide a sense of closure; do they act as vehicles for 'reconciliation'; or do they serve as boundary markers in a contested city?

## **7. Hillel Cohen**

### **Joint Israeli-Palestinian Political Activity in Jerusalem: New Dimensions Since the 2000?**

In light of rather tense relations between Palestinians and Israeli Jews in Jerusalem, this chapter aims to describe and analyze the development of the Jerusalemite 'peace camp' and the unique joint Israeli-Palestinian struggle in the city. It is a neglected fact that despite its image as a rightwing stronghold, Jewish Jerusalem has been since the mid-1980s the centre of the Palestinian-Israeli joint struggle against occupation, and the home for most Israeli human-rights associations. Based on interviews and participant observation, the chapter follows the consolidation of the joint struggle in the early 1980s, through the first Palestinian uprising of

1987 which was the honey-moon of this cooperation, to the crisis of the Israeli left during the second Intifada of 2000-2005 -- and the revival of the joint struggle in Jerusalem in recent years. I suggest that the unique political behaviour of the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the emergence of Israeli protest group in the city have influenced each other and are in many aspects interrelated.

## **8. Amneh Badran**

### **How do Israeli (Jewish) Protest Groups Envision the Future of Jerusalem?**

In a utopian world, activists would not be required. In an optimist's world, activist groups are looked to and relied upon to keep the government's power in 'check', particularly in the context of divided cities. However, if these groups' perspectives are rooted in and share the very paradigms that the government's actions are based on—perhaps this 'activism' is little more than a legitimizing agent? Since 1967, Israeli protest groups across the political spectrum have developed various positions regarding the future of East Jerusalem. These groups treat West Jerusalem as *de facto* Israeli territory and thus exclude its future from discussion. In the framework of their visions for peace, the political platforms of Israeli protest groups encompassed a variety of views, which have not been static. This chapter investigates the political positions of liberal Zionist groups and leftist groups regarding the future of Jerusalem. It focuses on the period between 1987- 2003.

This chapter illuminates how the ideological national 'consensus' on Jerusalem, accepted by Liberal Zionist groups, has affected their political stance(s). While some (progressive) groups challenged parts of the political national consensus on a selective basis, their commitment to the ideology in power, made their message of peace, particularly on the future of Jerusalem, quite cosmetic. In addition, their stance sidelined the related message of the Leftists.

Over the years, and as the balance of power remained firmly in favour of Israel, the proposed solutions to the question of Jerusalem put forth by the majority of Israeli protest groups, continued to accommodate in many aspects their Government's positions. Most Israeli protest groups proposed 'solutions' involving various types of Palestinian self-administration over parts of occupied East Jerusalem, but not a contiguous sovereign future capital for a Palestinian state. Such proposals reflect the balance of power between the two sides and ignore the applicability and the principles of international law.

### ***Section 3: Being Modern***

Modernity is a condition that is constantly being defined and refined. If modernity is a loss of confidence that certainty can exist in the world, is the city in conflict the truest example of modernity in action? For many contested cities, being modern (or, in some cases, post-modern) is an ongoing preoccupation that intermingles with the conditions of conflict. European and Middle Eastern timelines and urban aspirations may vary in this pursuit. In cities where tradition forms a vital component in identity construction and maintenance, modernity offer opportunities for new beginnings and at the same time destroys the central values of the embattled cultures.

## **9. Salim Tamari**

### **The Triadic Modernity of Jerusalem, Jaffa and Beersheva: Ottoman Urban Planning and the Imperial Frontiers of Palestine**



This study examines Ottoman urban planning in the Jerusalem Province from the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the end of the First World War. The modernity of Ottoman Palestine was centred on a triadic relationship between Jerusalem (the capital), Jaffa (its port city), and Beersheba (the new frontier town). The relationship between these three cities defined the parameters of urban planning in Ottoman Palestine at the turn of the century.

Jerusalem received planning guidelines after the passage of the Ottoman Municipalities Law in 1877, which regulated building permits, building material and the height of buildings. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the administrative redevelopment of Jerusalem was a key aspect of the Ottoman strategy to ‘centralise’ Palestine. As a result of the institutionalisation of municipal and administrative councils, Jerusalem—a provincial city in the southern frontiers the empire –was elevated to the status of a central city in the eastern Mediterranean region.

The paper discusses the duality between the cosmopolitan coastal city of Jaffa and the administrative holy city of Jerusalem. The latter was the seat of a class of urban notables (the Husseinis, Khalidis, and Nashashibis). These families constituted the link to Istanbul as they were responsible for the generation of an agrarian surplus for the regime through the system of *iltizam*, tax farming. The privatization of communal landholdings (after the land code of 1858) led to the creation of a new class of agricultural capitalists (in grain and citrus products) whose fortunes created a new urbanscape. The expansion of the Hijazi railroad and inter-urban road networks, electrification, and the construction of public buildings consolidated the relationship between the three nodes of the Jerusalem Province.

The pivotal figure of Raghib Bey al Nashashibi, (urban planner, architect and later mayor of Jerusalem) demonstrates the continuity of the role of this Jerusalem elite in the modernization of the province from the Ottoman era into the Mandate period. This chapter argues that the British colonial authority’s claim that it was solely responsible for the modernization of Palestine must now be reconsidered.

## **10. James Anderson**

### **Demography and Ethnocracy: The ‘origins’ of national conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast**

Demography in ‘divided cities’ is interesting and revealing for two opposed sorts of reasons. Firstly, the relative numbers of the different and contending population groups, their spatial distributions, their differential birth and death rates, their migration flows whether voluntary or enforced, and the expectations or predictions about their future numbers and distributions, all shape ethnic and national conflicts and are shaped by them. Demography matters because in various ways ethno-national conflicts are *about* demography. They are partly about the numbers physically occupying and asserting ownership over particular territories; and with the advent of mass democracy they are partly about imposing rival territorial frameworks for democracy, even when undemocratic in practice. They are about the making or unmaking of electoral ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ - in short ‘the dark side of democracy’. Demography also matters because it is a measure of conflict for observers and researchers as well as for the protagonists. For example, mapping the various ways and extent to which population groups are segregated is one of the most basic and revealing ways of comparing ‘divided’ cities, though it is not without its problems and contradictions. Separation can operate at different spatial scales so that areas of the city which appear ‘mixed’ are actually segregated at the smaller scale of individual streets for instance, or localities may be ‘mixed’ because they are in the process of being ‘invaded’ or ‘taken over’ by rival groups. The social context of the demographic statistics is all-important, but there is the general contradiction that the logic of

conflict *control* or minimisation is separation, whereas conflict *resolution* requires mixing and co-operation.

However, precisely because demography is highly politicized by conflict, even quite basic statistical assessments and quantitative comparisons can in practice be difficult if not impossible. Politicization can mean that population statistics are not collected or are not made publically available because of their ‘political sensitivity’. Or if available they are unreliable, and/or they are misleadingly interpreted. All this is a serious obstacle to accurate statistical analysis and comparison. But, looked at positively, this points to the second, opposed sorts of reason why demography is revealing in ‘divided cities’. The ways in which population statistics are used and abused as material and symbolic ‘weapons’ in the conflict, what demographic information is collected and not collected, or how the population picture is distorted or obscured, are all in their own way potentially revealing about the conflict between the different groups.

This chapter discusses these general issues of demography in ethno-national conflicts and exemplifies them in a demographic comparison of Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland and their key cities of Jerusalem and Belfast. To the extent it is statistically possible, it outlines the changing population ‘balance’ of rival groups, their segregation/ mixing, and the significance attached to demographic trends in the two cities. Comparing their often very different data limitations and interpretative distortions throws further light on the respective conflicts and their relative prospects of resolution.

## **11. Allan Cochrane**

### **Re-making the Modern City: The Case of Berlin**

The local experience of Berlin in the second half of the twentieth century was largely defined by the harsh geopolitical realities of the Cold War. The global politics of a bi-polar world also created a divided city, within a divided Germany and a divided Europe. Divided Berlin was an expression of a particular modernity – the material product of competing visions of modernity. Post-1945 Berlin was very clearly the product of state based contestation, but it was a contestation between world powers (or their surrogates), rather than one driven by ethnic division. Even some of the most mundane realities of urban development (the compact city, the public transport system, the Turkish migration etc.) were rooted in the politics of world power and the divisions generated by it.

The shock of German reunification and of the end of the bi-polar world, was also a fundamental shock for the city. Exemplifying its role as a city able to speak the troubled history of the twentieth century, the jubilant media coverage of the Berlin Wall’s opening subsequently became a metaphor for that whole period of historical shift. Yet it also meant the disruption of the old arrangements, the – admittedly rather peculiar - yet taken for granted conventions of economic and social life, which had defined Berlin for its residents, economic and political actors.

At each step of the way, the processes of rebuilding and redefinition come up against the thickness of history, the obduracy of memory, and questioning from those Germans who are concerned about the re-nationalisation of German culture through sovereignty and unification. In that sense, at least, Berlin remains contested both as a state space (the space or a key space of the German state and the German nation) and as a space within which people live their daily lives. Some of the obvious divisions between East and West have been undermined since 1989, particularly as parts of the former East have become gentrified and parts of the former West have faced their own problems of unemployment, deprivation and ethnic division. The grand ambitions of the world city boosterists from the early 1990s have been replaced by the more recent recognition that (in the words of its *Bürgermeister*) what

makes Berlin the place it is, is that it is ‘arm aber sexy’ (‘poor but sexy’). This chapter considers the relationship between Berlin’s changing geopolitical position and local experiences of urban life, charting an uncertain and contested path towards a new ‘normality’.

## **12. Liam O’Dowd & Milena Komarova** **Territorialities of Capital and Place in ‘Post-conflict’ Belfast**


This chapter is concerned with the interaction between two main processes infusing urban conflicts. The first, is primarily economic and promotes material prosperity in the guise of growth in trade, investment, incomes, and consumption. It is typically represented in positive constructive terms and is often associated with a more promising and peaceful future. The second, ethno-national conflict, is primarily political and cultural and is typically portrayed as potentially violent, destructive and backward-looking. Both of these, when materialised in urban space, have their contradictory territorialities. Through an empirical focus on Belfast, as a ‘post-conflict’ but still ‘contested’ city, we probe the changing relationships between the territorialities of capital and ethno-national divisions. The re-designation of Belfast as a new capitalist city was an integral part of the Northern Ireland peace process. Its economic regeneration has been associated with rebranding it as a culturally diverse city open to trade, foreign direct investment and tourism. This ‘new’ Belfast has been envisioned as a major rupture from the city’s long history of (sometimes) violent, ethno-national division. The emergent city reflects both the new project of economic regeneration and the durability of the violently contested city

Drawing on photographs, historical accounts, contemporary documentary stories and a series of interviews with key informants and stakeholders in the urban regeneration process, we interrogate these two overarching narratives and how they are shaping contemporary Belfast. We find that they are metamorphosing into a number of distinct if overlapping narratives which inform the debate about Belfast’s present and future. These narratives are institutionalised in the various coalitions of property developers, commercial interests, planners, local politicians, government agencies, voluntary and community groups which have sought to reshape Belfast in the aftermath of the ‘Troubles’. We argue that these contemporary narratives are asymmetrical in terms of their material base, mobilising power, internal contradictions and the degree to which they engage with each other. They render the city contradictory and incoherent at the same time as they attempt to order and reshape it. We conclude by questioning the extent to which the assumptions underlying a ‘new capitalist city’ narrative have the capacity to overcome, or offer a constructive alternative to, the ‘contested city’ narrative in post-Agreement Belfast.


### **Sample of Images:**



Berlin Wall, 1971 (Wendy Pullan)




**Damascus Gate Spatial Study**  
 Palestinian commercial topography: Friday morning April 4th, 2008



Jerusalem spatial study, 2008 (Conflict in Cities)



Separation Barrier between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, 2010 (Conflict in Cities)



Nicosia's Old City, 2009:  
Greek & Turkish Cypriot Museums of National Struggle



**KEY**

	Turkish Cypriot Northern Nicosia
	Greek Cypriot Southern Nicosia
	United Nations Buffer Zone
	Border Crossing Checkpoint
	Old City Walls and Bastions

**Conflict in Cities  
and the Contested State**

supported by the ESRC  
University of Cambridge - University of Exeter - Queens University Belfast

Nicosia's Old City, 2009 (Conflict in Cities)



Public commemoration of Rafik al-Hariri's death in Beirut's Martyr's Square, 14 February 2006 (Craig Larkin)



Belfast mural, 2010 (Conflict in Cities)



## **RESISTANCE, GRAFFITI AND THE SEPARATION WALL (J1.5)**

Conflict in Cities Research Report

Craig Larkin, July 2012

### ***Introduction***

Constructed during the last 10 years (2002-2012), in the aftermath of the second Palestinian Intifada (Al-Aqsa), the Israeli Separation Barrier covers 708km, annexes 9.4% of the West Bank, integrates 80 Israeli settlements and excludes around 55,00 Palestinian Jerusalemites from their holy city. Whether a defensive security buffer or a divisive apartheid wall, the barrier has emerged as both a defining icon of Israel's on-going occupation of Palestine and a symbolic site for mobilising local and international acts of resistance. While media attention has been drawn to the popular protest movements such as the 'Stop the Wall' campaign in affected villages of Bil'in, Ni'lin and Budrus, there has been little examination of how Jerusalemite communities are developing new strategies and techniques for challenging the Wall. This research seeks to explore alternative Palestinian forms of confronting and resisting the Jerusalem barrier, particularly through graffiti, protest art, and commercial advertising. Such oppositional practices employ the wall as both a site of public contention, but also a space to be reclaimed or re-scribed through text, image and discursive narrative. While the wall continues to fragment and dislocate Palestinian communities leading to the deterioration of everyday life, it also provides a monumental surface on which to paint and critically debate these issues.

*All this graffiti that you see on the wall, even when it's not political is not an act of adjustment –it's an act of resistance!*

Al-Ram Shopkeeper, February 2011

### ***Research Questions***

The aim of the research was to explore both the nature and scope of wall interventions (graffiti, art, and commercial advertising) and situate them within the wider debate on the limits and potentiality of Palestinian resistance. A number of questions were addressed:

- First what is being communicated and in which language? (Arabic, Hebrew, English)
- Is the content primarily political critique, social commentary or internal communication? How has the content changed to reflect shifting political dynamics



and in response to specific issues (i.e. Arab Spring, Hunger strikes, Gaza blockade, BDS movement)


- How does the subject matter relate to the position along the Wall?
- Who is the intended audience and where and when are multiple audiences addressed? How can local and international interventions be distinguished?
- Who is responsible for the graffiti and protest art? Is it mainly a youth phenomenon? In what ways does it differ from the graffiti of the first Intifada?
- What do local inhabitants think of the interventions? Do they read the graffiti? Do they believe it to be an act of resistance? How do they view the Wall being used as a space for commercial advertising?
- How do these interventions inform or reflect broader trends within the Palestinian Jerusalemite community with regards to resilience and resistance?

### *Methods*

A number of methodological approaches and techniques were used over a period of two years (2010-2012). Specific sites of the wall were selected - Abu Dis, al-Ram, al-Ezariyya, and Bethlehem - and periodically observed, photographed and ethnographically surveyed. Over fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted with Palestinians from these districts directly affected by the path of the wall. The interviewees included local shop-owners, students, community leaders, teachers, civil activists, politicians, graffiti artists and other key informants.



*Bethlehem, Leila Khalid Mural, (March 2012)*



Map of Jerusalem displaying the multiple borders, boundaries and the path of the Separation barrier (Conflict in Cities©)



Majd Abdul Hamid's, *Deconstruction of Mahmoud Darwish's 'Palestinian letter of Independence'*, 2010.

## ***Key Findings***

### ▪ **The Art of Resistance**

- The Wall has become the ‘world’s largest canvas’ for oppositional protest art, global critique and local resistance. Artists from around the world have been drawn to the wall to paint murals which highlight local injustices and interconnected global struggles against imperialism, securitization and capitalist exploitation.
- Western street artists have received a mixed reception from local Palestinians. Some welcome the gesture of international solidarity, the global media coverage their murals generate, and the ‘Wall tourism’ it encourages. Others critique their artistic interventions for beautifying the Wall and obfuscating Palestinian issues with universalizing peace discourses.

*It is good that foreign tourists come to support the local people but often they write what is in their heads not exactly the thought of local Palestinians. They want the wall to fall but they don't understand the details of occupation. They fail to see the wider picture. (June 2010)*

- The most prominent criticism is levelled at the irrelevance of the visual messages given the immutability of the wall. Artistic paintings of cracks, fissures, doors and windows that offer glimpses into alternative worlds cannot dematerialise or adequately subvert the wall’s concrete reality but instead reveal the weakness and impotence of Palestinian resistance.

One student spoke of how even Banksy’s (the famous British graffiti artist) images have been Palestinized.

*Someone bricked up the window Banksy painted on the Wall. Maybe they didn't like his work, or the idea of a beautiful landscape. For me the issue is not about rejecting the view but whether it's the right time to imagine it. (Bethlehem, July 2010)*

- Western painted murals in Bethlehem also tend to focus on forms of Palestinian escape - ladders, escalators, segments of the wall falling like dominos. Palestinian paintings in Al-Ram and Al-Ezariyya mainly rely on traditional emblems of *Sumud* or steadfastness: the rooted olive tree, the sacred Al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock (Haram al-Sharif), the former keys of destroyed homes, the stone throwing youth and Naji al –Ali’s rejected but defiant refugee child, Handala.

- Among many Palestinian youth and activists, murals and graffiti provide a public space to vent their opinions and anger against the Israelis - *Take your share of our blood and leave (al-Ram)*, their own society – *Abbas's government is corrupt (al-Ram)*, and the apathy of the outside world - *Foreigner you know Shoah...But why did do you don't know Nakba?' (al-Ram)*

*Graffiti is not a solution but sometimes it is the only way to be heard – to cry out, shout, dream, fight back! (Shop-owner, Al-Ram, Sept 2010)*

- **The Dynamic Politics of the Wall**

- Important distinction between Wall graffiti from the graffiti of the first Intifada (1987-93)

(i) Graffiti during the first Intifada was an oppositional practice, which challenged Israel's claim to surveillance and control, leading to fines and imprisonment. Graffiti on the Palestinian side of the Wall is now often tolerated by Israeli military. This problematizes the issue of whether it is actually an act of resistance.

(ii) During the first Intifada graffiti emerged as a crucial medium for internal communication in a climate of censure and closure. This is no longer the case as the rise of new technology has created the possibility of an 'electronic intifada' in which protests, civil disobedience and communal resistance are organised, mobilised and transmitted to a local and global audience through websites/blogs/ twitter/ email updates/ social network sites/ and you-tube clips.

(iii) Finally the Palestinian conflict has become globalised – with the emergence of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and other groups committed to bringing the power of global solidarity to the on-the-ground struggle against Israeli colonization, under the unofficial mantra, *'We are all Palestinians.'* As one graffiti reads, *'Palestine not Nokia connects people'*; and certainly there has been a convergence of acts of resistance and a blurring of activist roles and indigenous responses.

- International interventions versus local responses

Western graffiti often invokes human rights discourses and international peace slogans: *'An eye for eye makes the world blind'* – *M. Gandhi*; *'Only Free men can Negotiate'* *N. Mandela* and *'Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere'*. Yet reposts in Arabic localise the struggle, with references to Palestinian poets and writers – Darwish, Kananafi, colloquial proverbs (Arabic is closer to the truth) and political parties and defiant declarations, such as Yasser Arafat's *'Jerusalem is ours – Deal with it whether you like it or not.'*

There is a Western propensity to both conflate the Wall with the wider Palestinian struggle thus subsuming all other Palestinian issues, concerns and historic experiences, and to simultaneously conceptualize wall resistance as part of a larger global struggle for freedom, therefore diminishing the local Palestinian voice. In both circumstances, this is evidenced by international graffiti which largely ignores Palestinian political agency but instead focuses on calling Israel and its US backers to moral and legal account.

- The Palestinian politics of the Wall are not just limited to confronting the wall but reflect on existential national themes (Nakba, Right of return, Jerusalem) and contemporary pressing issues (The Arab Spring – *Revolutions have started here and will continue until...*)

Defiance and resistance is mediated through the discourses of the dominant Palestinian political parties – ‘Fatah is everywhere/ Fatah is the key to resistance’; ‘ Hamas - The Glory and honour of our dear martyrs’

Sprayed political slogans and emblems affirm local support and territorial boundaries, seeking to tie communal resistance to political mobilisation and victory. Yet they also reveal the complexities and tensions within contemporary Palestinian politics with some graffiti critiquing the PA leadership; others condemning peace negotiations - ‘*No for negotiations with the continuation of occupation and judiazation procedures*’ (DFLP); some imploring a new uprising ‘*Yalla, Yalla, Intifada*’ and many demanding ‘*Yes to National Unity.*’

The wall functions as a memorial repository, a place to inscribe and commemorate loss and survival, to inform the world and remind future generations of Palestinians. Yet Palestinian graffiti also highlights immediate and local struggles that consume Jerusalem, such as the battle to protect the neighbourhood of Silwan against Israeli settler encroachment through Elad’s ‘City of David’ heritage park. Free Palestine is mirrored in places with Free Silwan. Attention is also given to liberating political prisoners, stopping house demolitions, ending peace negotiations, and joining the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign.

- **Commercial resistance: ‘Wall for sale’**
  - An increasingly visible and creative means of subverting the wall is its use as a space for commercial advertising - both of local businesses and also global marketing.
  - In formerly thriving commercial centres such as al-Ezariyya or al-Ram, marginalised by the route of the Wall, shop-owners use the wall to promote products and prices (carwashes and supermarkets), services are advertised (wedding caterers and

construction hire) and posters and billboards are fixed and bracketed highlighting beauty salons, furniture shops, musical concerts, and restaurants.

- Local inhabitants hold conflicting opinions on the practice – some condemn the commercial exploitation and the sanitising of the space, others worry that it simply normalises their brutal exclusion from Jerusalem. Local business owners are more pragmatic and stress the need to adapt and get on with life.

*Advertising [On the Wall] is only a natural response – how can we say this is right or wrong, it doesn't matter about positions, it's about the reality of life. The wall is there and people use it for everyday functions; nothing remains static.' (Student Activist, Feb 2011)*

- One shop-keeper in Al-Ezariyya, observes a shift in the communal attitude from initial defiance to tacit acceptance: *'At the beginning slogans were about resistance and defying Israel, then people started to use it like any other wall. They put up political posters, death notices, and advertisements. It feels wrong to have messages like 'The Wall Must Fall' next to taxi numbers – but I suppose life has to go on.'* (Feb 2011)
- Finally the wall has also become an iconic global message board; a medium for international greetings and solidarity support, and a symbolic backdrop to advertise websites (Australian Jewellers support Palestine - [ejeweller.com.au](http://ejeweller.com.au)), publicise humanitarian blogs ('this wall is a symbol of human failure - [Lifeisbrutallyunfair.com](http://Lifeisbrutallyunfair.com)') and promote international events (Toronto Palestinian Film Festival, November 2008).
- One Palestinian initiative, Sendmeamessage, (2005-2010) was created to enable anyone to post a message on the wall via an internet site. The 'you pay, we spray' project, entailed a 30 euro donation, used to support grassroots charities, and involved local volunteers spraying the received personal messages on the wall and then sending the recipient three digital images of the graffiti.

In the words of one of its founders, *'The focus of the project was marketing Palestine globally; to present the Palestinian struggle to the world using creative and new forms.'*

Questions remain whether such projects help market the Palestinian struggle globally or simply provide space and agency for international voices to inscribe their own meaning on the Wall. Such projects reflect growing disenchantment with local activism and political actors and a concerted emphasis on raising international awareness and building solidarity links through global media.

## ***Conclusions: a shifting form of resistance***

When the Wall was being built in Jerusalem we went to protests in Abu Dis and Al-Ram. We thought maybe we could change something. But now we feel defeated there is no point going to these protests, we have too much to lose...What does resistance mean these days, I'll tell you what it means- survival. Being willing to stay and not leave for Ramallah or another country that's the greatest act of resistance (*Sumud*) for East Jerusalemites.

Rami, Shop-owner, Sheikh Jarrah, June 2010

- Amongst Palestinian Jerusalemites Wall graffiti and art is treated with ambivalence and indifference. While some laud its importance in globalising the Palestinian cause, others warn of the danger of losing a distinct local voice. Conservative and traditional segments of society tend to dismiss graffiti tags, posters and advertisements as trivialising and normalising the monstrous concrete intrusion, yet disillusioned youth point to the graffiti's importance in claiming a presence, expressing their existence, and venting their anger.
- What emerges from the cacophony of opinions is a deeper debate over the very nature and limitation of resistance within Jerusalem. Few Jerusalem ID holders currently believe there is any prospect of meaningful political opposition within the city or indeed is there an appetite for *Muqawama sha'biya* (popular resistance). Instead they prefer to emphasize the importance of personal *Sumud*, remaining steadfast and persistent in the face of difficult circumstances.
- *Sumud* is being renegotiated away from a political/national mode of resistance towards a struggle for urban and civil rights within the context of Jerusalem. Some fear this is a move towards normalisation – but Palestinian Jerusalemites may be presently more concerned with their state of life, than the state they live in.
- Wall graffiti, protest art, commercial advertising and conflict tourism reflect new trajectories of Palestinian resistance - strategies of survival - which challenge Israeli hegemony over the city.

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### ***J1.3 Landscape and the Environment of Conflict***

**Dr. Britt Baillie-Warren**



Figure 1: Tree uprooted in Walaja to allow the construction of the separation barrier. Eventually, the 'Wall' will completely encircle this village cutting off the villagers from their farmland, a source of income, work in Jerusalem, etc. Baillie-Warren 2010.

### **Introduction**

The battle for land(scape) and territorial control is a key element in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the 'struggle for Jerusalem'. The separation barrier around Jerusalem will cut the city off from its hinterland for the first time in history. This will radically alter and curtail the metropolitan area and population that the city will serve. In addition, the construction of the 'Wall' threatens the ability for Jerusalem to serve as a capital of a future Palestinian state and further reduces the amount of territory available to such a state. The research for this module began with investigations examining the impact of the separation barrier and landscape conservation strategies on the Refaim Valley in Southern Jerusalem. This has extended into broader landscape studies which look at the long term impacts of roads, settlements and 'security' infrastructure on Jerusalem's increasingly fractured hinterland.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pullan, W. (forthcoming 2013) 'Spatial Discontinuities in Contested Cities', in W. Pullan & B. Baillie-Warren (eds.) *Locating Urban Conflicts: Ethnicity, Nationalism, Religion* (London: Palgrave MacMillan).



The research to date has focused on the impact of the 'Wall' on the archaeologically rich and environmentally sensitive Refaim Valley—'the bread basket of Jerusalem'. Here environmental and heritage discourses are being used to legitimize the transformation of the valley from a Palestinian agricultural resource to an Israeli 'Biblical landscape' conservation area. This extended Israeli National Park in the valley will be linked into a 1,500 hectare 'Jerusalem Ring' Metropolitan park. The planned route of the 'Wall' not only cuts off local farmers from large swathes of their land, it also severs nine Palestinian communities (c. 22,000 inhabitants) from services and employment in the city. This research also examines the Palestinian cooption of the 'preservationist' discourse, through UNESCO Palestine's Battir Cultural Landscape Project, as a strategy of resistance.

### **Research Questions**

- What is the impact of the separation barrier on the landscape and environment of Jerusalem?
- What is the impact of bypass roads, settlements and other forms of 'conflict infrastructure' on the landscape of Jerusalem?
- How and why is Jerusalem being landscaped?
- Why are there both Palestinian and Israeli proposals to preserve parts of the Refaim Valley as a National Park/World Heritage site? How and why are the proposals different? What impact would these proposals have on the definition of Jerusalem's boundaries?

### **Research Design**

The above questions were addressed through: a) an analysis of the impact of the separation barrier on Walaja and Southern Jerusalem, b) a comparative study of the Israeli National Parks Association and UNESCO Palestine's proposed plans for the Refaim Valley.

### **Methods**

- Semi-structured interviews were carried out with local residents, their legal representatives, planners, Cremisan Monastery monks, NGOs, Israeli National Parks Association (INPA), the Society for the Protection on Nature Israel, Jewish National Fund, UNESCO Palestine, etc.

- A comparative analysis of the INPA and UNESCO Palestine proposals for the Refaim Valley.
- Photography was used as a means to capture the impact of shifting boundaries on the area. The 'abandoned' and 'new' villages of Walaja, the Ora and Aminadav Moshavs, the village of Battir, the railway line, bypass roads, agricultural terraces, Har Gilo settlement and other surrounding areas were all extensively photographed during fieldwork.
- Maps of Southern Jerusalem (Mandate, Israeli, Palestinian) were compared to track the changes in the area over time. The visual evidence collected led to a series of maps produced by Nadera Karkaby and Lefkos Kyriacou.

## **Key Findings**

### *General*

- The erection of the barrier has inflamed Israeli/Palestinian tensions in the area.
- The 'Wall' has forced Palestinians living in this area to seek work outside of Jerusalem often resulting in large decreases in income levels.
- Being severed from Jerusalem has meant that Palestinian communities have had to shift their 'centre of life' to Bethlehem.
- The planned route of the 'Wall' has left Palestinian villages outside whilst placing large swathes of what was once Palestinian farming land 'inside' Israeli controlled Jerusalem to enable the future expansion of Israeli residential areas.
- Landscape preservation is usually seen as a benevolent process and in conflict/post-conflict scenarios it is often put forth as a vehicle for 'healing' traumatized and divided communities. However, it can also become a continuation of war by other means.

- Israelis and Palestinians follow two vastly different approaches to landscape preservation as outlined in the table below:

Israeli Authorized Heritage Discourse <sup>2</sup>	Palestinian Living Heritage Approach
'Safely dead' heritage separated from present by the advent of modernity	Heritage retains strong spiritual, community meaning
<b>Creates relic cultural landscapes in UNESCO parlance</b>	<b>Maintains continuous cultural landscapes in UNESCO parlance</b>
Top down/expert driven/'scientific'	Bottom up/ community driven, 'lay' expert driven
Object centred	People centred
Heritage is a static embodiment of culture, tangible, grand.	Heritage is in flux, intangible, 'everyday'.
Heritage is a 'consumable' product.	Heritage is a medium/process through which identity, society and power are reproduced
Values are 'universal' e.g. Western/colonial.	Values are local, context specific.

### *Refaim Valley*

- The landscaping of the Refaim Valley, through the construction of the separation barrier, the extension of the National Park boundaries, and the expulsion of Palestinian residents has enabled Israel to excise the maximum amount of land from the West Bank whilst simultaneously radically altering the demography of the area through the insertion of ultra-Orthodox settlements.
- The bypass roads in the area further suture the settlements and the Etzion Bloc into the body politic of Israel.
- The construction of the separation barrier seriously damages the visual integrity of

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<sup>2</sup> Smith, L. 2006. *Uses of Heritage*. London: Routledge.

the landscape which the Israeli National Park is seeking to 'protect'.

- By ceasing farming activities on the agricultural terraces which are being incorporated into the park, the INPA is not only depriving Walaja's Palestinian farmers of their property and a source of income, they are also putting the very fabric of the terraces at risk. Without active maintenance by farmers the integrity of these terraces will rapidly decline, thereby radically altering the nature of a landscape which has been continuously farmed for over 3000 years.



Figure 2: The separation barrier under construction between Walaja and Har Gilo. The barrier is a visual blight on this scenic landscape which the INPA seeks to protect. Baillie-Warren 2010.

## Outputs

1. Baillie-Warren, B.W. (2011) 'Vanishing Walaja: Changing Landscape in South Jerusalem'. CinC photo essay soon to be made available on-line.
2. Baillie-Warren, B. & W. Pullan, (forthcoming) 'Landscaping Jerusalem: the politics of proposed cultural landscapes on the edge of the Etzion Bloc'. Target: Conflict in Cities working papers series and journal article
3. Baillie-Warren, B. & W. Pullan (forthcoming) 'Fragmented hinterland: the impact of the separation barrier and conflict infrastructure of the future of Jerusalem'. Target: Conflict in Cities working papers series and journal article

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## Public Space in Belfast City Centre and Belfast's 'Peacelines' and Interface Areas Young People's Experiences and Perspectives



### Introduction

This research explored with young people their perceptions and experiences of growing up in Belfast; their understandings of the divisions, physical and symbolic, that they feel exist in the 'post conflict' city and the ways in which they (re)produce, negotiate or challenge these in their everyday lives.

### Research Questions

- What are young people's experiences and perspectives on change (structural and attitudinal) in the city?
- How significant are ethno-national divisions in their everyday lives?
- How do young people relate to, occupy, manage, and cross space in Belfast?
- How do their localised everyday micro-geographies differ from adults in politically contested cities such as Belfast?
- Can these differences shed light on the saliency or disruption of wider socio-political processes around territory and boundaries?

### Research Design

In addressing the above questions the study focused on young people who were 14/15 years of age, attended school in Belfast and, predominately, lived in the city. The reasons for this were:

- Young people's negotiations of divided cities and their social and spatial practices and imperatives are likely to differ from adults because of their more immediate use of public space.
- Teenagers in this age group were not directly involved in 'The Troubles' yet are often associated with ongoing levels of sectarian violence. Thus, as the 'next generation' they provide an interesting lens through which to explore the continued (ir)relevance of ethno-national divisions and how these are sustained or challenged

- They provide insights into how the regenerated, rebranded, repackaged 'post conflict' city is experienced, perceived, negotiated and (re)imagined by a group whose voices are absent or peripheral.

The study also worked, primarily in an advisory capacity, with two groups of young people (Belfast City Council Youth Forum and a Scout Group). Both were important in shaping and refining the main research tools and provided insights into being a teenager in Belfast.

## Methods

- **Questionnaire:**
  - Pupils from 20 schools in Belfast chosen to reflect gender, religion and class.
  - 442 young people completed the questionnaires.
  - 7 sections:
    - Perceptions of safety in local neighbourhoods and attitudes toward police.
    - Usage of mobile phones/internet – including potential of internet to encourage dialogue between Catholic and Protestant teenagers.
    - Knowledge of and views on 'The Troubles' including attitudes to peace walls and territorial marking of communities.
    - How young people view adults' and other teenagers' perceptions of them and the extent to which this influences spatial behaviour.
    - Perceptions around safety and risk in city centre and how city centre space is used by teenagers.
    - Involvement in sport and other leisure activities and potential of these for bringing different groups of teenagers together.
    - General attitudes to and experiences of Belfast as a divided or shared city.
  - The final page was blank and participants were asked to imagine it as a wall dividing the two communities upon which they could draw or write messages for the other community to see. The opening illustration presents three of these drawings.
- **Photo Prompts and Focus Groups**
  - 3 Catholic and 3 Protestant schools (125 pupils) located in interface areas or whose catchment included such areas.
  - Shown 11 photographs of 'old' and 'new' Belfast –
    - 2 Groups of teenagers (Hoods/Chavs/Spides and Skaters)
    - Iconic building (City Hall)
    - 2 – Festivals (St Patrick's Day and Orangefest)
    - 2 – Walls (peacewall and racist graffiti wall)
    - 2 – Murals (republican and loyalist)
  - Question sheet to gauge what each photo meant to them, particularly in relation to continuity and change - social, attitudinal and built environment
  - Followed by focus group interviews.
- **Self Directed Photographs and Follow Up Discussion**
- **City Centre Walkabout and Bus Tour with Itinerary Set by the Young People**
  - Participants - members of Belfast City Council Youth Forum advisory group.
  - Focus – everyday teenage life in Belfast

## Key Findings

- **The Troubles and Peacelines**

Do You Feel The Troubles Are Over?		
	Protestant %	Catholic %
YES	9% (3%)*	19% (12%)*
NO	54% (66%)*	40% (29%)*
HOPE SO	37% (31%)*	41% (59%)*

What is a Reasonable Time for the Peacewalls to Come Down?		
	Protestant	Catholic
RIGHT AWAY	8% (11%)	13% (7%)
2 – 5 YEARS	38% (22%)	37% (49%)
10 YEARS	21% (26%)	29% (18%)
NEVER	32% (41%)	21% (26%)

(Responses are split between 6 focus group schools (%)\* and 14 other schools)

- Questionnaire and qualitative focus group responses indicate that these ‘post conflict’ young people remain cautious, with Protestant young people being less optimistic than their Catholic counterparts.
- Young people draw upon contradictory narratives when discussing the significance of ethno-national concerns. While most comment on how ‘things have changed’ many also indicate through their spatial practices or attitudes to ‘the other’ that ethno-national concerns and judgements remain.
- In focus groups discussions on peacewalls young people drew on 6 narratives:
  - **Inclusionary:** positive territoriality; strong place attachment; group solidarity; pride in area and its history.

*It tells everyone you're proud to be something.*

- **Exclusionary:** geography of knowing unknown places; identified safe and unsafe areas; reinforces inward tendencies.

*They keep the Huns in and the Taigs out.  
You know where to go and where not to go.*

- **Ineffective:** ‘recreational rioting’ ongoing; people and property on the ‘other side’ not fully protected.

*You can just chuck stones over them anyway.*




- **Invisible:** unremarkable features in interface areas; divisions become normalised; little curiosity about who lives on the other side.

*It's like a normal thing now ... you just walk out and you see it there and you just look at it without really seeing it cause it's just always been there.*

- **Necessary:** 'The Troubles' may not be over; without walls lives could be put at risk and history might repeat itself; relationships are still not 'normal'; longevity of walls/barriers indicated that they were still needed.

*Some people just can't get along and that's that and if you brought Catholics and Protestants together they'd probably kill each other cause they're two different religions. That's like putting Scotland and Wales together.*

*If they come down they'll try to take over each other's land.*



- **Temporary:** young people have moved on; they think differently from their parents; they did not live through 'The Troubles'

*They were a good idea at the time but they're not needed today cause the behaviour of people has changed over time.*

- **Them and Us**

- Because some young people experience local space in highly segregated ways, they often access city centre spaces with peers from their own community and transfer local spatial perceptions to these more 'shared' locations.
- However, participants generally saw the city centre as a place for performing their 'teen identity' even in spaces where they could not afford to shop.
- While ethno-national concerns were not absent, especially for boys, their more pressing concerns were meeting friends, hanging about and messing around, and, in general, in this respect the city centre was regarded as shared and/or neutral space.
- Territoriality was more evident in relation to other groups of teenagers – Goths, Emos, Skaters, Hoods

- Goths and Emos were regarded as weird and a little frightening but with no 'religious' connection and Skaters as non-threatening with no 'religious' connection. However, a number of the focus group participants suggested that the 'religion' of 'Hoods' (both in the city centre and neighbourhoods) could be gauged by clothing, jewellery, speech, names, haircuts.
  - The adult/teen division was important in their everyday lives.
  - In their neighbourhoods young people felt that during the day they were seen as 'just teenagers' but at night they were regarded as threatening and suspicious.
  - In the city centre, participants (boys in particular) commented on being asked to 'move on' in shopping centres as they were seen as 'annoying' 'trouble' or 'thieves'.
  - They generally felt that they had an undeserved negative image
- **Parades and Festivals**
    - The notion of the city centre as a shared space could be unsettled particularly in relation to parades and festivals.
    - Focus group participants' experiences and perceptions of St Patrick's Day and 12<sup>th</sup> July Orangefest, for example, were shaped by the political relations of space but they responded to these in contradictory ways.
    - Despite Belfast City Council's and the Orange Order's attempts to make these 'festivals' more inclusive they were viewed, by this group of teenagers, largely through an ethno-national lens.
    - Some Catholic young people felt that Orangefest could never be inclusive but that St Patrick's Day, although it was 'their day', could potentially be inclusive; some Protestant young people felt that St Patrick had been '*stolen by the Catholics*'; while many of the young people felt that it was acceptable '*that they have their day and we have ours*'.
    - While the Pride Parade in the city centre provokes a negative reaction from some fundamental Christian groups the participants saw it as an inclusive event – 'a bit of a laugh' and one that appealed to teenagers from all communities.

## Conclusions

- Community divisions continue to impact on the lives of many teenagers in Belfast and call into question the labelling of Belfast as a 'post-conflict' city.
- Segregated housing and education enable sectarian attitudes and behaviour to persist.
- How young people are perceived by adults (and other teenagers) - impacts positively/negatively on their spatial behaviour.
- For many teenagers 'shared' space is little more than parallel use of 'neutral' space.
- Young people's 'ways of seeing' are still not effectively incorporated into policy.

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## **Conflict in Cities and the Contested Space State Project Report, June 2012**

*Working Title --*

*Where Conflict Swirls: Violence, Boundaries, and Memory in 'Post-Conflict' Belfast*

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### Introduction

Projects designed to commemorate the past, and emphasize a select number of its narratives, continue to dot Belfast's landscape. Much scholarly study has been devoted to murals, monuments, and parades that mark dates, honor deaths, and memorialize iconic figures and events (McCormick and Jarman 2005; Lisle 2006; Hill and White 2012). Other recent efforts encourage forgetfulness. The rapid physical alteration of Belfast's city center after the Good Friday Agreement removed most indications of conflict (Switzer and McDowell 2009); government branding of Belfast as the city that built the Titanic promoted a history free of recent violence (Neill 2006); and Belfast City Council-sponsored St. Patrick Day Celebrations "represented an attempt facilitate a social act of forgetting" (Nagle 2006: 33). These ventures ignore histories of violence and division in hopes of inspiring a single, dominant Northern Irish identity. Forgetting, however, is complicated by the central role memory plays in identity formation; to erase memory is to subversively attack an identity and thus face resistance from those who feel that their history is under siege.

In Belfast, memories of violence, as opposed to its direct experience, are gradually assuming greater import. Many residents in their teens and early twenties have lived lives free of the routine violence that characterized the Troubles, instead brought up in the midst of Northern Ireland's peace-building efforts. For these young adults, the violence that so divided their city is not lived history but a narrative passed down from older generations. The effects of inter-generational tales are not irrelevant to the day-to-day lives of city residents; far from being wholly eradicated by the peace process, the fear that ran through Protestant and Catholic communities during the Troubles endures in and is transmitted through narrative. Stories that may, at first glance, appear benign, carry both symbolic power and significant consequences in the day-to-day lives of residents. Identities are supplied with histories, attributes, and expected behaviors while physical boundaries are maintained by implicit and explicit warnings. Sectarian territoriality, a central and often studied aspect of Belfast's geography (Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998; Dochartaigh 2007), appears in and is reinforced by stories parents and grandparents tell their children. The tales' emotional undercurrent is fear: this area is safe, that area is dangerous. Identity is inextricably woven into that fear. An area is safe precisely because it is Protestant or Catholic, Unionist or Nationalist, Loyalist or Republican; an area's residents are deemed aggressors precisely because they are Protestant or Catholic, Unionist or Nationalist, Loyalist or Republican.

### Research Questions

The degree to which memories of the Troubles inform residents' attitudes and behaviours is central to understanding 'post-conflict' Belfast. In what ways do Troubles-era incidents influence how residents navigate the city and interact with one another? What narratives

continue to emerge in informal familial settings and among friends? The trauma of the Troubles did not miraculously dissipate after the signing of the Belfast Agreement. To believe that it did is to ignore the impact of memory on Belfast's landscape, and the attitudes and behaviours of its residents. The meanings Belfast residents extract from memory also help shape their definitions of 'Protestant' and 'Catholic.' Where and when does religious and ethno-national identity matter? At what moments and at what sites are the borders drawn?

There have been clear and positive changes since the Belfast Agreement went into effect. Belfast is no longer a paramilitary battleground, efforts towards creating shared space are underway, and a functioning political system has produced a stable government. There is no doubt that the city has entered a distinct era. Despite improvements, the legacy of the Troubles cannot be so easily brushed aside. The question, put simply, is: to what degree and in what ways does conflict continue to resonate in Belfast?

### Methods and Sources Used

The study does not aspire or claim to be representative of Belfast residents or any particular area of the city. With the ultimate aim of shedding light on forms and patterns of conflict in contemporary Belfast, its focus is on uncovering processes that influence and are influenced by residents' day-to-day behaviors and attitudes. As even individual attitudes and behaviors are often fraught with complexity and contradictions, the study's aim was pursued using qualitative research methods that allow for deep analysis of a relatively small number of Belfast residents. Replicating survey results, like those of the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey, would not be particularly useful; rather, exploring some potential explanations for and implications of those results is better suited to this study's aim. To that end, data obtained from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey is used to contextualize interviewees' attitudes and self-described behavior.

The interviews were guided by a questionnaire designed to move beyond politically correct answers. In addition to describing their origins and current occupation, interviewees were asked questions on three general areas: (1) their use of space and social networks; (2) their attitudes towards and perceptions of their neighborhood, identity group, and community; and (3) the stories and/or experiences that most shaped their views and perceptions of others and themselves.

### Preliminary Findings and Results

Belfast residents cope with fear and minimize their exposure to perceived danger by restricting their spatial behavior. Literature concerning residential segregation in Belfast reveals an urban landscape highly divided along ethno-national and religious lines (Shirlow and Murtagh 2010; Murtagh 2011) wherein locals cope with perceived dangers by purchasing or renting homes in homogenous (and therefore 'safe') areas. A simple housing choice is not, however, the sole spatial response to fear. Residents negotiate their day-to-day spatial patterns to circumvent areas thought of as dangerous and avoid contact with people who, due to their ethno-national beliefs, might instigate conflict. Crucially, avoidance is a tactic used not only by older generations or those with direct experience of sectarian violence. Fear, an undeniable theme in the narratives told by and memories of Belfast residents, continues to direct spatial behavior across generational lines.

Whereas the spatial behavior of Belfast's twenty year-olds affirms decades-long divides, some stated attitudes indicate a willingness to move beyond sectarianism and separation. Belief that Belfast, and Northern Ireland, is 'past' conflict is common amongst those too young to hold personal memories of the Troubles. The contrast between stated attitude and spatial behavior – a tension between the high politics of the state and the low politics of everyday routine – is stark. Despite asserting pluralist views concerning Northern Ireland's state-wide politics, many young adults are bound by geographies of fear, homogenous social networks, and memories that are not their own. More troubling is a sub-set of young folk in working class Catholic and Protestant areas who cling to romanticized memories of the Troubles, engage in regular low-key violence, and express a desire to act on sectarian attitudes. This group is anything but irrelevant to the larger society: they operate in neighborhoods that were the conflict's hubs of tension and, according to some elderly community members, are more willing to engage in all-out violence than youth of similar background in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

### General conclusions

Though commonly used to describe Northern Ireland's capital, 'post-conflict' is, in fact, an inaccurate label when applied to the everyday spatial behaviors of Belfast residents. Memories of violence, and the fear stoked by that violence, ensure the inviolability of community boundaries and help perpetuate ethno-national and religious segregation. Those memories were not simply extinguished by the Good Friday Agreement, nor have they been quashed by a decade-old peace and the economic benefits it brought. Tales of violence are passed down from one generation to the next and while Belfast's young adult population has few, if any, direct memories of the Troubles, it does preserve the narratives of older generations. In the strictest sense, Belfast is a post-conflict city in that peace reigns where once sectarian violence was a daily occurrence. Yet conflict is at the core of residents' spatial practices and the city's landscape; it is a force that exerts a daily pressure on individual decision-making and shapes the politics of space. Unlike the challenges faced by state governments or the trauma experienced by victims of violence, there are no frequently proscribed 'solutions' to deeply rooted fear and the widespread behaviors it engenders. The term 'post-conflict,' therefore, can be and often is a distorted lens through which Belfast is viewed. Conflict reverberates in the memories of city residents, the narratives that maintain community boundaries, and the divisions that define Belfast's landscape.

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## **Gender and Belfast City Centre 2008/09**

### **Introduction**

City centres are often characterised as sites of 'neutral' and/or 'shared space' with the potential to promote enhanced social cohesion and civic outcomes, yet as embodied spaces how they are used, perceived or experienced is not uniform. As such, this study aimed to explore the potential of Belfast's city centre to generate social change, as well as social reproduction, through examining its significance in the everyday lives of mothers of pre-school children living in ethno-nationally divided inner city neighbourhoods. As the analysis clearly indicates, for many of these women the city centre is peripheral in their everyday lives and it is within their neighbourhoods that both continuity and change and the incentives and constraints to boundary crossing can be more easily observed.

### **Research Questions**

- How do these mothers negotiate the shifting dynamics of sectarianism and civility in everyday life?
- How significant is ethno-nationality?
- How do these mothers experience and perceive the varied changes (structural and attitudinal) unfolding in the city, particularly in the city centre?

### **Research Design**

The above questions were addressed through a qualitative study focused on mothers of young children, living in working class neighbourhoods of the inner city. The reasons for this were:

- Motherhood is a significant social identity and practice, involving both the reproduction of collective identities over time and a willingness to embrace change in order to improve children's lives.
- The demands of raising pre-school aged children on a low income means that women in this category often find themselves moving about the city centre and wider inner city, often on foot, crossing sectarian interfaces and confronting potential risk as they engage in various economic, educational, familial and neighbourly activities, on a daily basis.

### **Methods**

- *Mapping*
  - To explore the extent or significance of ethno-national boundaries by tracing with participants their routes into and around the city centre.



- *Semi-structured Interviews*
  - 39 (19 Protestant, 18 catholic and 2 not specified) audio-recorded interviews lasting 30 minutes to one hour conducted in community settings.
  - On average mothers were aged 26 (range 22 – 39) and had 2 children; 75% were full time mothers, 17% part time paid work and 8% full time paid work; those in paid employment typically involved in community, caring, retail and catering.
  
- *Self-directed participant photography and follow up discussions*
  - 18 disposable cameras distributed, 12 returned and 10 follow up discussions.
  - Time consuming and levels of engagement relatively low.
  
- *Observation and Photography*
  - Ongoing city centre and neighbourhoods – everyday life and key city centre events

## **Findings**

The findings that follow are divided between participants' orientations and expectations firstly in the city centre and, secondly, in residential neighbourhoods

- *City Centre: Significance, Change and Constraints*
  - The city centre was only marginally significant in participants' everyday lives; generally used instrumentally and habitually with friends and families; did not offer opportunities for significant ethno-national mixing and, thus, its potential for crossing or blurring of well established social boundaries is limited.
  - Maternal and class considerations constrained their use of the city centre - lack of resources, difficulties of getting small children into and around the city centre, being judged negatively by shop assistants.

*I suppose the town is better for the people that can afford it, like the Victoria Centre, but I couldn't even afford to buy anything out of there. I've been in it once just to have a nosey but that's about it.*

- Increasing diversity in the city centre, particularly in terms of race, produced complex and, at times, contradictory attitudes. While welcomed by some it caused a degree of unease for others expressed in fear of heightened crime or risk to children from strangers. Immigrant mothers begging with children provoked severe censure – bad mothers, dishonest and not really in need of the money.

- *City Centre – Access and Safety*

- The city centre was perceived as a generally safe, neutral space for everyone - for many this was not something that was particularly new.
- Reflecting the decrease in sectarian tensions, some participants noted changes (during the day) in routines and dispositions in walking to and from city centre.

*Like walking through [Catholic area] going straight into the town that's no bother cos you've the Police Station and all there; but the Police Station being there would never have made me feel any more safer 5 years ago ... but now I don't see it as being a big problem - during the day*

- The dynamics of fear in the city centre (day time) have changed. As fear from violent conflict has declined it has been replaced by more 'ordinary' urban fears and annoyances associated with muggings, teenagers, begging, diversity etc.
- Night time concerns around fighting, drunkenness and gendered crime. It was felt that gendered crime and teenage violence had increased as ethno-national violence had lessened.
- When travelling home significant concerns relating to sectarian violence emerged. Taxis were seen as essential reflecting the deeply segregated nature of their neighbourhoods where getting home meant crossing interface areas.

*My brother was beaten up badly coming home when he was 23 and he died ... so you would have that fear and we wouldn't walk home. Even though you only live [short distance] you'd still get a taxi home you just wouldn't walk.*

*City Centre – Neutral and/or Shared Space*

- In terms of ethno-nationality, city centre generally perceived as a neutral space, a shared space, a space of indifference (Tonkiss, 2003)
- However, this perception could be disturbed in response to particular events (parades, festivals or football matches) when ethno-national identity could be ascertained or assumed (see research with Young People)
- Understandings of what neutral/shared space might mean in practice was open to interpretation - illustrated in attitudes to dressing children in ethno-nationally distinct clothing (especially football outfits). For some, this meant not wearing anything in the city centre that would signal ethno-nationality as it might give offence, to others that same neutrality and sharing meant that expressing ethno-nationality was acceptable.

- *Neighbourhoods - Everyday Life, Boundary Crossing and Reproducing Group Identities*

- Lives are highly gendered as participants inhabit everyday social networks of women, with men having a more marginal presence.

- This seems to produce gendered orientations towards the city and its 'post conflict' dynamics, with women having more opportunities and/or feeling safer negotiating the city.
- Family ties are highly valued and there was a strong sense of belonging and pride in local neighbourhoods, despite a clear-eyed view of the wide range of problems typical of many inner-city areas.
- This strong attachment to neighbourhoods of origin played out through expressions of resistance to the isolation typically associated with urban life, and reinforced patterns of residential segregation.



*Like you can go to the shops and you'll always meet somebody and talk and have a wee smoke and all ... Like when I lived up the Antrim Road I used to walk round to Tescos and straight back, but if I go to the shop here I'd be away for an hour (laughs) here, you'll always meet somebody*

- Participants' identities as mothers, thinking about and planning for their children's future, played a central role in their views on the conflict and the peace and their perspectives on the value and purpose of cross-community interaction.
- Boundaries, physical and symbolic, remain a feature of their daily lives; yet there are signs that these are being challenged, often through seemingly mundane encounters and practices.

*I want this area to be a better place for my kids. I don't want my kids growing up in what I grew up in which was rioting all the time, your area wrecked, destroyed, you know what I mean? Drugs, friends getting killed. We don't want that for our kids.*

- Reasons for crossing ethno-national boundaries – opportunities for children to mix and learn, a break for themselves and their children, affordable childcare that would enable them to engage in part-time work or accessing courses - educational, social or maternal.

- Boundary crossing was, however, limited. The use of playgrounds/parks, leisure centres, health centres remain largely divided with mothers expressing unease that they would be recognised as 'other' because of names, clothing, tattoos etc.
- Responsibility for women for reproducing group identities very evident. While the majority of mothers said that religion was not overly important they were nonetheless committed to sending their children to the 'appropriate' (Catholic or Protestant) school.
- Catholic mothers remarked on the superiority of Catholic education and of rekindling their religious observance when their children started school or were preparing for religious rites of passage. Protestant mothers spoke of the collective traditions such as 12<sup>th</sup> July Orangefest and importance of band membership.

*She'll go to [local primary school] cause that's where all her cousins go ... go to a Catholic school make their communion and all ... like that's what I done so I would like to bring her up to do it ... it's just the way it is.*

## Conclusions

- While a city centre free from bombs and bullets is clearly welcomed, the regenerated city centre does not present opportunities for wider changes in addressing or reconfiguring mutually antagonistic ethno-national identities. Rather, it provides a commercial arena where maternal and classed everyday practices are reinforced and, in general, it is these categories, rather than ethno-nationality, that shape how the city centre is used and experienced.
- The city centre is seen as a neutral/shared space but this can be disrupted by particular events and understandings of neutrality and sharing are open to interpretation.
- In everyday life ethno-national dispositions remain centrally important in these segregated inner city residential neighbourhoods.
- Processes of change are neither fixed nor linear, but, rather, a series of uneven responses to the norms, needs and priorities of family, community and self that are informed by the past, present and hopes for the future.
- An emergent norm of civility can be observed in women's orientations to routine activities such as walking, shopping and accessing play and education for their children. The operation of this norm depends on situational dynamics, including degrees of segregation; gendered patterns of risk; and historic inter-personal conflicts between neighbours (Smyth and McKnight forthcoming)

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## ***J1.6 Shared Space in Jerusalem***

**Wendy Pullan, Yair Wallach, Haim Yacobi; fieldwork by Nadera Karkaby**

### **Introduction**

One of the most difficult problems in contested cities is the subject of shared space. Part of the problem is the term itself which may vary in meaning in different disciplines. Physical spaces may be seen to act as settings which may be shared, particularly in terms of repeated everyday activities, recognition of places, and memory of events in particular sites. These exist even in hostility. The memory theories of Frances Yates and others after her are important here. On the other hand, shared space can also be understood in terms of territory that is based upon policies or practices of inclusion or exclusion. To some extent we can see space as agent, or quite differently, as background that often remains latent, and becomes more explicit and active only under certain circumstances.

Jerusalem is an exceedingly divided city, but at present, only parts of it have hard physical barriers. While many Israelis and Palestinians have little or no contact with the 'other side', some do and in some cases there are surprising interactions in what can, to some extent, be called shared space.

### **Research Questions**

- Which terms are useful? What research has been done on shared space, spatial encounters, mixed cities, etc, in ethno-nationally divided cities? Can we begin to find useful themes? Can we draw any comparisons with Belfast, where 'shared space' is seen to be a more useful term and concept.
- Historians sometimes refer to a more integrated Jerusalem in the late Ottoman period. How has shared space in Jerusalem changed in history?
- In which areas of Jerusalem are there public spaces that can be said to be shared between Palestinians and Israelis? Where are these and why are they shared? What role does commerce play?
- One of the most investigated fields in urban studies is ethnic segregation in housing. In Jerusalem there is very little mixing in the residential neighbourhoods. However, relatively recently there has been a small but significant migration of upper-middle class Palestinians, mostly Israeli citizens, into Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. What sort of phenomenon are we seeing here?
- To what extent do shared spaces in a city like Jerusalem function as part of everyday urban life and to what extent may they be regarded as over-politicised? How can we begin to understand the points of shared space, and the points of violent clashes, in a diverse yet divided city? What spatial features does it produce?

### **Methodologies**

Three different types of research were carried out: 1. A study of the relevant literature in a number of disciplines. 2. A historical study based on the memoirs of the Jewish Judge Gad Frumkin who, over time, migrated from the

Muslim quarter to modern Rehavia. 3. Site studies in Mamilla and Malcha shopping malls, and the residential settlement of French Hill. The methods used were varied. Close readings of selected letters, historical newspapers and published memoirs aided the historical study. Wallach's research particularly focused on a memoir of the Ashkenazi Frumkin. For contemporary Jerusalem, Wallach and Pullan relied on site observations over long periods. Wallach and Yacobi conducted interviews in Hebrew and were assisted by Nadera Karkaby doing interviews in Arabic. Yacobi relied upon help from the IPCC for help in tracing Palestinian residents in Jerusalem settlements. Karkaby's fieldwork traced movement patterns like bus routes, and even a survey of mailboxes.

### **Key findings (to date)**

- historically, late Ottoman and British Mandate Jerusalem was far less segregated than usually assumed, although there was certainly a movement towards segregation, becoming sharper in the 1930s and 1940s.
- today there are many places in Jerusalem that are shared, ranging from the civilised to the hostile. In most cases, the relationships are asymmetrical based upon political power relations. Nonetheless, it seems better to encounter the other; otherwise all cultural memory becomes distant and foreign.
- certain buildings and spaces are more conducive to sharing; eg. shopping malls seem to work well in Jerusalem because they are relatively neutral. Thus, exactly what we normally dislike about their architecture actually plays a more positive role in a contested city.
- To a small extent, public and commercial spaces in French Hill are shared and at a minimal level, some experiences of the neighbourhood become applicable to all. This is typical of many middle class Western cities where, in Bauman's words, 'strangers meet, remain in each other's proximity, and interact for a long time without stopping being strangers to each other' (Bauman, 2003:6). Should we be expecting more of a contested and damaged city, like Jerusalem?
- Two interrelated possibilities of sharing may be cited in the French Hill example, possibilities which in themselves are powerful, although it is too soon to understand their impact. Firstly, both groups share the problem of having their private lives regularly catapulted into the public realm and world stage. Yet, both groups are middle class, educated and living relatively conventional lives in this suburb of Jerusalem. This raises the second point: in many ways these two groups are remarkably similar economically and professionally if not politically. Ultimately, will such profound similarities help to form a quiet if not friendly sharing of the neighbourhood? And, would not a middle-class initiative, like establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli school with instruction in Hebrew and Arabic, going a long way to easing tensions and preparing the next generation for a certain amount of shared space?

- in most divided cities we are likely to find sites of encounter, which are rarely thought of as 'shared', because there is no explicit investment in 'sharing' (Belfast being the exception), and yet at the same time, people do in fact share space. It is unhelpful to idealise 'shared space' as sites of inter-communal bliss, as this creates impossible expectations. Rather, it is more useful to look at the sites of 'sharing space', as these often get lost in the stories of segregation.
- 'shared space' in 'divided cities' is something of a categorical impossibility, in the sense that the term already assumes territorial division as the fundamental trait of divided urban space. Shared space exists when people stop defining the space as 'ours' or 'theirs', and yet, even if they stop doing so, they are unlikely to think of the space as 'shared'. Rather, these are just places that one frequents. Thus, it is probably more useful to study actual dynamics and actual spaces, not lofty ideals.

## Outputs

Yair Wallach, 'Shared Space in pre-1948 Jerusalem? Integration, Segregation and Urban Space through the Eyes of Justice Gad Frumkin', Working Paper 21, Conflict in Cities Working Paper Series, 2011; [www.conflictincities.org](http://www.conflictincities.org)

Haim Yacobi, Wendy Pullan, 'The geopolitics of neighbouring: Jerusalem's colonial planning revisited', *International Development and Planning Review*, special issue on Cities in Conflict: Planning and Public Policy in Deeply Divided Cities, scheduled for 2013

Yair Wallach, Wendy Pullan, 'Shared Space in Jerusalem?' in preparation

Yair Wallach, 'Towards a theoretical understanding of shared space in contested cities', in preparation



## DEMOGRAPHY in DIVIDED CITIES and CONTESTED STATES with reference to Belfast and also Jerusalem

James Anderson and Ian Shuttleworth

### 1. Introduction: Research Questions

There are three different though related strands in Module B.1.3, but two need up-dated statistics. Hence this Report does not follow the standard format for a unified or completed empirical project.

- **Strand 1: Conceptual questions of demography and ethno-national conflicts** - a measure and mirror of conflicts, 'divided' cities and territories and their inter-connections; providing two different, complementary types of evidence: would-be 'objective' statistics and a battlefield of flawed data and biased public discourses; focusing on socio-spatial segregation/mixing; and on the ethno-national population 'balance' in particular areas; linking to territory and democracy, particularly 'majoritarian democracy', or the biased *ethnocracy* rather than democracy typical of ethnicised conflicts (McEldowney, Anderson and Shuttleworth 2011; Anderson 2013).
- **Strand 2: Demographic changes in Belfast since the 1960s** (using data for Protestants and Catholics) - their interactions with conflict in the 'Troubles' from 1968 and in the so-called 'post-conflict' period since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement; in terms of segregation/mixing, and the ethno-national 'demographic balance' in Northern Ireland and the greater Belfast Urban Area (BUA); using the available statistics and also the flawed data and discourses as complementary evidence. (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2009; McEldowney *et al* 2011; Shuttleworth and Anderson 2011).
- **Strand 3: Comparative demographics of Belfast, Jerusalem and their contested territories** - comparing Irish Unionism and Zionism as minority nationalisms which nevertheless created 'democratic (ethnocratic) majorities' through the shared British Empire expedient of territorial partitions, of Ireland and Palestine; the contrasting relations of the two cities to the wider conflicts, Belfast always central, Jerusalem much less so; that is until its centrality has far exceeded Belfast's since Palestinian East Jerusalem was occupied in 1967; and its internal geography became dominated by an aggressive policy of Israeli settlement to change the city's 'demographic balance'. But Belfast's ethnocracy has been dismantled and Jerusalem's intensified (Anderson and Shuttleworth 2010; Anderson J. 2013; Dumper 1997).

However, Strand 2 needs more work because the most recent Census statistics are from 2001 (only three years into the post-1998/'post-conflict' period). Census 2011 data first become available this autumn and through 2013, and we (Anderson and Shuttleworth) plan a comprehensive, up-to-date analysis from the pre-Troubles 1960s through to the post-Troubles decades. Similarly, Mick Dumper is up-dating his main demographic analysis of Jerusalem (Dumper 1997), and we (Anderson, Dumper and Shuttleworth) plan to complete the Strand 3 comparison on the basis of both the up-dates.

## 2. Sources and Methods

Quantitative and qualitative, they include:

- secondary accounts for historical population data and contextualising information;
- official Census data for most of the post-1960s statistical analyses;
- public debates and comment in the media for the analysis of 'biased' discourses,
- and also some secondary sources and interviews with politicians.

Belfast has much better demographic data than most 'divided' cities, including (unique to Northern Ireland) consistent 100-metre grid-square data for all five decennial Censuses since 1971. Standard descriptive statistics were used to summarise population changes 1971-2001, but some findings (e.g., our 'anti-conventional wisdom' conclusion that segregation has *not* increased significantly if at all since 1991) have been confirmed using more sophisticated techniques including the calculation of various segregation indices.

## 3. The main findings/conclusions for each strand are briefly outlined:

### ***Strand 1: Conceptual questions of demography and ethno-national conflicts***

In these conflicts demography often becomes highly if not overly politicised:

- it describes absolute and relative numbers of conflicting groups in particular territories
- it helps situate 'divided' cities in relation to surrounding 'contested' territories
- it expresses different forms and degrees of segregation/mixing in socio-spatial terms
- it constitutes 'facts on the ground' which produce conflict and co-operation outcomes
- conflicts are partly *about* demography, creating 'democratic majorities' and *ethnocracies*;
- and population statistics are often flawed, unavailable or misinterpreted.

Conflicts are conditioned by demographic factors such as differential birth and death rates, and migration patterns. Political forces are encouraged/discouraged by perceptions and expectations of population trends and projections which may or may not be accurate reflections of reality.

Censuses and population data are 'weapons' used and abused by protagonists, and also by people seeking to manage conflict. The questions asked - and not asked - have 'created identities' and are

'inextricably embroiled in politics' (Kertzer and Arel 2002, 2, 7, 18). Some questions may be deemed too 'politically sensitive', or if asked may not be answered; or entire censuses may be postponed or cancelled because of conflict conditions, or because of their own de-stabilising potential to *create* conflict.

Censuses established the practice of using questions about religion or language as 'indirect markers' of ethno-national identity, but they are only imperfect approximations, time-specific, and sometimes misleading. For example, not all of Ireland's Catholics are Irish nationalists, nor all its Protestants British unionist, and the approximation does not hold historically as Ulster Presbyterians (Protestants) were the main founders of Irish nationalism ((McEldowney *et al*, 2011).

The 'facts' of demography are thus often difficult and sometimes impossible to ascertain. The (mis)interpretations put on the statistics that are available are sometimes more 'fictions' than 'facts', though the data inadequacies, 'fictions', and 'population panics' about becoming 'out-numbered', can be very revealing in themselves.

National conflicts in cities and contested states (while often undemocratic in practice) are typically about rival territorial frameworks for democracy. 'Democratic majorities' can be (re-)constructed by how borders are (re-)drawn (as in partitioned Ireland); and/or by demographic change in given territories, through birth- and death-rates differences, and population movements into and out of territories, sometimes voluntary, or enforced as in the Palestinian *Nakba* (Pappe 2007).

Frequently the result (as in Northern Ireland and Israel) has not been democracy but *ethnocracy*, a concept developed by the Israeli geographer, Oren Yiftachel (2006). It describes nominally-democratic states which in practice support the dominant ethnic group or *ethnos* and systematically discriminate against subordinate ethnic groups, rather than acting even-handedly on behalf of the *demos* of all the citizens. Most of his cases are self-governing, national states but the concept can usefully be extended back in history to what we can call *imperial ethnocracy* (e.g., in pre-partition Ireland and Palestine), to the formative empire period of most 'divided' cities before national self-government. *Imperial ethnocracy* typically involves three-way relationships where imperial bias is structurally constrained by having to 'divide and rule', arbitrate between or play off the local ethnic rivals against one another, rather than simply supporting one side. In contrast, *national ethnocracy* typically involves a simpler 'majority-minority' relationship: it is often less restrained and more authoritarian, though perhaps more concerned with democratic appearances (Anderson 2013).

## **Strand 2: Demographic changes in Belfast since the 1960s**

- The most significant changes over the 1971-2001 period include overall population decline in the central City part of the BUA, especially in Protestant numbers and in inner-city areas (see Figure 1, below); and suburbanisation to beyond the City mainly of Protestants (partly because surrounding areas were predominantly seen as already 'Protestant territory').
- There was intensive violence in many central areas of population decline. However, in 1971 they were densely-populated and had ageing populations especially in Protestant communities, and similar patterns of decline were typical of many industrial cities. It is thus

difficult to say how much *net* decline in Belfast was due to the conflict (it also brought population increase with some Catholics forced back in from the suburbs after 1968).

- But greater Protestant suburbanisation and a higher Catholic birth-rate meant Belfast became a more 'Catholic and nationalist' city between 1971 and 2001.
- In 2001 Belfast City was also undoubtedly more residentially-segregated than in 1971.
- However ... in the two decades *since* 1991 both 'Catholic increase' and 'increasing segregation' have been the focus of partly misleading (exaggerating) public discourses.
- Most of the demographic changes actually occurred *before* 1991 (it seems the high Catholic birth-rate and segregation through enforced housing moves had *decreased* by the 1980s).
- Contrary to flawed discourses, there is little evidence of segregation increasing between 1991 and 2001 (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2009), either in Belfast or in Northern Ireland as a whole (see Table 1; and here the 2011 Census evidence will be interesting). We found that some of the errors were due to simple statistical mistakes, though some seem to have been motivated either by a political desire to 'prove' that the Good Friday Agreement was failing, or by media 'attention-seeking' through spreading 'bad news' (McEldowney *et al*, 2011).
- Belfast becoming 'more Catholic' was less because of 'Catholic increase' – relatively small over the 1971-2001 period – than because of the large decline in the Protestant population, particularly in the inner city, with a resultant increase in Catholic percentages (Table 2).
- The demographic 'imbalances' have on-going conflict-generating potential. For instance, some North Belfast Catholics face a very serious housing shortage, more land is needed for housing, but much of the vacant land in the City is traditional 'Protestant territory'. And recently (on the previous Girdwood Barracks site) there is what we can call a *counter-suburbanisation* as well as *ethnocratic* scheme to revive a declining Protestant community in the City with new-build segregated housing, despite local Catholics having the overwhelming housing need (BBC, NI, *Spotlight*, 29 May 2012).


Distance band	1971	1991	2001 R	2001 C
<b>0 to 5km</b>	0.75	0.84	0.82	0.78
<b>5 to 10km</b>	0.56	0.77	0.78	0.75
<b>10 to 15km</b>	0.40	0.49	0.47	0.43

Table 1: Index of dissimilarity (D) by distance band from City Hall, 1971, 1991 and 2001

Note: 2001 R is calculated on the basis of Religion, and 2001 C is calculated on the basis of religious 'Community background' (from which even atheists in Ireland rarely escape).

Year	0 to 5km	5 to 10km	10 to 15km
<b>1971</b>	26.30	20.70	16.23
<b>1991</b>	34.94	28.78	12.22
<b>2001 R</b>	38.45	39.06	11.90
<b>2001 C</b>	43.44	42.93	14.08

Table 2: Percentage population Catholic for Belfast Urban Area 1971-2001, by distance band from City Hall (again 2001 R = Religion, 2001 C = Community background).



### **Strand 3: Comparative demographics of Belfast, Jerusalem and contested territories**

Our first comparative study of Belfast and Jerusalem focuses on the

- 'demographically improbable' origins of their respective ethno-national conflicts,
- thanks in both cases to the *imperial ethnocracy* of the British Empire,
- relatively small minority national movements managed to create 'democratic majorities' in partitioned states (in 1920 and 1948, respectively), through
- border 'gerrymandering' with little population movement in Ireland (Anderson 2008)
- a massive demographic transformation by ethnic cleansing in Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1971; Pappé 2007; Tzfadia 2008).

There are important similarities and differences in Zionism and Northern Irish unionism as forms of 'settler/colonial' nationalism (active and historical/ideological respectively). And in the fluctuating roles of the two cities in their respective conflicts (Anderson and Shuttleworth 2010; Anderson J. 2013):

- Belfast has been central in the formation of Irish nationalism and of Ulster unionism since the end of the eighteenth century, and central to the conflict between them;
- Jerusalem was the main centre for Palestine's small indigenous Jewish population and for some religious Jewish immigrants up to the end of the nineteenth century, but
- thereafter it lost its political centrality in relative terms (Hepburn 2004).
- Secular Zionism and settlers from Europe favoured Jaffa-Tel Aviv and other coastal cities and towns over Jerusalem in the first half of the twentieth century; and
- much of the Jewish-Arab conflict occurred in these places and surrounding countryside.

- In 1948 West Jerusalem did become the capital of the new state; but
- not till the 1967 Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and their illegal occupation, did the re-unified city achieved its more recent political centrality.

Since then Jerusalem has become the fulcrum of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Dumper 1997). Not only Israel's capital, it is also the would-be capital of a projected Palestinian state; and in reaction Palestinian East Jerusalem is subject to an aggressive ethnocentric strategy of Jewish settlement to transform the city's 'demographic balance'. In both Northern Ireland and Israel the *national ethnocracy* was more authoritarian and intense than the preceding *imperial ethnocracy* which helped establish them in the first place. In the Irish case it led to the Troubles starting in 1968-9; and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was only possible because unionist ethnocracy was effectively dismantled by the British authorities.

These contrasts will be the focus of the completed Strand 3 comparison based on up-to-date statistics. It will pick up the story of both cities from the 1960s and take it through to the present.

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## **Capturing Urban Conflicts:**

### **The use of original visual material in researching contested cities**

Prepared by Lefkos Kyriacou, Milena Komarova and Martina McKnight

#### **Introduction**

The possibilities for using visual material in research are not yet fully exploited, especially in disciplines more oriented to verbal and textual discourse. Over the course of this project, as part of an interdisciplinary approach, a series of presentations and discussions at workshops and smaller meetings have taken place on the use of visual material to encourage photography and mapping in CinC research. The critical reading of visual sources informs a great deal of CinC research but this report focuses on how CinC's production of original visual material has been used as an analytical research tool and a method of communicating the project's findings.

CinC has undertaken several years of fieldwork in contested cities throughout Europe and the Middle East, a large part of which has been observing, recording and reflecting upon everyday activities and situations that take place in the city as a way of understanding the nature of the contestation on the ground. This process has been helped by the use of mapping, drawing, photography and film that are not only an end product of the research but a way of thinking, probing and understanding.

The use of original visual research has been used extensively throughout CinC, including (but not exclusively):

- In Jerusalem: all research modules.
- In Belfast Module B1.2: The Built Environment; Module B2: Belfast 'Peace Lines' and Interface Areas; Module B3: The Religious City and Module; B4: Conflict Management to Conflict Transformation; Module B5: Public Spaces in Belfast City Centre
- In Nicosia, see research report: Urban Memory in Divided Nicosia: Praxis and Image.
- In Mostar, see research report: Re(ad)ressing Mostar. Architecture and/of everyday life.
- In Beirut, see research report: The role of public space in contested Beirut.

This report highlights areas of work not covered in other reports and aims to represent the spectrum of CinC visual research but is not intended as a comprehensive catalogue of the project's visual research.

#### **Visual research materials**

##### Maps and drawings

In CinC's analysis of contested cities, researchers have developed a reflective conversation in the act of gathering evidence, analyzing and interpreting through mapping and drawing, in order to make sense of the highly contested and often complicated urban situations. Sketches are used in understanding sites as they are quick to produce, easy to adjust and can develop into publishable images. CinC maps and drawings are part of an observational approach where the place itself is the common denominator, which is not an attempt to give the city's architecture special status but an understanding of the reciprocal relationship between the many human situations (including the physical) that make a place what it is.

##### Photography

Photographs can convey aspects of cities and contestation that are difficult to capture through text and drawings such as detailed environmental conditions, fleeting moments and human expressions. The camera has the capacity to capture and investigate the performative nature of urban life in contested cities. The use of photography has enabled the interpretation of images in their spatial and social context over periods of time, thereby providing an understanding of the mutual and fluid constitution of space and identity.

CinC has encouraged researchers to use photography during fieldwork where possible and to date, the CinC image archive contains over 10,000 photos of Jerusalem, Belfast and other contested cities. The image library has been a valuable resource for researchers preparing publications and presentations.

##### Film

Video can draw attention to the mundane, banal aspect of human practices and show how the very act of performance does unexpected work in urban space, capturing the fluidity of acts which leave little lasting material imprint. Film can record sensory experiences and emotional reactions which are important ingredients in the constitution of place and in decision-making during performance.



## How visual methods have contributed to Conflict in Cities

### Capturing Urban Conflicts exhibition

This series of exhibitions showcased a collection of unique maps of contested cities, drafted by CinC, and 23 photo-essays composed by 19 different project members. The maps drew attention to sites of contention and interaction but also highlighted fluidity, ambiguities and specificities. Complimenting the maps was a collection of photo-essays that drew on the extensive CinC photographic archive providing glimpses into the everyday life of the diverse cities covered by CinC. The Capturing Urban Conflicts public exhibition was displayed at the CinC *Urban Conflicts* Conference, Belfast; Cambridge University's 'Festival of Ideas'; (19-23 October) and as a part of the ESRC's 'Festival of Social Sciences' (London Metropolitan University, 3-5 November). The combined exhibitions drew over 530 members of the public. The feedback about the exhibition was very positive:

'Easy to read...provoking and important' – Designer, London.

'A set of maps at the same scale with the same info is wonderful. I can see this as a very useful teaching tool and look forward to their publication' – Academic, Belfast.

'I would love to be able to have [the photo essays] as a book' – Student, Cambridge.



Exhibition at London Metropolitan University (above) and a photo-essay (below)




Micro-studies of Jerusalem's Old City


Wendy Pullan, Lefkos Kyriacou

A problem with attempting to show the many everyday connections and divisions in the centre of any city, is that there is so much life and complexity to record. CinC have been developing visual tools to help portray not just the built fabric as a background to urban life, but help to convey something of urban life itself.

The project has investigated key sites in Jerusalem's Old City such as Damascus Gate and the junction between the Muslim and Jewish Quarter by focussing on spatial sequences that take in walls, tunnels, shops and streets. These micro-studies have developed as three-dimensional drawings that can reflect human activity, mobility and the transient situations that constitute these rich urban environments. In order to stay true to the temporal nature of urban life and the research themes such as religion or security, conditions can be mapped at particular times such as Friday prayers or during civil unrest. The drawings when used in tandem with text and photography can offer (temporal and partial) views of some of the world's most contested sites. By focussing on everyday events such as ad hoc markets that are normally overlooked by planners and politicians, CinC can better understand the important role these sites play in the spatial and political functioning of the city. Conversely, the drawings help reveal the impact of architectural design, town planning and political policy on everyday life in contested cities.



Development sketch of an Old City micro-site (above), with published image (below)



## Contested Parades in Belfast

Milena Komarova, Martina McKnight

Photography and video were extensively used during observation of a number of contested parades in Belfast, both by the researchers and by a variety of participants in these events – marchers, protesters, the media, the police, conflict mediators and other researchers. The ability of the camera to contextualise in space and time and to record moving images was particularly useful in studying how the movement of contentious parades through the city produces urban spaces in ways that both challenge and embed contestation. Visual methods shaped both the analysis and how observations were conducted by researchers at contested events: mediating the relationships with others present and interactions with them; influencing what was noticed or omitted; and affecting feelings of ease and unease.

Observations of contentious non-violent parades highlight the ways in which incorporating photography and video in highly ritualised and choreographed performances produces *de facto* opportunities for temporary border crossings by engendering a momentary non-verbal dialogue between opposing sides. The use of visual methodologies offers researchers opportunities to notice and capture these temporary crossings which, while containing the possibility of redrawing boundaries, fade fast from the permanent urban fabric.

The use of visual methodologies encouraged greater reflexivity, making researchers more aware of different cultural backgrounds, biographies, gender and levels of familiarity with the spatial and social context of the research sites.



Montage of images taken during parades in Belfast

## Outputs

The production of CinC original drawings and maps is based at the Department of Architecture in Cambridge but the process has been collaborative. The cross-cutting nature of visual research has brought together investigators, researchers and PhD students from the three universities and across disciplines contributing to over 25 publications to date including journal articles, policy briefing papers and books. This range of publications includes a large number of original maps, drawings and photographs of Jerusalem, Belfast and other contested cities.

Some examples:

*Visual material including maps and photographs of Jerusalem, Nicosia and other contested cities for:*  
Pullan W. (2011) 'Frontier Urbanism: the periphery at the centre of contested cities', *The Journal of Architecture*, 16.1, pp.15-35, special issue on architecture and conflict.

*Maps of Belfast for:*

O'Dowd, L. & M. Komarova (2010) 'Contesting Territorial Fixity: A Case Study of Urban Regeneration in Belfast', *Urban Studies*.

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Dumper, M. & W. Pullan (2010) 'Jerusalem: The Cost of Failure'. Chatham House Briefing Paper.

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*Maps of Jerusalem for:*

Pullan, W., M. Dumper, M. Sternberg, C. Larkin & L. Kyriacou (forthcoming 2013) 'The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places' London: Routledge.

### **CinC planned publications on visual methodology:**

Kyriacou and Pullan are developing an article on visual methodology that will be based on the CinC mapping work. There will be a particular emphasis on situational drawings used to represent and examine everyday life.

Komarova, M. & M. McKnight 'The Digital Eye in Conflict Management: Reflections on Doing Research in a Contested City' CinC working paper series, [www.conflictincities.org](http://www.conflictincities.org), (under review)

Komarova, M. & M. McKnight 'We Are Watching You Too!: Reflections on Doing Research in a Contested City' (*being revised for Sociological Research Online*)

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## **Conflict in Cities and the Contested State Project Report – June 2012**

Title of the Research Project:

*Urban Memory in Divided Nicosia: Praxis and Image*

Anita Bakshi, PhD

Clare College, University of Cambridge Department of Architecture

### **1. Introduction**

Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, like the island itself, has been divided since 1974. Dissent and intercommunal violence between the two main ethnic groups, the Turkish-Cypriots in the north and the Greek-Cypriots in the south, escalated in the 1950s, and by 1974, they were divided by the United Nations Buffer Zone, which runs through the heart of the city. This line of division neatly bisects the perfect geometry of the city walls, and the historic center that they define. The division of the island created many refugees who had to resettle either north or south of the new border. From 1974 up until the checkpoints first opened in 2003, people were unable to cross over to the other side; their old lives and the neighborhoods that housed them had become suddenly inaccessible. This abrupt distancing from their homes has resulted in the intensification of many aspects of memory related to the city including nostalgia and imagination. Over the last several decades this disconnect has resulted in the development of memories of the united city that once was, and imagined constructions of the lost part of the city, on the other side of a border that was inviolable. Division has led to two divergent approaches towards history, where events and chronologies are selectively remembered or forgotten. The city is represented in different ways, with each side constructing official renderings of what this place was like in the past.<sup>1</sup>

There are important reciprocities between conflict and memory, which often become embedded in disputed places or territories central to ethnonational conflicts. This PhD research project focused on interrogating memories, images, and imaginings related to two sites in Nicosia: the historic walled city center and the Buffer Zone that divides it - the two most dominant urban elements in Nicosia, most strongly connected to the history of both unity and division in Cyprus. These sites are important resources, containing a wealth of information about the nature of coexistence or conflict between diverse communities in Cyprus, although previously only a few studies have engaged seriously with these sites in relation to the conflict. This study outlined changes to these sites from the 1950s to the present in order to enhance understandings of the conflict and the division of the city. The theoretical approach of this dissertation situates a reading of memories associated with these sites within three main contexts related to the study of memory: the relationship between memory and image, between remembering and forgetting, and between memory and history.

The nature of the area now contained within the Buffer Zone, once Nicosia's main market area along Ermou Street, was reassessed in light of new primary material. This was collected through interviews with shopkeepers who once worked or lived in

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<sup>1</sup> Papadakis, 2005.

the Buffer Zone prior to the 1950s, requiring the development of a specific methodology, which was heavily reliant on the use of visual materials and mapping to prompt and document memories related to the everyday life of the city. These were then used to reconstruct the spatial, social, political, and commercial topographies of the Buffer Zone streets, as the walled city changed from a mixed city to a divided city from 1950 to 1974 - rendering visible previously unregistered memories that have been overshadowed or obscured by the divided official narratives of the contested past in Cyprus. Furthermore, the question of how memories acquired through experience - through urban praxis - are affected, influenced, or transformed by official representations of memory is assessed through an examination of the shopkeepers' memories along with the present-day imaginings of the walled city of a younger generation of Cypriots, born after it was already divided.

## **2. Main Research Question**

Scholarship on memory has described the ability of places to house and contextualize the fleeting images of memory, but what happens to this relationship when the disruption of conflict explodes previous innate and endemic patterns of inhabitation of cities and landscapes? Conflict has a significant impact on place-based memories as it disrupts existing patterns of dwelling and inhabitation. Memories of conflict are attached to the places in which they were sited, while at the same time, intentionally crafted historical narratives are projected on to places - creating ideological constructions and images of places as they *should* be remembered. This study questions the nature of exchange and interchange between these differing engagements with memory and place. In contested cities, due to the extended conflict, memory comes to be a constitutive component or facet of the city. Therefore, this study approached Nicosia through the study of memory. Conflict can create borders, refugees, and scarred landscapes of war. How are collective and individual memories about such contested sites reconfigured?

## **3. Methods and Sources Used**

In order to explore these issues in Nicosia and to address the dearth of existing scholarship on the Buffer Zone, it was necessary to generate a method of working that engaged with current approaches and frameworks from recent scholarship on memory. Major sources included current scholarship on memory and recent anthropological work on Cyprus, as well as an assessment of evidence from historical texts, ethnographies, and memoirs. An important component of this research was the primary material gathered from mappings and interviews. This process used the few documentary resources available,<sup>2</sup> and relied most heavily on the memories of shopkeepers who knew the Buffer Zone in the 1940s and 1950s when it housed the main marketplace along Ermou Street, before intercommunal conflict changed the nature of the city. Working with visual materials and mapping allowed for the redirection of memories onto innocuous details of everyday life, and away from the standard narratives that officially dictate how the city *should* be remembered.

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<sup>2</sup> These sources included historical maps, property registers, commercial catalogues, and newspaper advertisements.

Photographs and maps served as prompts to bring up memories that had long been lying dormant - grounding the shopkeepers' narratives in a material substrate and centering the discussion on the everyday reality of the city. The memories flesh out the maps with tissue and sinew. The map of the city, at the same time, provides a framework for these memories, a structure that these fragments can cling to. The theoretical basis for this methodology follows on from an approach that emerged in the past three decades that deals with 'mnemohistory,' oral history, and the inclusion of questions of memory in the historiographical process.

Since it is not possible today to walk the Buffer Zone streets maps and visual prompts were used instead to encourage spontaneous moments of memory related to the material reality of this site. This allowed the shopkeepers to virtually re-enter these streets again, as they once were in the 1950s, and to retrace their daily movements through the city with their fingers on the maps. (Figure X). This assisted their ability to recall the location of certain buildings, patterns of movement, names of acquaintances, witnessed interactions between people, as well as more atmospheric qualities of the streetscape such as impressions of density and the smells and sounds that once populated the old city. A related methodology was employed with a younger generation of Cypriots who did not know the city prior to division, by using visual materials that they would be familiar with. They were shown a book of photographs taken inside the walled city and graphic representations of the city walls, to prompt a discussion about their attitudes and imaginings of the old city.



Figure 1: An example of the maps created with the shopkeepers

#### **4. Main Empirical Findings**

This study offers the most extensive and focused discussion available on the interrelationships between space, history and memory in divided Nicosia, and is the first to reconstruct the past of the current urban absence of the Buffer Zone. It offers a detailed discussion of the nature of coexistence or conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities in Nicosia from the pre-conflict nature of interaction in the early 1950s, to the changes to the social, commercial, and political structure of the city from 1958-1974. This research contributes to the fields of architecture and urban studies both through the discussion of places of absence and the 'reserve of forgetting' connected to place, as well as through the unique methodological approach which combines a spatial study with an investigation of commercial networks and political ecologies, offering a new approach to architectural research. It is proposed that such a place-based methodology can be useful for scholars researching contested environments, where official histories and archives can be heavily cultivated, disallowing alternative versions of the past. The concept of the 'reserve of forgetting' proposed by Paul Ricoeur is developed as a means of reconceptualizing and filling in the gaps emerging in contemporary readings and experiences of places influenced by official ideologies.

##### **Nicosia and the Ermou Marketplace:**

- This study provides a clearer picture of the reality of the everyday life of the mixed city and the nature of coexistence and conflict between its diverse populations by delineating links between the spatial characteristics of the marketplace and the social practices and relations embedded there.
- The discussion of developments in Nicosia from 1950 to 1974 illustrates that the city had the ability to resist complete division - as it did up until 1974. Even economic sanctions, a blockade, and pressure from separatist organizations were not able to truly solidify this line and make it impermeable. This fact of resilience stands as the strongest possible evidence attesting to the effectiveness and capacity of the urban framework of Nicosia to allow for the coexistence of diverse populations.
- The fact that Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots were still working together - even after the establishment of an urban frontier - indicates that the city was well able to facilitate a mixed population. It worked as a mixed city because of the simultaneous existence of multiple urban realms which allowed for varying degrees of interaction or separation in the public life of the city. Of these, the shared realm of the Ermou marketplace was crucial in that it provided a space that allowed for contact, visual recognition, and social negotiation between the city's diverse populations.



### **Nicosia - Memories of Praxis and Images of the Past:**

- While there was once a shared past, the division has now caused different communities to remember that same past in drastically different ways - imagining the streets, buildings, and places that sited that past differently. Memories of urban praxis are overwritten by images of the past.
- Along with the 'forgetting' of this place, whose history has remained unwritten and absent from public discourse, was executed the 'forgetting' of a shared past with all of its complications, everyday conflicts and negotiations - installing in its place either a nostalgic image or a complete absence.
- This study illustrates the many forces acting on memory in this contested city including: the manipulation of chronology, the role of national discourses on origin, the establishment of temporal boundaries on remembrance, and the manner in which difficult memories are transfigured in the present. These forces have a significant impact on the relationship between place and memory.

## **5. General Conclusions on Conflict, Place, and Memory in Nicosia**

As the shopkeepers' testimonies illustrate, the transformative capacity of memory is compounded in contested environments, where it is put through complex processes of division and compartmentalization. In certain dominant and ideological representations of Nicosia the image, conceived as a vehicle of memory, also serves to enable forgetting. The forgetting of the Buffer Zone does not occur just because it is an absence in the city, but also because the presence of a certain image of the past has come to affect, and at times obscure, memories of what this place once was like. For the shopkeepers, what I have called in this study the 'reserve of forgetting,' held in *place*, in the Ermou streets, has managed to push them past certain official narrative frameworks and tap into other memories - memories that were held below the surface of conscious recall. In contested environments and divided societies, projects of intentional forgetting can lay a thick mantle of oblivion over entire sets of memories. But at the same time, memories held in the reserve of forgetting of place can uncover and bring to light the apparently 'forgotten,' serving as a powerful resource for memory and for history in contested environments.

The maps and visual prompts used with the shopkeepers tapped into this reserve and allowed the emergence of some of the personal stories that are obscured by official versions of history. At times memories converged, and at other times Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots remembered the same places in radically different ways; these divergences are associated with the influence of national narratives, official histories, and symbolic and mythical representations of place. The research and interviews with a younger generation of Cypriots reveal how certain constructed images of the city have affected their knowledge of the past, and their urban imaginary of the city today. This study has shown that memory and history are intertwined; official histories severely impacted individual memories about places, but at the same time, memories awakened by place maintain the capacity to counter these national narratives.




Figure 2: Rendering visible the history of the urban absence of the Buffer Zone

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## Berlin Research Report - Linda Rootamm

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### PhD thesis title:

### **Belonging in the 'New' Berlin: The Experiences of Young East Berliners in Reunified Berlin**

Queen's University Belfast, School of Sociology, Social Work and Social Policy

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Berlin is enjoying a fairly successful post-division phase having by now had more than 20 years of experience of the process of 'being put back together'. This PhD research looks at the reunification process of the city as well as its impact on, and its interpretation by, the residents of the city. By documenting individual narratives, this study specifically looks at East Berliners' biographical experience since the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, how these experiences have impacted the redevelopment of their social spaces and their physical movement in the urban space of Berlin, and how these latter processes relate to the different discourses they produced about the reunified Berlin and the reunified Germany.

The project focused on East Berliners who were at the age of 20-25 during the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This age group was chosen due to them having been socialized in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with its socialist ideology, while at the time of the reunification of the two Germanys they were still young enough to easily adapt to the rapidly changing social and physical environment of the city and to the new State structures.

The main research question which this thesis intends to answer relates to East Berliners' changing feelings and understandings of belonging in the evolving social and physical environment of the city:

How have East Berliners established their own place in the unified Berlin? How have they negotiated their way through the new structural, social and physical context of the unified Berlin?

- How did they enter the new social and structural space which gradually enveloped the East? What circumstances assisted them in the process?
- How has their perception of the urban space of Berlin changed since the fall of the Wall?
- How has the crossing of pre-existing boundaries between themselves and West Germans taken place for individual people?
- How have the relations with West Berliners and West Germans influenced their perception of their own 'self'?

### ***Some concepts used***

The experiences of East Berliners which this study explores are conceptualised through Lefebvre's triadic theorisation of space and in particular his notions of 'spatial practice' (every society produces and reproduces its own space through spatial practice that ensures continuity and cohesion) and representations of space that are tied to the order which the relations of production impose (2011).

I also draw on De Certeau's notion of the practice of space as a 'manipulation of the basic elements of a constructed order' (1997:100). Through these concepts one comes to understand how East Berliners appropriated the new space and system, while selecting, manipulating and transforming elements of it.

### **Data collection**

Data for answering these research questions was collected through semi-structured open ended interviews, walking tours and a movement mapping exercise.

23 East Berliners were interviewed – 15 women and 8 men. 18 of them also agreed to meet for a walking tour.

### **Main Findings**

#### **Biographical experience**

The first set of data relates to respondents biographical experience. From the narratives one can distinguish between different kinds of *framing strategies*, i.e. how people narrate about their experiences.

- A very clear framing strategy entails success stories and stories of accomplishment regarding jobs and work in the FRG. This kind of framing is mostly used by men and some single mothers.
- Another framing strategy involves stories that strongly compare experiences after the fall of the Wall to those of before. These are mostly stories of loss.
- The last strategy is a balance between the two previous ones – it acknowledges experiences of both 'eras' without raising one over the other. It might also entail aspects of loss but not as overwhelmingly as the previous strategy.

One can also recognise *patterns in the biographies* which reveal East Berliners different strategies for negotiating change:

- As a first step a variance in their experiences in the GDR needs to be recognized: some of them felt repressed, others felt free to follow their interests, further others went along with the circumstances of the system.

Alex: „*In the last years (of the GDR) I made some very interesting trips to Russia. I wasn't like that that I sat at home for 10 years and was upset that I wasn't allowed to travel. People were completely frustrated, of course, but I wasn't so frustrated because I was on some amazing trips at that time...*„

- Some East Berliners had developed a strong confidence in themselves because of their successes in the GDR and with confidence they started experimenting in the new system. Some were 'successful' and others not, which made them to return, in certain aspects of their life, to what had been familiar to them from the time of the GDR.

- Others experienced a very smooth transition into the new job market (often through accompaniment by West Germans). They have stayed on that one job and their life-course has been very much like it would have been in the GDR.
- One can also see a variance in the time and the life-stage when different people developed close contact to West Germans: e.g. some had been in a constant contact to West Berlin relatives already during the GDR, while others developed that contact through a job change at the end of the 90s.

### ***Perceptions of reunification and changes in the city***

The second set consists of attitudinal data which includes respondents' *perceptions of reunification* and their *view of the changes in the city*. Their discourse is, of course, pervaded by their biographical experiences and their perception of their experiences. Based on their main lines of discourse the respondents form an attitudinal spectrum from pro GDR to pro FRG, or very simplistically put – nostalgic, adaptive, enthusiastic.

- The first category is formed by people whose discourse, due to their negatively perceived experiences in the reunified Germany compared to their life events in East Germany, condemns the FRG while praising the GDR.

Sabine: *"The first thing I experienced as I went on a camping holiday after the change, .. we wanted to go to Austria as we knew it, with tents. There came a farmer 'This is my meadow! Get out of here, my meadow!' Private property. You didn't know it like that, it was foreign (fremd)."*

- The second category includes people, whose experience of transition into the market economy was quite smooth and who accept the conditions of the new State they live in.
- The third group involves people who welcomed the reunification and change, and feel much more 'at home' in the FRG than they ever did in East Germany.

The themes which appeared in the different lines of discourse are:

- A sense of displacement in familiar districts of Berlin
- Seeing new lines of division in today's Berlin, e.g. a division between foreign and German population, a division based on income.
- Identifying themselves with the changes in the city
- An imagination of a different GDR, had the reunification not taken place
- Interrelatedness of the physical and the social, i.e. a perception that people's attitude towards their personal experiences impacts on the general atmosphere in some spaces of the city (particular districts, or public transport)
- Definitions of who belong to Berlin and who do not, who have roots there and who do not
- Ownership of the city/of their own neighbourhood/of the districts where they spent their youth

Anne (speaking about gentrification in Prenzlauer Berg): *"Then the people move out and completely different people move in there who actually, it is silly to say, don't belong there, but you can feel that it is not their city, they live there but it is not their city."*

### ***Movement maps and walking tours***

The third set of data includes spatial movement maps of the respondents in Berlin to demonstrate how *their use of the city space itself forms a discourse* related to Berlin's reunification. The location of their residence in relation to where the Wall stood forms an integral part of this data. The different locations of residence can be categorized as follows:

- Far in the east of the city (Hochenschönhausen, Köpenick, Mahlsdorf)
- In the more vibrant districts near the centre (Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain)
- Centre of the city (Mitte)
- West Berlin (Kreuzberg, Neukölln)

*Jonas: "...in the Mitte East and West intermingle a lot. ... I think I have found my place because I want to have a bit of both. I wouldn't necessarily move to Weissensee ... where it's still pure East. I also don't want to necessarily live again in Mariendorf since it has been in most part formed by the West. And here is actually the point where people, who are here, it is like that also in our circles, are excited about the centre of the city, who feel good and who retreat to the positive."*

It varies in some cases but the general pattern is that the further one lived from the city centre at the time of the change, the later one came into contact with West Germans and the less one feels today that the city has grown back together.

The walking tour functioned as a space of enunciation (de Certeau 1992): if the interviews were more about East Berliners' perception and their presentation of that perception then walks were an active inhabitation or acting out of space in the present. More than anything, the choice of place for a walk illustrates the discourse of the particular person about the reunification and changes in the city.

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## MEMORY AND CONFLICT IN LEBANON

Conflict in Cities Research Report

Craig Larkin, June 2012

### *Introduction*

The Lebanese civil war may have officially ended in 1990 but national rehabilitation has been complicated by recurring violence, regional instability and debates over the historical past. The postwar silence – encouraged by amnesty, collective trauma and public shame – has given way to competing and conflicting war memory discourses from activists promoting social and personal healing, scholars concerned with nostalgia and national imaginings and politicians championing the search for historic truth.<sup>1</sup> Despite such emerging debates little attention has been given to how Lebanese youth are negotiating the silences and anguishes of their nation's bloody past. Larkin's book *Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: remembering and forgetting the past*<sup>2</sup> explores the multiple and polyvalent nature of residual war memory – its inscription, mediation and transformation in and through the lives of subsequent generations. Drawing on Marianne Hirsch's concept of *Postmemory*<sup>3</sup>, it examines the memory of a generation who have grown up dominated not by traumatic events but by narrative accounts of events which precede their birth. This inherited memory carries and connects with the pain of others, suffusing temporal frames and liminal positions.

*At times I want to close my eyes and cover my ears to my parents' stories of war. It was their conflict, not mine. I don't want to carry their burdens... Yet these memories are difficult to escape. Yani, they appear suddenly, and sometimes in unexpected places.*

*Georges, 21, Université Saint-Joseph, Beirut*

### *Structure*

The book examines how Lebanese postmemory is produced, reconstructed and transmitted, to fit shifting social contexts, political circumstances, spatial boundaries and personal experiences. Attention is first directed towards how the history of the Lebanese civil war is taught or ignored in public spaces of education – school syllabus, history textbooks and classroom discussions as well as the private realm of the home, through family stories, rituals and memorials. Emphasis is then placed on the dynamic production of 'memoryscapes'— memories of violence localized in particular sites or empty spaces; and finally on narrative constructions of the past implicated in the on-going search for meaning, historical truth, and identity. These polysemic frames provide a means of contextualising the postmemory experience in Lebanon yet still probe wider post-conflict dilemmas over traumatic memory and civic education, post-war reconstruction and national imagining.



### *Research Questions*

The book raises significant questions concerning the limitations and potentiality of traumatic memory and its impact on identity formation, historical consciousness and social interaction.

- How do Lebanese youth integrate and rework such memory tropes and traces within their own everyday encounters?
- To what extent are postmemory narratives shaped by public silences, competing war memory discourses, and the threat of recurring violence?
- How do war memories inform urban spatial patterns and perceptions of the city – in particular Beirut's fractures, exclusive spaces, and contemporary divisions?
- Finally, does Lebanese postmemory present a significant obstacle to future reconciliation and national recovery or are Lebanese youth able to assimilate, redeem and transform their tragic historical legacy?




**The war scarred Martyrs memorial statue in Beirut's newly restored Downtown**

### *Methods and Sources*

The book utilizes extensive ethnographic and anthropological research methods. Over 100 in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted among Lebanese high school and university students, from ten different educational institutes, during a one-year period, the summer of 2005 to the summer of 2006. Given the sensitive nature of representation and proportionality in Lebanon, a country of eighteen politically recognized religious sects with its last demographic census in 1932, the sample attempted to reflect Lebanon's diverse religious composition, its continuing socioeconomic divisions, and its geographic spread.

Thus, 67 percent of students interviewed were from a Muslim background (26 Shi'a; 24 Sunni; 13 Druze; 4 Alawi and Ismaeli) and 33 percent from a Christian background (14 Maronite; 6 Greek Orthodox; 5 Greek Catholic; 3 Armenian Orthodox; 3 Protestants and 2 other). The schools and universities chosen were a mix of public/private, secular/religious, and rural/urban; and the interviewees were from Beirut, Tripoli, the South, the Bekaa, the Shouf, and the Metn Mountains. Students were deliberately chosen to reflect the full spectrum of Lebanese society; family names, residency, political affiliations, economic background, and religious confession therefore informed the selection process. Student interviews were semi-structured and open ended, allowing themes and stories to emerge naturally. Arabic and English were used interchangeably depending on the context and fluency of the student. High school students were interviewed on school grounds, while university students were given freedom to choose a place where they felt most comfortable. The individually selected interview locations provided interesting social and political backdrops to frame family memories, historical events, and political position.



## ***Key Findings***

- **A disorientated and liminal generation.** Lebanese youth are struggling to reconcile public censure and private anguish, to come to terms with a history that resists either explanation or annihilation, and to situate their life stories between an unredeemable past and an unimaginable future. This is undoubtedly a consequence of Lebanon's post-war failings, leading to mass youth migration, and high levels of depression, adolescence violence and weapon-carrying.
- **War traces, in the forms of sites, absences, and narratives, have become normalized in everyday Lebanese life, impacting spatial patterns, social encounters, and self/other perceptions.** Students utilise these to both justify and challenge postwar realities. Massacres and militia battles, sniper strongholds and checkpoints, tales of betrayal and loss are used to explain continuing confrontations (student elections, neighbourhood skirmishes, or political leadership battles, i.e. Samir Geagea v. Michel Aoun) as well as everyday struggles of segregation, prejudice, and mistrust. While some students may seek to subvert and re-textualise war memories to offer contemporary critiques on Lebanese sectarianism or corrupt officials, their voices and struggles remain marginal and disempowered.
- **Unresolved war memories are reawakened during periods of political flux and instability – reactivating old grievances and historicising contemporary tensions.** Urban spaces of imaginative connection and shared trauma are not only strengthened and reworked, sustaining prejudices and sectarian/political differentiation, but also offer protection, communal solidarity, and a sense of belonging. Lebanese youth may desire the creation of more open plural city spaces yet they favour the security of sectarian residential enclaves, especially in uncertain times. There is an implicit tension between the allure of cosmopolitanism and the fear of a 'shared life' (*aysh mushtarak*).<sup>3</sup>
- **Lebanese schools and universities have evaded a critical examination of the war and recurring postwar tensions.** This is evidenced by a failure to agree a unified history textbook or create an educational environment open to debate and dialogue. By denying students the opportunity to critically appraise their contemporary history and by neglecting to provide safe forums for cross-communal discussion, Lebanese high schools leave students ill equipped to process or engage with the past. In abdicating this educational responsibility to interpret or explain the war, schools have relegated war memory almost exclusively to the private realms of the family, home, and local community.
- **Forgetfulness is a costly antidote, but Truth and Forgiveness remains a 'poisoned chalice.'** For those youth who do seek to distance themselves from Lebanon's destructive past, this often comes at a cost: a disavowal of history and a dislocation from the present. Students confess to feeling bereft of meaningful narratives or historical answers to explain their personal experiences or Lebanon's postwar realities. While students are critical of Lebanon's culture of impunity and untried war criminals they believe truth is illusive and unknowable and forgiveness is unpalatable and beyond their reach – 'we do not have the right to forgive crimes against our loved ones.'
- **The struggle for the Lebanese past is linked to the on-going contestation over its national future.** The 'Independence Intifada' (2005) and the demise of Pax Syriana has led to the emergence of two oppositional blocs – March 8, a pro-Syrian, Shi'a Hizbullah led coalition and March 14, an anti-Syrian, Western leaning alliance led by Sunni leader, Saad Hariri – with conflicting national visions, narratives and geo-political alignments.

## Conclusions

As contemporary Lebanon lurches from sporadic violence (Israeli War July 2006; Hizbullah's military incursion into Sunni West Beirut in May 2008) to fragile consensus (the Doha Accord, May 2008), civil war memories are increasingly implicated in sectarian

*The problem is we didn't reconcile our past in order  
to live for our future*

*Tony, 22, Lebanese American University*

diatribes exchanged between political opponents and secular protest rallies calling for 'civil marriage, not civil war.' These debates will undoubtedly inform future postmemory narratives—but

the Lebanese postmemory experience remains dynamic and multi-layered, resistant to official silences, and selective in its appropriation and negotiation of war. The challenge facing Lebanese society is not whether to remember or forget the war, but how historical memory can enable Lebanon's diverse communities to know and better understand what divides and unites them.

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<sup>1</sup> Craig Larkin, 'Beyond the War? The Lebanese Postmemory experience,' *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42 (Nov 2010): 615-35.

<sup>2</sup> Craig Larkin, **Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: remembering and forgetting the past.** (London and NY: Routledge 2012)

<sup>3</sup> Marianne Hirsch, **Family frames : photography, narrative, and postmemory.** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

<sup>3</sup> Craig Larkin 'Remaking Beirut: Contesting Memory, Space and the Urban Imaginary of Lebanese Youth', *City and Community*, Vol.9, Issue 4, (Dec 2010): 414- 442.

9<sup>th</sup>- 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012, University of Exeter, Conference Workshop:

## **Conflict in Cities and the Contested State**

### **Everyday life and the possibilities for transformation in Belfast, Jerusalem and other divided cities**

Mr. Brendan Browne 3rd Year PhD Candidate, School of Sociology, Social Policy, Social Work, Queen's University Belfast [CinC Affiliated PhD Student]  
[Supervisors: Dr. K. Hayward and Prof. L. O'Dowd].

#### **Project Title:**

### **Commemoration in Conflict: The negotiated construction of commemorative events in Belfast, Northern Ireland and Ramallah, Palestine**

Commemorations, including those selected for comparative analysis, are unique forms of ritual activity, which involve the recollection of a seminal moment from a group's past with the intention being to serve a specific purpose in the present day (Connerton, 1989). A review of the literature on commemoration suggests that participation in the commemorative event can serve the purpose of strengthening bonds of solidarity between groups for whom the remembered event is salient (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2010). However, commemorations have the potential to be divisive, and contested, particularly where the remembered past is a source of tension between rival factions. According to Vinitzky-Seroussi (2010: 5), 'We can learn much about a society by understanding how it performs its commemorative activities', as such, researching the 1916 Easter Rising commemorations in Belfast and the *Nakba* commemorations in Ramallah is a useful means of analysing the fragmented and factionalised nature of both societies under investigation. Collective memory, embodied through the act of commemoration, is as crucial for understanding the nature of a given society as any other sociological tool (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2010: 5).

This work explores the role that factions play in the organisation and delivery of commemorative events in Ramallah, West Bank and Belfast, Northern Ireland. In choosing to focus specifically on the commemoration of two of the most important and defining moments in Republican and Palestinian history, namely the 1916 Easter Rising and the 1948 Palestinian *Nakba*, the research explores how group cohesion and solidarity is generated or limited at these commemorative events. It is proposed that an analysis of how solidarity is evident or lacking is possible by focussing upon issues related to (a) the sharing of space and time by rival groups on the day, (b) the interaction and relationship between groups involved in organising the event, and (c) the effect of the

9<sup>th</sup>- 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012, University of Exeter, Conference Workshop:

political climate of the day on the events ability to strengthen solidarity or highlight division. In comparing the two events in question, a better understanding across cultures as to how commemorative events may be capable of generating group solidarity is gained.

For Irish Republicans the anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising remains the most important event on the commemorative calendar, the largest of which takes place in Milltown cemetery, West Belfast. However, unlike other important annual commemorations, the anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising in Belfast is a fragmented affair with rival Republican factions holding separate events within the same shared space over the course of the Easter weekend. Far from being solidarity generating, the event serves to harden the lines of differentiation between the various groups, each of who claim to be the true inheritors of Irish Republicanism. For Palestinians it is the 1948 *Nakba*, or 'Immense Catastrophe' that is the focal point of the commemorative calendar. Commemorative events take place across the West Bank on the 15<sup>th</sup> May with the main activity centering upon the city of Ramallah. Meeting under the auspices of the National High Committee for the Commemoration of the Nakba, Palestinians from across the West Bank, including refugee camp officials, non-governmental organisations, activist groups, and political party representatives, gather together to plan the *Nakba* commemorations. Attempts are made to ensure that rival factions share the same space on the day in which to commemorate in order to present an image of solidarity and togetherness to an outside audience. Factional specific symbolism is restricted, and cultural events take place to promote a shared sense of Palestinian heritage. Understanding the circumstances and conditions that may effect the generation of a fragmented, multivocal or more cohesive commemoration, and the role which factions play in developing the commemorations in question, forms the basis for the present research.

A multivocal commemoration will involve factions sharing commemorative space and time. A shared narrative on that which is being remembered is provided, albeit one that carries diverse meanings for those taking part in the event. A fragmented event will include multiple commemorations in various spaces and at different times, where diverse discourses and interpretations of the past are preached by rival factions and aimed at disparate audiences (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2010: 4) Although directly challenged by the findings of the present research, Vinitzky-Seroussi's model for assessing the likelihood of a chosen commemoration to be multivocal, and therefore solidarity generating, or fragmented and therefore divided, is one that has been useful in shaping my analysis and understanding of the selected events for comparison.

According to Vinitzky-Seroussi (2002; 2010), a fragmented commemoration will be more likely where there exists a strong link between the remembered event in the past and the present day needs of the group, when the event takes place in a conflictual political culture, and where the agents of memory involved in the commemorative activity retain a strong power base. A multivocal commemoration is more likely to occur when there exists a more consensual political culture, when the commemorated past is no longer part of the present agenda, and when the agents of memory have limited power and resources.

9<sup>th</sup>- 11<sup>th</sup> July 2012, University of Exeter, Conference Workshop:

*Key Questions:*

- What type of commemorations are the 1916 Easter Rising in West Belfast, and the *Nakba* in Ramallah, multivocal or fragmented?
- How do factions involved in the organisation of the selected events ensure that group cohesion and solidarity is generated or limited at the commemorations in Ramallah and Belfast?
- Through an analysis of the sharing/division of time and space in which to commemorate, the interaction between those who 'do commemoration', and the effect of the political climate of the day upon the commemoration, how is solidarity evident/absent on the day?

*Methodological Considerations:*

- Fieldwork involved six separate trips to Ramallah, encompassing a longer period of time (February- July, 2011) set aside to conduct semi-structured interviews with key respondents across the West Bank. Those targeted for interview included: members of political parties, (Fatah/Hamas/DFLP) NGOs, community based organisations, academics, activist groups, refugee camp officials, and additional members of the National Committee for the Commemoration of the Nakba.
- Interviews in Belfast targeted those groups involved in organising the separate commemorations for the 1916 Easter Rising, including: Sinn Fein, the National Graves Association, Irish Republican Socialist Party, Official Republican Movement, Eirigi, Republican Sinn Fein, Workers Party, former members of the Provisional IRA, and Republican activists.
- Interview data was complemented by structured observations made at both the Easter 1916 commemorations in West Belfast and the *Nakba* events in Ramallah. These observations took place over a two year period, Easter 2011/12, and May 15<sup>th</sup> 2011/12.
- The outcome of the data collection process was the generation of a rich set of qualitative data.

*Key Findings:*

***Belfast:***

- In Belfast, the commemoration of the 1916 Easter Rising is a fragmented and divided affair whereby rival Republican factions organise separate events over the course of the Easter weekend (6 in total spanning Easter Sunday morning to Easter Monday afternoon).
- Whereas each group/faction makes use of the same commemorative space, namely Milltown cemetery, this space is in itself internally divided with groups claiming ownership over selected memorial spots. Assembly

points and parade routes for the various groups differ.

- The allocation of timeslots is deemed necessary to ensure that the day does not descend into violent confrontation, as has been the case in the past.
- Therefore, instead of being a multivocal commemoration as Vinitzky-Seroussi's model may suggest, the 1916 Easter Rising commemoration in Belfast appears fragmented and divisive. The solidarity generated on the day is faction specific and not between Belfast Republicans on the whole.

***Ramallah:***

- In Ramallah, efforts are made to coordinate the commemoration of the *Nakba* centrally. Palestinians from across the West Bank travel to the city to gather together at a designated space.
- Negotiations take place in a structured setting to ensure rival factions stand alongside one another and restrictions are placed upon the flying of faction specific flags and the displaying of other factional specific symbolic capitols.
- Efforts are made to strengthen solidarity between Palestinians as a whole as opposed to highlighting the factional differences on the day. Although satisfying the requirements for a fragmented commemoration, the *Nakba* event in Ramallah appears more multivocal than Vinitzky-Seroussi's model would presuppose.

In analysing the findings gathered across both fields it is appreciated that Vinitzky-Seroussi's model for assessing whether a given commemoration will be multivocal or fragmented is a useful starting point, yet is one that is ultimately subject to challenge on the evidence provided. This research is designed to add to the ongoing debate on collective memory and the generation of solidarity. The findings suggest that factionalism can actually expand in more peaceful contexts, such as is the case in Belfast, whereas coordination and negotiation to present a united front is more critical and even achievable in a context of 'live' conflict (Ramallah).

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## Belfast the Religious City

'The legacy of religious wars and religious divisions is still written into the fabric  
of the city'



### Introduction

The study, which began in October 2010, explored the role and significance of religion in Belfast and its potential, implicit and explicit, to both foster and bridge conflict and divisions. In doing so, it focused on how religion is spatially manifest in both structures and practices (formal and informal), and the role that churches and clergy had/have in promoting, sanctioning or challenging violence and sectarianism in the city.

### Research Questions

- In what ways does the distribution of church buildings reflect the changing dynamics of the city?
- In what ways does religious space (sacred space) symbolise politics, territory and identity?
- How does religion through formal and informal rituals and practices help (re)constitute urban space?
- What role do clergy and members of faith based groups think religion played/plays in sustaining/challenging violence and peace?
- Do church sponsored social activities reproduce the divide between 'two civil societies' or are they contributing to a rather more singular and coherent Belfast?
- Do Catholic and Protestant churches relate differently to public space, civil society and the state?

## Methods

- *Mapping of places of worship in Belfast:*
  - No central database of churches available; drawing on church websites, directories and the Internet a spreadsheet was compiled; preliminary mapping done.
- *Semi-structured Interviews:*
  - Participants: 26 clergy and members of faith based groups with interviews lasting 1-2 hours.
  - Focusing on: religion and politics, the role of religion in encouraging violence and conflict resolution, engagement between churches and priorities and activities – continuity and change in the ‘post conflict’ city
- *Observation, Video and Photography:*
  - Visually recording formal (Ash Wednesday, St Patrick’s Day, Good Friday ‘peace walks’, Orange marches with, at times, associated nationalist protests, Pride Parade protests) and informal displays and practices of religion in public space in Belfast. Capturing the interplay between religion and politics, territory, memory, identity, community.
  - Resulting in a substantial body of photographic material, some video footage and a completed video entitled ‘Holy Day to Holiday’, based on interviews and footage collected on Ash Wednesday and St Patrick’s Day 2011 with students and young people living in the University area. Attention is drawn to how ‘religion’ is embodied and emplaced and reflects belonging and identities.

## Main Findings

- *Mapping – Fragmentation, Suburbanisation, Territory*
  - The mapping of places of worship clearly demonstrates the central role of religion in the historical development of the city; its continued presence in the built environment and the fragmented nature of Protestantism
  - 58 Church of Ireland, 28 Methodist, 81 Presbyterian, 186 other Christian, 47 Catholic and 7 other faiths
  - Evidence of some Protestant churches closing.
  - Representative/territorial importance attached to religious buildings and who/how these are accessed significant.

*Like the best way I could get a crowd into the church is to say they are going to close it and sell it to the chapel then I would be full every Sunday.*

- Protestant interviewees spoke of the fragmentation of Protestantism and suburbanisation of their congregations. As middle class Protestants moved out of the city, congregations now often made up of ‘drive ins’ with little knowledge or understanding of inner city problems.
- The centrality of religious institutions and infrastructure in maintaining community evident from Catholic interviewees. While acknowledging that observance was dropping Catholics remained connected to the church through relationships at parish level, a range of support/social structures (St Vincent de Paul, Credit Unions, GAA) and importantly schools and rites of passage such as Holy Communion (latter supported gender module findings)
- There is a deep-rooted asymmetry between Protestant and Catholic experience.

*Even though the numbers may fall away they are still connected into the church in one way or another. So even though you have a lot of our young people not practicing at all you still have an influence and a direction of where things are going and that's very very important.*

- *Religion, ‘The Troubles’ and Churches*

- ‘The Troubles’ were not regarded as driven, primarily, by ‘religion’ i.e. doctrinal differences, but by ‘religion’ that also encompassed identity, territory, ritual and community; not merely marking boundaries between communities but also giving meaning to them (Mitchell, 2006).
- A number of Catholic interviewees commented that for Protestants the conflict was religious while for Catholics it was political.

*For the Catholic people the troubles were always about matters of justice not religion I think for Protestant people it was more religious than justice. For Catholic people it was the chance to go for a job and get a job*

- The overlap between formal and informal religion and popular politics was pervasive.
- Interviewees (predominately but not exclusively Catholic) spoke of their role as advocates for their local communities during ‘The Troubles’, acting as mediators between paramilitaries, police and army.
- Interviewees acknowledged the difficulties in seeking to minister to their congregations while not being seen to condone violence.
- A number of Protestant interviewees were critical of the Protestant churches’ actions (or lack thereof) during ‘The Troubles’, feelings that biblical justifications of disengaging and working behind church doors meant that clergy didn’t get their ‘hands dirty’. However, this was countered by others who said they worked at ‘keeping things normal’.

- Some Protestant interviewees also commented on how individuals such as Ian Paisley 'gave shape to what people saw the churches were doing which wasn't necessarily the story on the ground'

*I don't think [church people] want to acknowledge the toxic force of religion at times ... as a paramilitary once said to me, it was much easier to kill Catholics if you were taught that they were shit in Sunday School. So that kind of the way theology kinda colours people.*

- *Bridging the Divisions – Theological and Social Activities*

- There is a continuum - theological ecumenism – to community social/welfare engagement latter often not explicitly 'religious' (based on gospel/Bible based principles).
- Some Protestant interviewees spoke of the need to become more relevant in their communities moving beyond notion of 'we preach the gospel, we don't do social work' to social engagement.
- Key individuals are involved in conflict transformation at a macro level. At the same time, cross community activities and conflict management are often bottom up, rely on grassroots, personal relationships and engage with a range of civil society organisations. While in existence before mid 90s these had gained impetus/become more acceptable since that time (links to Module B4).
- Priority given to cross community activities variable.
- Particularly from Protestant interviewees there was a perceived need for single identity work to precede or supplement cross community work as Protestant communities felt left behind.
- This notion (expressed as either fact or perception) of Protestant loss and Catholic gain featured in both Catholic and Protestant interviews. Catholics were perceived as being more organised, politically and socially and as having a more coherent identity. Protestant communities were portrayed as fractured, lacking political representation and strong social and community structures.
- Sense of a confident, educated, professional Catholic population against a beleaguered, under-achieving Protestant one

*For many of the people in these side streets dialogue with Catholics isn't even an issue [they feel] I can't get through the day let alone starting to talk to people who I don't even know and don't really like in a sense.*

*I'm not into hugging nuns and hugging priests in St Anne's Cathedral now I'm not knocking those ecumenical services and they are good for some people in a sense, but for the ordinary person in these inner city areas there is still a lot of rampant sectarianism and it is not hidden below the surface the way*

*middle class people do it, those people need to have hard conversations and ask hard questions to break up those stereotypes.*

*I think then Catholic people got themselves educated, got themselves good jobs and all the rest and invested an awful lot in education but I think where you have people who have nothing to move forward for that is where divisions start.*

- **Religion and Everyday Life**

- Despite declining levels of observance, religion remains deeply implicated in the physical environment and the practices and processes of everyday life in Belfast.
- Individuals, often at pre-reflexive levels, derive a sense of belong and identity from the memories, traditions and antagonisms involved in the rituals that are directly or indirectly linked with 'religion'.
- These rituals engender territorial attachments to 'sacred spaces', not in the sense of the Jerusalem's Haram al Sharif, but to the seemingly inconsequential and mundane gable walls, bricked up houses, churches, streets and monuments.
- Interrelated nature of residential space and ritual and commemoration in public space.

*Newtownards Road whether you like it or not is still a Protestant Road ... parades actually determine a lot of housing and if housing goes wrong then we will lose our parade and this is still a big thing with people.*

## **General Conclusions**

- Signs that while social significance of religion is waning it is adapting to changing circumstances and needs.
- Religion in Belfast is not relegated to private sphere 'religious codes, symbols and categorizations litter the landscape' and, particularly in everyday live, religion continues to play a public role in creating and maintaining communities (Mitchell 2006 91-93) – positive and negative consequences
- Belfast becoming a Catholic city – risking alienation of Protestant communities.



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## ***J2. Holy City/Holy Places***

### **The Holy Basin: Politicisation of landscape in Jerusalem 2008-2012**

**Max Sternberg, Wendy Pullan**

#### **Introduction**

Landscape has played a seminal role in colonialist and imperialist conceptions of Jerusalem's holy places since the nineteenth century. This research has focused on two key areas: firstly, the influence of landscape conceptions on the representation and official planning of the city, by the British up to 1948, then the Israelis after 1967; secondly, the use of landscape design by private settler associations intent on reconfiguring the Old City's environs (frequently referred to as the 'Holy Basin'), aiming to achieve control over both its meaning and territory. The forthcoming co-authored book *The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places* serves to bring together these two separate studies, exploring the connections between long-term trends in the understanding of landscape and the current, increasingly extreme physical interventions in Jerusalem's topography of holy places.

#### **Research Questions**

- How have Western landscape conceptions informed the perception of Jerusalem's holy places since the nineteenth century?
- Why has the so-called Holy Basin become central to the Israel-Palestine conflict in Jerusalem today? In what ways is it being manipulated?
- What role does the colonial manipulation of the landscape play in the appropriation of holy places?
- How is the insertion and extension of parkland in Jerusalem's Holy Basin impacting the urban functioning and socio-cultural fabric of the city?

#### **Research Design**

The above questions were addressed through: 1) a historical study of the origins and evolution of the Holy Basin as a planning concept and policy; 2) a qualitative study of the physical and symbolic transformation of the 'David's City' archaeological park in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan (to the south of the Old City) by the radical settler organisation El'Ad.

#### **Methods**

- *Visual sources*  
A wide range of maps were collected that together show the evolution of the Holy Basin concept, its topographic, territorial, visual and iconographic invention, ongoing redefinition and manipulation. We analysed topographic survey maps, archaeological



maps, official and unofficial outline plans, maps produced by NGOs representing political activities, as well as tourist and street maps. Evidence collected from maps was complemented by other visual evidence, ranging from nineteenth-century lithographs and photographs, to tourist guides, and audio-visual material on websites.

- *Semi-structured Interviews*

A limited number of qualitative interviews were conducted with civil activists that work directly on aspects of planning or heritage management in the Holy Basin.

- *Archival work*

We studied a number of planning documents produced at the beginning of the British occupation of Jerusalem, as well as during the Jordanian period, now kept in the Central Zionist archive and the municipal archive in Jerusalem.

- *Observation and Photography*

Ongoing city centre and neighbourhoods – everyday life, land use, events and spatial interventions in the Holy Basin, focusing on David's City park.

- *Mapping*

The visual evidence collected, combined with site observations, led to a series of maps produced by Lefkos Kyriacou that communicate both the historical development of the Holy Basin as a planning zone, as well as the physical expansion of El'Ad's settlement activities in Silwan.

## **Findings**

### *1) Holy Basin*

- Although it focuses on religious sites that are of significance to the three monotheistic religions, the Holy Basin is both a modern term and a modern concept.
- While modern religious fascination was the origin of the Holy Basin, the modern disciplines of archaeology and cartography were most influential in creating the concept of a demarcated zone that define the 'sacred space' of the city.
- Prior to the colonial representation of Jerusalem, the holy places in the city cannot be said to have been defined in territorial terms. Western landscape conceptions, most significantly the British eighteenth-century Picturesque tradition contributed most dramatically to reinventing the sacred geography of Jerusalem.
- British heritage planning in Jerusalem had certain anti-urban features that focused on attempting to 'preserve' the biblical character of Jerusalem. This, although unlikely intentional, was at the expense of the local Palestinian communities.
- A fascination for the landscape of the Holy Basin (consistently referred to as a sacred park by British officials) was the driving force and overarching goal of British planning 1918-1948. The Jordanians did not significantly reverse this trend 1948-1967, and the Israelis enshrined it in their planning policies, most notably through the creation of the Jerusalem National Walls Park in 1973. The overarching goal has been to sever the Old City and its environs from the rest of the city.
- The redefinition of the Old City's environs as a park has served to screen, ignore and partially obliterate the traditional agricultural landscape and land use of the Jerusalem villages.

- The Holy Basin planning policy and landscape imaginary has prepared the ground for settlers' appropriations of the Holy Basin from the 1980s; they have since built very skilfully on these foundations

## 2) David's City

- David's City presents the most significant gain the settlers have made in the Holy Basin since the 1980s.
- El-Ad's actions have turned the Palestinian neighbourhood of Silwan into one of the most disputed areas of Jerusalem, and one most prone to outbursts of violence.
- El'Ad's control and nationalist narrative manipulation of the site is powerfully exercised on the level of its physical transformation of significant parts of Silwan into a 'Disneyfied' neo-biblical tourist-scape. Landscape plays a critical role in mediating an Arcadian sense of well-being and archaeological excavations give a strong sense of authenticity.
- Landscape and archaeology are part of a wider visual and spatial strategy, including architecture, urban design and tunnelling. Heritage planning, control and marketing attract and encourage an extensive but selective tourism that furthers the aims of El-Ad and the wider settler agenda.
- El'Ad's actions in Silwan are linked to wider territorial strategies of control that can be mapped out according to visually powerful sites distributed within the Holy Basin. Tourist visitors' centres are one of the prime tools of this expansion.

## Conclusions

The research has uncovered links between state planning that has developed over a century and far right private actors that have become influential in the past twenty years or so. Landscape has become a key spatial practice, closely integrated with planning, tourist development, archaeology and heritage management, in the current battle over the Holy Basin. Today, landscape has been turned into one of the most effective weapons in the Judaization of East Jerusalem. On a more general level, the research uncovers the potentially detrimental effects of the apparently benign practice of creating parkland in cities.

## Research outputs

- W. Pullan, M. Sternberg, M. Dumper, C. Larkin & L. Kyriacou, *The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places* (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2013).
- W. Pullan & M. Sternberg, 'The Making of Jerusalem's Holy Basin.' *Planning Perspectives: An International Journal of History, Planning and the Environment*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2012), p. 219-42.
- W. Pullan & M. Gwiazda, 'Designing the Biblical Present: Jerusalem's "City of David".' In A. Webber, U. Staiger & H. Steiner (eds.) *Memory Culture and the Contemporary City: Building Sites*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 106-25.
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# CONFLICT IN CITIES AND THE CONTESTED STATE

www.conflictincities.org

Wendy Pullan, Max Sternberg, Mick Dumper, Craig Larkin, Lefkos Kyriacou, *The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places* (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2013)

## Aims and Scope

Contested, conquered and imagined throughout centuries, Jerusalem exists as a uniquely holy city to the world's three major monotheistic faiths – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Its power to attract derives not only from the fact that it contains a high number of holy places and sites but that it remains the loci of religious fervour, seasonal pilgrimage and eschatological visions for worshippers around the world. Despite the tendency to relegate Jerusalem to a state of irresolution in peace negotiations, various religious, economic and political events, often driven by opposing factions within the city, have catapulted Jerusalem into the centre of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This book offers a timely re-assessment of the dramatic changes that have taken place in religious sites that form focal points within the wider urban structure of the city. It adopts a multi-disciplinary and contextual approach developed as part of the research project, 'Conflict in Cities and the Contested State' (2007-12) directed by Wendy Pullan and funded by the Economic and Social Research Council's Large Grant programme. The book reveals the intensified radicalisation surrounding sacred sites in Jerusalem and argues that we are witnessing significant changes in the nature of their appropriation and their relationship to the city. In order to understand these sites and the underlying politicisation that has formed them anew, we augment the analysis of key areas today with a theoretical and historical framework; in doing so, we examine a selection of representative case-studies which have developed out of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and impact upon the wider city.

The 'Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places' will be unique among monographs on Jerusalem's religious sites because of its genuine multi-disciplinarity, its contextual approach through wider urban issues in this contested city, and its visual research methodologies. Most studies of Jerusalem's holy sites have focused quite narrowly on specific themes within the genres of religion, policy analysis, security, and international law, and have tended to privilege national events, official policies and technical matters in their analyses. This book investigates an under-researched field, namely the role of architecture and urban identity in relation to the political economy of the city and its wider state context; this is seen through the lens of the holy places. In this way the book sheds new light on the key role played by everyday urban life and its spatial settings for any future political agreements about the city and its religious sites, and the overall well-being of the city. Reflecting the wide disciplinary backgrounds of the authors, it adopts perspectives from architecture,



urbanism, and politics, and provides in-depth investigations of historical, ethnographic and policy-related case studies. This angle of research is substantiated by fieldwork carried out in Jerusalem by the authors on the Conflict in Cities project from 2003 to the present. In the course of the research, extensive interview work has been integrated with on-the-ground analysis of major points of contention and interface areas in Jerusalem's historic and religious core, the city centre, metropolitan periphery and wider hinterland. Photography, mapping at different scales and architectural drawing are significant tools in revealing patterns of everyday dynamics in the city, often ignored not only by policy-makers and planners but also scholars studying the city.

By analysing new dynamics of radicalisation through land seizure, the politicisation of parklands and tourism, the strategic manipulation of archaeological and historical narratives and material culture, and the general appropriation of Jerusalem's varied rituals, memories and symbolism for factional uses, the book reveals how possibilities of co-existence are seriously threatened in Jerusalem today and in the future. In the long history of successive re-configurations of Jerusalem's unique agglomeration of holy sites the phenomenon of politicisation is by no means novel. Yet the development of colonial urbanism and conservation from the nineteenth century and the recent rise in religious nationalism have contributed to a long-term trend of segregating the holy sites from everyday urban life. We argue that it is this separation of sites from the living city that presents one of the most worrying and unprecedented developments in Jerusalem. Many proposals for international intervention in the city do not sufficiently address the extent to which religious sites are embedded in the social life-world of local communities, and may thereby actually deepen this problematic trend. Respecting and bolstering everyday life as integral to the character and meaning of religious sites is emphasised as a key challenge for Jerusalem, if the city is to recover possibilities of diversity and stability.

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6. UNESCO and the Old City of Jerusalem: The limits of international intervention
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## Chapter summaries

### 1. Introduction

The introduction will outline Jerusalem's long history as a major centre for the three great monotheistic religions. It will introduce the major events and sites in the manipulation of holy sites that serve various factions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will also set up the basic dialectic of politics and urban issues that is central to the argument developed in the book as a whole. Individual chapters will be introduced briefly and the reader will be provided a guide to how the issues they raise link to one another.

### 2. *Sacred Space in Modern Times: Jerusalem paradoxes*

This chapter investigates Jerusalem's holy places within the wider idea of sacred space and religious life as understood and practiced today. It is intended to act as an overview for an urban situation that is confusing and often paradoxical. To what extent are the Jerusalem holy places simply a continuation of a 3000 year history of conflicting interests and violent appropriations? Or, are we witnessing a different version of contentious holiness where modern secularism has instilled the sites with new meanings? And if the latter is true, does it affect the nature of the conflict and its impact upon the city? Clearly our concept of temporality has altered with modernity, so that sacred space in contested territories today is not so much regarded as a link to an unattainable eternity but more likely to be adopted as a way of re-enacting and recruiting the historical past for a present cause. The 'my temple/church/mosque/synagogue has always stood on this site' argument has become the primary refrain for the political legitimisation of holy sites in many parts of the world. In Jerusalem, the present and future rights to land, are dominated by a meta-history that has had two contradictory impacts amongst local leaders and international interests: firstly, secular authority becomes the chief arbitrator in religious struggles, and secondly, everyday urban life is regarded as insignificant and even unconnected to the larger claims of history. Whilst the first point is generally true, resistance to the second is becoming increasingly common, as the examples in this book will demonstrate.

### 3. *Jerusalem's Holy Basin: From history to settlement*

This chapter analyses the dramatic impact of western ideas of heritage and landscape tied to planning mechanisms in Jerusalem's holy places and their urban context over the past century. The broader changes in concepts of sacred space discussed in the preceding chapter will be traced specifically in relation to town planning. Most of the current developments in the politics of heritage in Jerusalem are in part determined by a dramatic physical reconfiguration of the urban landscape in the historic core of the city since the nineteenth century. Today the Holy Basin is understood as a geographic zone surrounding the Old City situated in East Jerusalem, containing the majority of sites holy to Islam, Judaism and Christianity in the city. But not only a geographical term, the Holy Basin serves as the guiding principle in the discourse on how to manage the religious sites from an urban and a wider national-political perspective. The chapter reveals that this particular idea of Jerusalem's religious sites developed in the nineteenth century, was transformed into a fully-fledged planning policy in the early phase of the British Mandate and was then used as a political tool by Israeli planners soon after the 1967 war. This little studied development and its underlying conceptual basis sheds light on why the Holy Basin has become so pervasive today and subject to increasingly

extreme forms of political manipulation in the past ten years or so. The chapter thereby brings to light that the Holy Basin is a highly constructed idea rather than an urban reality or political necessity as often assumed in Israeli and Western circles.

4. *David's City in Palestinian Silwan: towards a tipping point*

Following the analysis of the wider planning framework, this chapter studies contemporary political uses of heritage sites within the Holy Basin. It specifically addresses the rising impact of state-sponsored Jewish settler associations on Jerusalem. The chapter focuses on the 'City of David' archaeological park, located at the foot of the Old City in Palestinian Silwan, as a prime example of far right settlers' increasing influence over the transformation of Jerusalem's dense topography of historic sites. In recent years the 'City of David' has developed into one of the most heavily contested sites in Jerusalem, and a likely source of future conflict and violence in Israel/Palestine and the Middle East. The private settler organisation El-Ad, who has effectively been given control over the area by the Israeli authorities, is shown to use a wide array of privatised tourist, security and heritage mechanisms as ways of extending the infrastructure of expropriation and occupation in East Jerusalem. The 'City of David' highlights how the instrumentalisation of varied architectural and visual mechanisms is critical to settler's exclusivist and antagonistic heritage stewardship. The success of the settlers' tactics and their damaging impact on the city is shown to be depended not just on their successful political lobbying and property dealings, but their appropriation and extension of longstanding planning and urban design policies analysed in the previous chapter.

5. *Redeeming the holy places: The rise of political Islam*

This chapter turns to the responses within the Palestinian community to the 'judaization' policies traced in chapters three and four and the absence of an effective international intervention preventing this process. The past ten years have witnessed the dramatic collapse of political authority and leadership in East Jerusalem. Evidence on the ground suggests that the Islamic Movement from within Israel is beginning to fill this vacuum. The chapter therefore examines in detail the growing involvement of the Islamic Movement of Israel in Jerusalem, both in terms of rhetorical discourse and specific facts on the ground. It explores how the Al Aqsa mosque has been employed, particularly by Shaykh Ra'ad Salah (Northern Branch) as a symbol for political empowerment; a site for public contestation (Waqf authority and Israel Antiquities Authority excavations) and a focus for religious renewal (local piety, activism and tourism). At the same time the chapter probes the question of how significant and far reaching the Islamic movement's impact is within Jerusalem and amongst the local Palestinian inhabitants. It debates whether their presence should be perceived as a growing strategic threat, part of an Islamizing trend or rather a consequence and culmination of weak local leadership, political intransigence, the failure of secular authority and the unintended consequences of the separation Wall and the non-recognition of the Hamas government. While the answer to these questions is as of yet unclear they will be critical in the future of the Palestinian community and the city as a whole.

6. *UNESCO and the Old City of Jerusalem: the limits of international intervention*

This chapter focuses on the role of the international community assessing how it may act as a mediator in the conflicts of the city. While studies into conflict resolution often refer to the importance of international agency and organisations such as UNESCO, the specific circumstances of international mediation in Jerusalem is rarely explored in depth. This chapter therefore offers a critical account of

international heritage interventions not just in Jerusalem but in divided cities the Middle East and beyond. It focuses specifically on UNESCO's role in Jerusalem's Old City. It examines the tension between universal heritage values and protocols and nationalist agendas which often involve politicised archaeological responses. Drawing on comparative case studies of UNESCO-affiliated projects in Fez and Aleppo, and in the violently divided cities and regions of Mostar and Kosovo, it assesses future challenges and possibilities facing UNESCO in Jerusalem. While the chapter confirms an increased need for an international arbitrator and protector for the city's sacred sites and divided cultural heritage, it also underscores the limitations of UNESCO's legal remit and the political sensitivities which hinder its praxis.

#### 7. *Holy sites and the living city*

This chapter addresses the limitations of the urban approach to heritage sites in Jerusalem and historic cities more widely. A critical discussion of the modern treatment of religious sites points to alternative scenarios more conducive to strengthening the city as a viable place for both Palestinians and Israelis. Traditionally holy places were seen as integral parts of the city rather than as barricaded sites that need to be dealt with rather than lived with. This chapter analyses the character and implications of planning strategies that separate religious sites from the wider city, and points to examples where residents over-ride such policies to reintroduce everyday religious – sometimes radicalised – practice into Jerusalem's streets. A segregation policy has been central to Israeli planning in Jerusalem, and UNESCO urban management plans more generally. This chapter therefore returns to the problem of the Holy Basin, this time from a critical urban point of view and in light of the implications of a buffer zone severing the Old City from the rest of Jerusalem and its hinterland, advocated so vehemently by Israeli planners and policymakers, as well as western-based international peace initiatives. We question the apparent managerial neutrality of the Holy Basin concept with particular emphasis on the local Palestinian community's needs within, and interaction with, the historic core of Jerusalem. The academic and political discourse tends to represent issues of national sovereignty, of the religious sites and of everyday urban life in a hierarchical order of importance. This chapter argues that politics, religion and everyday life are more appropriately seen as a triangle of different tensions.

#### 8. *Conclusion*

The conclusion will bring into focus how holy places have become a major means of competing groups working against each other in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jerusalem today is undergoing deepening fragmentation, a process which is decisively accentuated by the radicalisation of religious movements and the imprint they make on the city. One of the key questions that has arisen from the study is how we approach and assess not only the fragmentation, but also new forms of urban vitality, that have resulted from radical nationalist-religious fervour in the city. The dialectic of the wider urban situation and the ongoing political events is shown to be critical to the nature of the conflicts in Israel/Palestine.



## Religion, Violence and Cities Symposium Report

The Conflict in Cities (CinC) ESRC funded Project hosted an international symposium 'Religion, Violence and Cities' at Queen's University Belfast on 28<sup>th</sup> – 29<sup>th</sup> May 2012. While there is a growing interest, within and beyond academia, in the relationship between religion and violence, the intersection of cities, religion and violence (key foci of the CinC research) is often tangential or absent. The symposium aimed to encourage this tripartite focus, stimulate debate and develop new insights and avenues for research - the feedback from those attending the event indicate that in these respects it succeeded. Over the course of the two days in excess of fifty people, including academics, PhD students, a group of visiting academics and students from Paris and members of churches and faith-based groups based in Belfast attended the presentations and contributed to discussions.



The symposium brought together eight internationally recognised scholars who, in line with the underlying approach of the CinC Project, represented a range of disciplines – Anthropology, Architecture, Development Studies, Politics and Sociology. However, the Project's focus was extended both through the inclusion of cities not fitting the category 'ethno-nationally divided' and a geographical spread that went beyond Europe and the Middle East. This multi-disciplinary approach addressing, amongst others, cities such as Belfast, Jerusalem, Kaduna, London, Sarajevo, Tokyo and Vukovar gives a flavour of the scope and vibrancy of the debates.

Unsurprisingly, this approach produced competing understandings of 'religion' and 'cities' and of the relative significance that each could, or should, be accorded when interrogating how and why violence erupts, is curtailed or memorialised in urban spaces. Definitions of organized violence ranged from killing, to violation of persons, places or property. A number of speakers

highlighted the importance of being attentive to context and history if nuanced understandings of the nature and dynamics of religion and violence in urban settings were to emerge. Attention was drawn to the ways in which religion is reflected in the political as well as in the physical and social structures of cities and the practices of individuals and groups. This theme fed into broader debates on the connections between the 'religious' and 'secular' and the links between theology/doctrine and violence. Several papers addressed the role and definition of 'sacred' sites, a fluid category in the 'secular' urban landscape, and the importance of religious structures, often acting as repositories of memories and identities in legitimising, for example, nationalism (again a contested term) in ways that could provoke violence and divisions. The importance of religious practices and symbols, both formal and informal, in demarcating and claiming public space and in the creation of feelings of inclusion and exclusion at both group and individual levels was another important topic. This latter point was visually reinforced and demonstrated in a number of the excellent powerpoints and in a short video on Belfast.

The symposium ended with a robust roundtable discussion. While acknowledging the diversity of disciplinary approaches and the difficulties of constructing conceptual frameworks that address the intersections of religion, violence and cities, particularly given the scale and diversity of contemporary cities, the importance of continuing to theorise these complex links and look for common ground was emphasised. As contributors noted, while cities have always been sites of religious diversity and violence they concomitantly have the capacity to absorb diversity in all its guises and, as such, there was general agreement on the value of exploring and clarifying the ongoing patterns and processes underpinning what was referred to as 'a three legged stool'.



## **TAMING THE INSURGENT CITY.**

### **On the role of Information Technology in the reconstruction of a Palestinian Refugee Camp in Lebanon. A PHD Thesis by Monika Halkort.**

#### **Introduction**

On May 20th 2007 a small group of militants attacked an army post in Nahr el Bared, a Palestinian refugee camp in the North of Lebanon. 18 soldiers were killed in the course of the battle. The reprisal of the military resulted in 3 month of continuous bombardment that destroyed the entire camp. The short lived war would change the lives of the camp residents forever. It not only deprived them of all their possessions, making some of them refugees for the 4<sup>th</sup> or 5<sup>th</sup> time. It also exposed the refugees to a multinational regime of military and humanitarian agendas that has held them hostage to the fall out of this incident till this day. 4 years into the reconstruction process, only 30% of the housing facilities that needed to be rebuilt have been completed. Not more than 60% of the population has been able to return to their former homes. Finding their way back to normalcy and making a fresh start is nowhere near for large parts of the 30.000 refugees who were forced to flee.

This project looks at the ways in which the camp's reconstruction enabled the refugee population to renegotiate the terms and conditions of its presence in Lebanon and in doing so turned knowledge and information into a key vehicle to reclaim authorship and ownership over their lives and environment. One of the biggest challenges in the rebuilding the camp was the question of how to address the temporal paradox built into its function and nature as political technology. Palestinian refugee camps have always been a key symbols of the right to return in the national imagination. The political imperatives of resistance have made it mandatory for the refugees to insist on the transitory nature of their home in exile, and thus to hold on to their paradoxical condition of permanent temporariness. One of the defining features of the camps, therefore, has been the outright rejection and denial of their enduring presence in a desperate attempt to not hold on to their right to return. The camps are indeed one of the most powerful manifestations of the impossibility to reconcile the competing narratives of return that divides Palestinians and Israelis and thus constitute a living embodiment of the central dilemma in the conflict over the political architecture of the modern Middle East. How does one approach the task of

recapturing the history of a bombed down refugee camp without restaging its political mythology and legend? Can the process of research and planning ever escape the dichotomy of victim and oppressor inscribed into its function and logic? Does it not always already carry traces of the 'enemy' with it? The traces of Zionism, Orientalism and Colonialism and, ultimately, the traces of secular modernity? How can the process of planning and development effectively confront their spectral presence? And what does it take to engage with a legacy of suffering and endurance without turning people into prisoners and eternal victims of their own past?

What is at stake with the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared is not only the challenge to rebuild or recuperate lost property and assets. The reconstruction is invested with a series of existential struggles that confront the refugees with the task to reclaim recognition as historical subjects after 60 years of exile and to reassert authorship and ownership of their histories and achievements in Lebanon. The paradoxes and contradictions that this involves are a mirror reflection of the many unresolved questions in the wider national struggle. The main focus of my discussion and analysis therefore centers on the question, to what extent technically enhanced modes of validating time and presencing durations, as provided by Geographic Information Systems (GIS), digital mapping tools and databases, facilitate and/or constrain processes of political claim making on behalf of the refugee population. How do the spatial and temporal grammars information technologies bring to bear upon the reconstruction articulate to the wider framework of historical imaginations within the process is framed.

If the camp is in and of itself already a manifestation of the impossibility to ever arrive at a shared understanding about the *whens*, *wheres* and *hows* of returning, what then can possibly provide a viable starting point for thinking and planning the return to the camp itself? What is the temporal structure within which this return should be thought and imagined? And whose histories and losses are indeed acknowledged and articulated in its demands?

## **Methodology**

I have been following the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared ever since the end of the war in 2007 in various roles and capacities. During the first year of research (2007 - 2008) I worked my way into the camp by volunteering for a small group of architects and engineers that came in a position to develop the master plan for the reconstruction. In this initial phase I was able to closely follow the challenging process of collecting and assembling basic information on the social and spatial history of the camp. On return visits in 2009 I utilized my inside knowledge of the development process to conduct open ended interviews with residents and key players involved in the master planning to map their expectations, roles and aspirations for the reconstruction of the camp. Another key component of the research were regular visits to the camp to immerse myself in everyday situations and struggles \and to participate in planned and unplanned events like town hall meetings, NGO cluster meetings and demonstrations where distinct senses of ownership and belonging became visible and expressed.

I was able to collect a wide range of audio-visual material, fieldnotes, interviews, maps, technical diagrams and architectural drawings that required to develop a theoretical framework through which I could bring all these very different types of data and sources into productive conversation. In response to this I have developed the concept of '*political technologies*' that allows me to link my observations across this diverse range of sites into a shared language and conceptual domain.

### **Political Technologies. A brief genealogy of the idea**

Political technologies, in the most general sense, can be understood as means of instituting and producing knowledge in ways that make certain forms of political existence possible. As such it provides a heuristic entry point to understand the performativity of data and information and to trace the hidden scripts and temporalities built into collective relief efforts in response to some form of crisis, emergency or needs. Technology, here, is not reducible to computer and data processing devices, but rather refers to the emergent properties generated by the ways in which human and non human mechanisms of processing information interact and converge into one and the same knowledge ecology.

Within this broader orientation, the concept of *political technologies* offers itself as alternative trajectory that bypasses the compartmentalization of the technological and the social by thinking the virtual as integral part of collectives – as that part which is not fully lived or represented, yet that remains fundamental to their grounding, the constitution of their temporal and topological limits and possibilities (MacKenzie, 2002, p. 11). In this sense political technologies also provide an innovative tool to think with, by mapping the algorithmic mode of technical ensembles<sup>1</sup> back onto the ways we think about the role of data and decision making processes themselves.

## **Findings**

Reconstructing informal settlements is challenging under any historical circumstance. What makes matters particularly difficult for Palestinian refugees is the fact no one has ever bothered to document the settlement structure of refugee camps. Nahr el Bared simply did not exist on the map of governmental bodies and UN agencies. This led a young team of architects and planners to join forces with the camp population and to document the historically grown spatial syntax of the settlement to ensure the camp can be rebuilt similar to the ways it was before. The work of this grassroots initiative provided much more than merely a thorough spatial analysis of Nahr el Bared. It brought an undocumented chapter of Palestinian history into view that set a unique precedent for political claim making in refugee camps far beyond Lebanon. The lack of archival records has clearly demonstrated the critical significance of social and geographic data/information for the refugee population to enhance their position vis a vis the state and the military humanitarian apparatus and to overcome the structural weakness built into their relationship with governmental bodies and UN agencies. Yet, at the same time and in fact because of that very reason, it also established a new site of severe power struggles amongst the key power brokers that soon led to fierce battles of control over the data base in the camp.

The scope of destruction and the series of challenges it raised for all parties involved provided a long overdue opportunity to openly acknowledge and address some of the key deficits and weaknesses built into the camp function as political technology and location, while at the same time opening up new channels through which power could be

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<sup>1</sup> Assemblages of order composed of living and no-living elements


redistributed and new voices could make themselves heard. The mere scope of the operation and the fact that people from all sectors of the refugee society were involved in the process almost inevitably transformed degrees of visibility and influence between the different actors and groups inside Nahr el Bared. But it also closed down critical sources of freedom and autonomy that the informal architecture of the camp has facilitated over the past 60 years. Hence, the operative logic at work in the reconstruction process all in all implicitly drew upon a telos of historicity and origins that maintain conditions of suffering and trauma rather than facilitating a new start. The idea of return that informed the overall planning imagination has proven highly counterproductive as it tried to bring back an ideal type image of the camp that no longer exists. The 2007 war and the many obstacles that occurred during the reconstruction of the camp transformed the social fabric of Nahr el Bared in profound and lasting ways. Yet none of the parties involved seriously engage with peoples changing relationship to their own past and to integrate the current transformations into the planning process, which severely constrained the potential of the reconstruction to live up to the ambition to facilitate a new beginning and support the refugee population in reclaiming its place and position inside Lebanon.

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**Conflict in Cities and the  
Contested State**  
**Project Report – June 2012**

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*Thesis Title: Education and Ethno-politics: The Role of Education in the Disputed  
Territories of Iraq. (Working title)*

**OVERVIEW**

The oil-rich northern districts of Iraq were long considered a reflection of the country with a diversity of ethnic and religious groups; Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Assyrians, Yezidi, Shabak and Chaldeans, living together and portraying Iraq's demographic makeup. However, the Ba'ath party's brutal policy of Arabisation in the twentieth century created a false demographic and instigated the escalation of identity politics. Consequently, the region is currently highly contested with the disputed territories, or disputed internal boundaries (DIB's), consisting of 15 districts stretching across four northern governorates and curving from the Syrian to Iranian borders.

The city of Kirkuk lies at the centre of the dispute due to its symbolic importance to both Kurds and Turkmen and strategic significance to Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The official contest over the city's administration has resulted in a tug-of-war between Baghdad and Erbil that has frequently stalled the Iraqi political system. Subsequently, across the region, minority groups have been pulled into a clash over demographic composition as each disputed districts faces ethnically defined claims and an administrative solution for Kirkuk remains evasive.

As the political impasse continues, ministries from both the KRG and Baghdad maintain varying degrees of administrative influence across the territories. These overlapping jurisdictions have created a complex system of service delivery based on ethnic identity. As the two linguistically distinct centres of governance vie for control, inter-ethnic communal tensions are rising and questions of identity increasingly overshadow day to day life. The

existing literature and research on the region focuses heavily on the governance outcomes and possible administrative solutions. Little has been written about the impact of heightened identity politics on the everyday lives of citizens. Regardless of the final administrative outcome, the multi-ethnic population of the region require services and systems of co-existence. It is within this context that the thesis examines the development of education systems across the region post 2003. In the fragile environment of the DIB's, the way in which the education system manages diversity is crucial. Schools hold great influence over the integration and segregation of ethnic communities. Yet there is a complete absence of scholarly analysis in terms of not only the emergent education system post 2003, but also its role within the wider identity based contest.

### **Objectives**

It was the purpose of the thesis therefore to conduct the first mapping exercise of education in the region and to determine the factors influencing the development of education structures. The thesis unpacks the central research question of '*How have ethno-politics influenced the education in the disputed territories post 2003?*' The research sought to examine the purpose of education in the region, exploring the significance of cultural reproduction and investigating the link between demands for ethnically specific education and the wider political contestation over the territory. In this respect two fields of influence were important. Firstly, the ethnic basis to territorial claims, which has amplified the discourse over linguistic presence, cultural representation and minority rights; and secondly, the insecure environment, in which sectarian based attacks are frequent and debates over territorial representation have been elevated to the height of ethnic survival issues. Given these fields of influence two important sub research questions arose; to what extent has ethnically specific education become a society security issue? And what is the relationship between education and the wider conflict?

### **Methodology**

The thesis drew on a variety of primary and secondary resources in its investigation. Policy documents, media reports, UN and NGO education assessments and the collection of nearly 50 interviews with education officials and community representatives across the territories. Data was collected over the course of four separate research trips to Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan and Jordan between 2010 and 2011.

## The Main Empirical Findings



*‘People need to celebrate who they are ... before it was forbidden so now they need it... it tells ‘you didn’t beat us, we will come back stronger’ Aziz*

**Identity and Education Reform-** With the particular experience of genocide and ethnic insecurity in the region, education has become an obvious vehicle for the reaffirmation of cultural identity. Growing ethnic segregation within the education system provides the perfect means by which to reinforce group identity markers and strengthen societal security through linguistically, historically and religiously specific education. In this sense, the language of instruction has become particularly important and calls for mother

tongue education can be heard from all communities.

From an educational perspective, the importance of Mother-Tongue learning stems from an acknowledgement of better learning outcomes due to better comprehension. However, the situation in the disputed territories is more complicated and a number of contradictions must be taken into account. The intricate nature of Iraq’s cultural diversity and political history has led to a multifarious network of both political and linguistic representation within each ethnic community. Due to the legacy of territorial dispute and devastating effects of Arabization, not all members of Iraq’s ethnic groups have an active linguistic basis for identity identification. Ethnic communities have been divided by two linguistic authorities and have adapted in order to survive, resulting in a varied mix of languages learned from birth within each ethnicity.

In this sense, for some ethnic groups, the use of the term ‘mother-tongue’ is called into question and can be seen to take on a new meaning. ‘Mother-tongue’ comes to represent a language that is traditionally spoken by their ethnic group and not necessarily one in which a person of that group has fluency. The emergent school structure is therefore complex, with a plurality of institutional structures and uses of the term ‘mother-tongue’. The influence of identity protection has resulted in four models of school to meet the mixed requirements of each community; *Mother-Tongue*, including Turkmen, Assyrian and Kurdish schools, *Dominant Language* submersion schools, Dominant language schools with traditional


language/religious instruction provision or Dominant language schools with mother-tongue year groups and classes within them – teaching a translated curriculum.

***Education and Societal security*** - The pursuit of ethnically specific education can be viewed in terms of two benefits; the pedagogical advantages of actual mother tongue education and the protection of societal security. The investigation found the latter to be of greater significance in the disputed territories. Access to ethnically specific education is framed in terms of ensuring access to the means of transmitting cultural heritage and this pursuit takes priority over pedagogical good practice or acknowledgement of international best practice standards. In this sense it is possible to identify children entering ‘mother tongue’ instruction schools because of ethnic affiliation and not because they have fluency in the language. This results in a form of submersion education which has negative educational outcomes for the pupil. Ensuring the transfer of tradition to the next generation and the protection of societal security has taken precedence over good practice. The ambiguity of future governance outcomes has created a need for representation at all costs.

***Threats to Societal Security and Securitising Moves*** - Any challenges to securing societal protection through education have therefore contributed to elevating the education narrative from one of cultural preservation to one of ethnic survival.

Perceived deliberate threats include:

- Insufficient ministerial representation for minority languages. (Subsumed under Kurdish studies)
- Official channels blocking requests for resource allocation and funding.
- Prevention of teacher transfers from dominant language schools
- No text book translation.
- No minority specific language text books from GoI.



*‘They do not fund the school just because it is a Turkmen school’ - Turkmen MoE official in reference to funding for a Turkmen school in Ninewa.*



*'In Kirkuk the Turkmen open schools all over as a 'Screw you' to the Kurds, that is why they complain of underfunding.'* Arab education Official

### ***Kirkuk, Education and Societal Security***

In Kirkuk an additional aim can be recognised. In terms of the three competing ethnicities, Kurd, Arab and Turkmen, linguistic representation through schooling can be seen to aid credence to their claims over demographic majority and historical ownership of the city. A more political dynamic emerges, without substantial representation in the region each groups fears it will lose control over the territory. The fight for Kirkuk is a

numbers game which demands representation on the ground due to the omnipresent anticipation of article 140. A battle for linguistic supremacy can be seen to be fought in order to demonstrate this. As such, protecting mother tongue education access can be seen to be enforcing their claims to administrative control and therefore safeguarding their future societal security in the city.

***Securitisation of Education-*** The lack of funding and threat perception has led education actors representing their communities to advance from securitising narratives toward taking direct emergency action. Despite acting within the state education system, community groups have sought private ethnically affiliated donors to support the schools and allowed outside influences to enter the state education system. This external influence has resulted in numerous negative outcomes for the traditional pursuit of education, both through intentional manipulations by actors using education for self-serving purposes and unintentional administrative complications caused by the mixed involvement of conflicting jurisdictions.

#### ***CONSEQUENCES***

- Taught curriculum which conflicts with exam curriculum.
- Teachers untrained in curriculum of both MoE's.
- Unregulated use of donated religious/cultural and history resources.
- Loss of Dominate language skills by different communities.
- Strategic opening of schools for territorial representation.
- Unequal distribution of educational resources – possible future horizontal inequalities.

Where language is so closely tied to ideas of identity, education can be manipulated by identity politics and used to serve the interests of political elites and nationalist extremists. The securitisation of ethnically specific education has opened the door for this possibility. Minority communities in some regions perceive the opening of Kurdish language schools as a predatory act by the KRG, suggesting that the KRG education programme strives to ‘**eliminate other cultures and languages**’ and achieve the illusion of linguistic dominance on the ground. Equally such a linguistic battle for regional representation is seen to affect political will in terms of the opening and support of language schools in more demographically mixed areas.

## CONCLUSIONS

In conflict and post conflict environments, education is too often measured and assessed by means of desk counts and gender enrolment. In divided and contested societies, education holds a powerful influence over ethnic interaction and the peaceful resolution to conflict. It is the recommendation of this research that monitoring systems to detect conflict actors within the education system be further developed. Therefore scholars must work toward bridging the gap between academic understanding and real world practice.

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**Sustaining power-sharing: the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats and conflict management**

**Scope**

The management of conflict has long been of concern to social scientists, urban planners and community-minded citizens. While differing mechanisms of managing ethno-national or ethno-linguistic tensions exist, few studies advance our understanding of how conflicts are actually managed – the study of ethnic peace. In this study I draw on the experiences of two differing examples of ethnic peace; Belfast and Brussels, in the expectation that other contested cities that may one day consider power-sharing as a form of governance may learn from what have been categorised as sites of successful power-sharing. While there are few studies of ethnic peace, fewer studies again seek to understand the role of the elite level bureaucrat in sustaining this peace. This research project fills this gap in the literature, investigating the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite and further, through determining core beliefs of interviewees, establishes how this discretion is employed.

**Methodology**

In his seminal research, Walker Connor (1997: 33) submits that ‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; perceptions are as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues’. Therefore, we need a methodology specifically designed to measure perceptions and preferences, not facts. The methodology designed to investigate core beliefs and individual motivations is therefore central to this type of research question. Standard questionnaires, while informative in ascertaining information, are less robust in determining motivations and values. For this reason, a method was introduced to conflict management and comparative public administration research from psychology. Within the dissertation I have argued that Q methodology is more successful in determining and describing norms and values than traditional methodologies such as Likert scales or the semantic differential method. Q allows for the generation of various typologies, or categories, of bureaucrat-politician interaction that actually exist. These typologies are in turn more useful in understanding the workings of an organisation as they do not suggest one model of interaction but allow for a number of interaction models to simultaneously exist within an organisation. These in turn are more reflective of real world relationships.

**Project Contribution**

Conflict in Cities and the Contested State seeks to understand how contested urban environments can absorb, resist and potentially play a role in transforming the territorial conflicts in which they are situated. Further, the project seeks to advance an understanding as to how heavily contested societies may become viable cities for all inhabitants and how structures and institutions may bolster cities to withstand state struggles. It is to this aim that my research seeks to contribute – I explore how institutions actually work in practice within the contested urban society. The dissertation has taken one of the core project cities, Belfast, and introduced a new city to the project, Brussels. The aims of the dissertation are very clearly defined in that I do not seek to analyse Brussels or Belfast, nor do I target the research at academics and practitioners in these cities. My aim has been to advance a more focused understanding of how conflicts can be managed in the longer term and determine the role of the elite level bureaucrat in this process. Thus my project, while drawing on Belfast and Brussels, does not seek to directly contribute to the conflict management processes of these cities. Rather, my intention has been to look at the concept of public administration and through this public administration theoretical lens take a fresh approach to understanding how power-sharing systems of conflict management are actually sustained. I therefore am less concerned with the city-state relationship and with the role of national and international institutions and their interactions with the city. While much is known about what policies to implement in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, little is known about *how* these policies may be implemented. It is this research deficit that my research is aimed. Each of my chosen cities has adopted a different conflict management strategy and each city provides an opportunity to learn from ethnic peace as opposed to perpetually focusing on instances of ethnic conflict.

### **Summary of the Findings**

1. While the importance of the bureaucrat in enhancing the quality of governance is well researched within the literature, the contribution of bureaucratic structures and the role of bureaucrats themselves in sustaining the conflict management process remain understudied. Attention within the conflict management literature is often focused on the effects of poor governance, leaving the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining conflict management less understood. While many academics have suggested increasing the role of government agencies in conflict management, a review of the literature demonstrates that little is known about how the bureaucracy would behave under such circumstances. It is the bureaucracy that either provides or facilitates public service provision within the modern state. How the bureaucracy functions under consociation conditions is of great importance if we are to understand how the process actually succeeds. It is not only important to understand what governance structures are theoretically most conducive to conflict management;



an understanding of how these structures will be manipulated by the bureaucrat will provide for a more accurate prediction of bureaucrat behaviour.

**2.** The bureaucrat is found to influence resource allocation, decision-making and conflict management. In Belfast, the bureaucracy is found to influence the decision-making process, particularly in traditionally divisive policy areas. The bureaucrat is involved in proposing policies, suggesting reforms and questioning policies that run counter to the general public interest.

**3.** The research finds that bureaucrats in both cities are motivated by secondary, socially constructed norms and values. This is termed a professional attachment or mentality. This is not to mean that a bureaucrat is professional in his/her job but rather that he/she is attached to a professional set of values such as free trade, tax harmonisation, green policies or particular social policies. While primary attachments are stronger in Brussels than in Belfast, these primary attachments are superseded by professional norms and values. Thus within the power-sharing society active representation exists, however this is not necessarily on behalf of a primary ethno-national/ethno-linguistic identity but a learned professional identity.

**4.** While the traditional comprehensive mechanism of power-sharing may be more familiar, an alternative mechanism of consociationalism has nonetheless been successful in Brussels. The lowest common denominator (LCD) mechanism provides a viable alternative to the more common comprehensive mechanism of conflict management.

**5.** If bureaucratic elites are seen to be either motivated by social equity or administrative efficiency concerns, or are politically responsive, does this not make the question of passive representation redundant? The findings support no such assertion. While an ethno-political's group may, under certain circumstances, be represented by members of that group in Brussels, this cannot be said in Belfast. Brussels therefore supports Meier and O'Toole's (2006) research where it is found that ethnics within the bureaucracy are more likely to represent their co-ethnics in society in instances of ethno-political importance. However as later found by Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) an increase in the number of female police officers also corresponds with instances of reported rape by women. At the same time, Lim (2006) found that the representation of minorities and women increased with passive representation as minorities and women changed the norms and values of their white male counterparts, and hence the entire organisation. In the case of Belfast, Lim's findings are supported by this research: I find that it is not Catholics who represent the interests of Catholics; nor do Protestants represent the interests of Protestants, but that attitudes, norms and values are shared. The findings therefore indicate that passive representation can increase

representativeness of the traditional minority, not through direct representation but through the emergence of shared values among the bureaucratic elite.

However Grissom et al (2009) found that context matters, Blacks in Southern American states were more likely to actively represent their counterparts in society than Blacks working in Northern states. If this were to be true in our case we would expect representation of a primary identity in Belfast to be greater than that of Brussels, due to the more hostile environment in which the bureaucracy is set. However the antithesis is the case. Hence within our two cases of consociationalism, the external environment has not encouraged increased active representation on behalf of a primary identity.

6. Despite the necessity for passive representation, chapter five found that within a heavily contested society, a passively representative bureaucracy can emerge without the necessity for quotas.

### **Summary of the typologies**

#### **Belfast**

**Type One:** Extensively involved in the conflict management and policy making process. They control the relationship with the political level to advance their own interests. These interests include a commitment to developing a more efficient public service, improving the environment, managing the conflict or advancing the needs of those less well off in society. They work with the political level to achieve these objectives.

**Type Two:** Extensively involved in the conflict management and policy making process. They too control the relationship with the political level however they differ in terms of goal derivation: they try and decipher the goals of the political level and set about trying to achieve these goals. They then assume a mediating role trying to get political agreement on an implementation plan.

#### **Brussels**

**Type Three:** Conflict management is not a function of these bureaucrats. They are the most 'functionaire' of all our typologies. These bureaucrats are most inclined to defend and represent the public administration from political interference. The law determines their roles, not their own personal motivations. They are the closest to Weber's ideal type rational-legal bureaucrat and are the only Brussels type to not represent the interests of their own primary communities. However they do not disagree as vehemently with the idea as their Belfast counterparts

**Type Four:** While type three will disagree with the political level on the basis of the legality of a decision, type four will disagree with the political level on the basis of the potential effects of a decision. These bureaucrats are less concerned with the rule of the bureaucracy and pay closer attention to the effects of public policy on social cohesion. Their relationship with the political level is the most fraught of all types. They are the typology most likely to represent the interests of their own personal community.

**Type Five:** These bureaucrats are least likely to involve themselves in the policy process. Similar to type three they are guided by what is legal, not what is right, however they are the only type to agree with the statement: 'my role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy no matter what the circumstances'. They differ from type three bureaucrats in that they view the rules of the bureaucracy as implementing the will of the political level. These bureaucrats do not disagree with the idea of representing their own personal communities within the administration – however neither do they agree with it.

### **Implications for cities considering power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict management**

Power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful, however significant effort should be made to make sure the various governing institutions can coordinate policy in areas of mutual interest. Ethno-political quotas are not a prerequisite for passive representation. Those seeking to address any representation imbalance in the civil service should address the cause of this imbalance, not the symptom. Finally, bureaucrats, as all individuals, possess a variety of attachments. Pending on the issue and their company (colleagues/surroundings), different attachments come to the fore and guide bureaucratic behaviour. My project has mapped these various attachments and has clustered like-minded bureaucrats together. The findings are conclusive in suggesting that bureaucrat behaviour is not a function of primary identity. Societies considering consociationalism as a form of governance will need to pay closer attention to developing administrative capacity, not simply for attaining the secondary goal of good governance but for attaining the primary objective of conflict management.

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**Module B4: Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution in Belfast**

**Project Report – June 2012**

*Prepared by Milena Komarova and Katy Hayward*

*(with James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd)*

**Introduction**

The management of contested space and contentious events in Belfast is critical to building deeper and stronger foundations for conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. What happens (or fails to happen) at the level of urban neighbourhoods is conditioned by wider urban, national and international processes. This can be seen in terms of international (specifically EU) support, inter-state relations, and state-level power-sharing (Hayward and Murphy 2012; Anderson 2008, 2012; O’Dowd 2009); state strategies for conflict resolution and their limitations (Komarova 2008, 2011); public discourses about the conflict and political futures (Hayward and O’Donnell 2011); and urban re-development and re-branding strategies for ‘divided’ cities which rely on general cultural or economic objectives trumping the political ones of ethno-nationalism (see module B1.2 report).

**The module**

The progression from conflict management to conflict resolution in post-Agreement Northern Ireland is a process that remains vulnerable to the effects of contentious events, most of which are confined – to a quite predictable degree – in space and time to particular areas of Belfast during the summer months (Bryan 2006; Jarman *et al.* 2009). In recognition of this, our analysis of conflict management in Belfast centres on case studies of negotiation and conflict around the policing of interfaces and nationalist protests at Orange parades.

This module explores the challenges that the performance of conflict and micro conflict management strategies pose to long-term conflict transformation processes in Belfast. In particular, it seeks to illuminate the (unexpected) opportunities that contentious events offer for constructive dialogue, mixing and urban border crossing.

**Research Questions**

In order to address the aims of the module within the project, we answered four main research questions:

- What is the role of civil society organisations in the management of conflict in contested space at street level in contemporary Belfast?
- How, and by whom, is interface conflict managed on a daily basis?
- Does the visible performance of conflictual relationships jeopardise conflict resolution in Belfast?

- What are the particular challenges of policing interfaces and contentious events and how are these managed?



### Research methodology

Fieldwork took place between September 2010 and December 2011 and included:

- Fifteen in-depth individual interviews with police officers, local community activists (including residents groups' representatives), members of relevant local authority and statutory agencies, and representatives of third sector organisations engaged in conflict management and prevention;
- Four walking/mobile interviews with local community activists in 'contested space' and the location of key contentious events in North Belfast;
- A focus group with different ranking police officers from two different district containing problematic interfaces between segregated communities in Belfast;
- Participant observation of Orange Order parades and the associated nationalist protests in four different locations in Belfast;
- Observation of roundtable multi-stakeholder meeting in North Belfast for the purpose of minimising the risk of conflict around a contentious parade on 12 July;
- Collated media files on interface conflict in Belfast during this period;
- Extensive use of visual methodologies (photography and video) of contentious events and interface areas.

### Main findings

- ***The expanding role of civil society organisations in conflict management***
  - There is a growing number of community, residents' and voluntary organisations in Belfast whose primary purpose is the prevention of public disorder and inter-

communal violence at interface areas. The development and sophistication of these organisations and their programmes of intervention vary considerably.

- The implementation of political Agreement and devolved governance in Northern Ireland has gradually created a relatively stable environment for the work of this growing network of local conflict management organisations. With this, the possibilities and opportunities for local interactions, co-operation and negotiations around contested events have grown.
- Through their participation in local informal negotiations, such civil society organisations play a central role in the search for accommodation around contentious events, allowing local community activists to forge and maintain vital relationships with ‘the other side’ and the police.
- On the day of any contentious event, a variety of these groups and individuals are present to both curtail/prevent violence and monitor the activities of participants. According to the police, the participation of local community activists in such events is indispensable in managing them in a non-violent way.

*“[T]he fact that we have committed people on both sides of the community here ... who try and work with each other and with the police to try and resolve tension is beyond invaluable... Otherwise you just end up pushing police resources to these interfaces... It’s hugely expensive, quite antagonistic and it doesn’t solve the problem.”*  
(Police district commander, 21/09/2010).

- ***The role of community activists as intermediaries at interfaces***

- The changing role of community activists and their relationship with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) is critical to conflict management strategies. Local activists’ role as ‘intermediaries’ is not, at the moment, primarily one of working between two communities but rather one of bridging their own community and the police.
- However, as a result of their work community activists often get caught in the very gap they are filling and interviewees recount how stewards of parades can become the targets of violence and abuse by both rioters and police.



- ***The importance of visibly performing conflict in public space***

- The 1998 Agreement and reforms in the governance of policing, parading and protesting (NB objections remain to some Parades Commission decisions and actions of the PSNI) have facilitated the open expression of conflictual relationships in public space in a controlled and non-violent way. This development is welcomed by many of our respondents as intrinsically democratic, and as being a catalyst for creating public dialogue and fostering public ownership of space.

*“Our view has always been that ...the [nationalist residents’] protest [is] a safety valve; that it is a formal way for people in a peaceful and dignified manner to express their opposition [to an Orange Order parade passing through this area].”*  
(Community activist, North-West Belfast, 20/04/2011)

- The enabling, and performance of, protest is crucial not only for relationships among residents in contested spaces but, more generally, for the development of trust between these communities, the police and the local community leaders who manage these contentious events.
- When expressed in a non-violent manner, the performance of conflictual, or oppositional opinion and identity, is a way to move things on; offering the possibility for conflict resolution.

*“[T]here’s something about the contested space being made visible both through the march coming through and the protest against it. And if that can happen in a peaceful way then you are always making visible the contest but you are also holding open the possibility that the contest might be resolved.”*  
(Community activist, West Belfast, 01/04/2011)

- Our observation of contentious events highlights the ways in which the transient intertwining of practice, symbolism and interaction (Dirksmeier and Helbrecht



2010) in the choreographed performance of such events produces *de facto* opportunities for temporary border crossings. The performance engenders a momentary non-verbal dialogue between opposing sides (e.g. through flags and banners, placards, the positioning of groups on the road, the use of music).

- However, although peaceful protest is seen as an increasingly important way of making opposition visible, it does not necessarily negate or substitute for the more violent expression of conflict, such as through rioting. The management of this potential conflict, both prior to and during the contentious event, is critical for determining the power of community-level actors to manage or prevent violent conflict on the day.



- Nevertheless, on the whole, street-level disorder and rioting have diminished in scale and impact. Our interviewees suggest that rioting now tends to involve mostly young people drawing in local (community) stewards and the police, rather than 'communities' against each other.

- ***Policing in Belfast: challenges to reform***

- Since the 1998 Agreement the PSNI have undergone extensive restructuring centred on the concept of 'policing with the community'. The latter is understood as a pro-active and partnership driven approach to policing developed together with, and empowering, communities (Byrne and Monaghan 2008; Topping 2008; Topping and Byrne 2012).
- Critical to the development of trusting relationships between police and communities is the practice of neighbourhood policing which includes greater visibility, participation and accountability at community levels. Our research

provides evidence that, locally, relationships between neighbourhood police teams and nationalist communities are changing for the better. However, this remains an incremental process with varied success across the city.

- The development of relationships with individual officers has been vital to the success not only of neighbourhood policing but also of conflict management strategies around contentious events.

*“Progress [in this interface area] ... is not about structures...  
It’s about human beings. It’s about individual officers who have made commitments  
and have put in a lot of time to develop individual relationships.”*  
(Belfast representative of a human rights organisation, 28/09/2010)

- There are two major challenges to the consistency, continuity and face-to-face relationships that underpin the success of neighbourhood policing. First, the majority of police work is ‘response’ policing, whether it be to incidents of ‘ordinary’ criminality or to flash-point violence. This, coupled with the considerable reduction in the size of the PSNI, has resulted in the frequent use of neighbourhood police as a ‘slush’ fund for other types of policing, preventing continuity of work on the ground and sometimes compromising carefully-built local relationships with individual officers.
- Second, and related to the above, the operational independence of Tactical Support Groups (used in response to public disorder) has the potential to damage the reputation of neighbourhood officers and their local relationships with communities. In sum, there is a perception that neighbourhood police officers’ local knowledge and experience are not adequately incorporated into policing decisions vis-à-vis the spaces and events that are most contested.

## **Conclusions**

The performance of conflict through contentious events and their management in localised urban spaces in Belfast poses particular challenges to long-term conflict resolution but also opportunities for constructive dialogue and border crossing.

The role of community-based groups, individual activist and the PSNI in the mutual ‘co-production’ of conflict management is crucial. Local community activists often act as intermediaries between communities and the police while neighbourhood policing is central to the development of trusting relationships with, and confidence in, the PSNI, particularly where nationalist communities are concerned. But at the same time, and significantly for their credibility with both their own community and their negotiating counterparts, the involvement of both in contentious events has the potential to compromise their position in the eyes of local communities.

Broader structural stabilisation has enabled the flourishing of local conflict management strategies. But while the intensity of localised street-level disorder and rioting is gradually reducing in Belfast as a whole, the mishandling of local conflict management within particular locales of contested space still retains the power to destabilise or disrupt wider processes of conflict resolution.

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Mick Dumper

**Conflict in Cities and the Contested State Project Report – June 2012**

**Title of the Research Project:** *Post Conflict Policing in Jerusalem*



**Introduction**

This project is part of the J4 module: *Conflict Management: Physical control, surveillance and policing* which analyses the various forms of control and surveillance in Jerusalem. This report summarizes work that has been carried out in an advisory capacity with the PLO's Negotiation Affairs Department on the comparative study of urban post-conflict policing and negotiation proposals which deal with security and policing. It is in this way a report of a "work-in-progress" as the final output will incorporate both feed-back from security experts and the political echelons of both sides to the dispute over Jerusalem. It will also be set in context of the current challenges to policing in Jerusalem.

## **The Project and its Research Questions**

The main focus of this project has been to explore the Palestinian concept of an open city and the implications of an open city for the management of conflict and maintaining order after a political settlement. What are the main functions of a security zone and are they congruent with other governance and infrastructural responsibilities? Can political, municipal and planning borders diverge from policing areas? What impact will the need for secure borders, surveillance, intelligence gathering, control and checkpoints have on the route of the border, the construction and use of main transport arteries, the provision and location of essential infrastructure such as sewage and waste treatment, water and power, and on contiguity of residential and commercial areas? The experience of the international community in other post conflict cities in policing and security is used to assess the viability of some of the ideas being debated and circulated.

## **Methods**

The research is divided into four main parts:

- a) the evolution of the notion of an Open City in the Jerusalem context.
- b) a range of case studies of policing in post-conflict cities and develops a typology in order to draw out some significant patterns in operations and structure.
- c) critiquing the Geneva Initiative and the Jerusalem Old City Initiative in terms of how these proposals have an impact upon the security dimensions of a post-conflict Jerusalem. Some consideration was also given to the Schengen Agreement.
- d) the feasibility of a security zone for an open city model: what are the prerequisites (in terms of what should be part of a political agreement) and what capacities are demanded.

Data was collected from a search of internal documentation of the PLO and interviews with Palestinian participants in the various rounds of negotiations with Israelis. Data for b) was drawn mainly from UN, OECD /DAC, EU data on the web and a number of key secondary sources. A number of interviews were also carried out with senior personnel in the Palestine Security Forces and with EUPOL Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support.

## Findings


The Open City concept for Jerusalem was proposed by the PLO in the mid-1990s within the context of negotiations based on a two-state solution. The basic concept is that an Open City will permit the free movement of persons and goods within its borders. Operationally, all controls appropriate to national borders will be exercised at the exits of the Open City zone and there will be an internal border running through the Open City. Some form of inter- or supra-municipal executive is essential. The advantages of a Zone can be seen in the areas of employment, tourism, services, coordinated governance, freedom of religion, and international support. There are also significant disadvantages. These include restrictions on sovereignty, curtailment on the freedom of action, potential asymmetrical development in East Jerusalem, unresolved disputes over refugee property undermining coordination, negative impact on development in the West Bank. The geographical area of the Open City Zone has been undefined in all the documents publicly available, although a number of options have been suggested ranging from the Old City to an Urbanised Region.

The Geneva Initiative was launched in December 2003 and proposes two capitals for two states with two municipalities responsible for their respective areas. A coordination committee will be appointed by the municipalities to oversee economic development. The shortcomings of the Initiative are:

- In the Jerusalem region, not a single settlement is evacuated or placed under Palestinian sovereignty.
- The drawing of the border in this way also fragments the city in serious and unacceptable ways, compromising its integrity and its functioning as a single urban unit.
- The border between the two sections of the city includes narrow necks or tongues of land, semi-enclaved clusters of houses, long tunnels with bends in them and bridges over strategic roads will require a huge investment in surveillance systems and personnel on the ground.
- The proposals for the Old City and its holy sites are very problematic. For example, the separation of the Jewish Quarter from the rest of the Old City and the



allocation of the western gates of the Old City to Israeli control will cause many complications in accessing different parts of the city



For its part, the Jerusalem Old City Initiative (JOCI) is based on the view that a negotiated agreement between the governments of Palestine and Israel on Jerusalem is not possible unless a special regime is established for the Old City. However the weaknesses of the JOCI proposals are profound.

- a) They make no reference either to UN Security Council Resolution 242 or to Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem as the basis of an agreement.
- b) The proposal extends the role of special regime to areas which are normally regarded the function of a municipality. The result would be to create a distinct entity which can be clearly seen as separate from the rest of East Jerusalem.
- c) The lack of clarity over the termination of the special regime establishes a **new** status quo for the Old City which will replace the existing UNSC position.
- d) In addressing a political problem, the JOCI proposal adds further to the current fragmentation of the city into enclaves and segregated areas.
- e) JOCI only offers ideas for a partial vision of the city which need to be developed further to take in broader city-wide issues.

To further contextualise these proposals research was conducted on eight case studies: Berlin, Beirut, Vukovar, Mitrovica, Kaduna, Dili, Kirkuk and Durban. In their specifics the cases above are not obviously relevant to Jerusalem. However, the principles of policing that were followed and the challenges to order and stability identified in these situations did provide some useful general pointers. Once the immediate security situation has stabilised, the case studies show how a model based upon three elements have assisted in the consolidation of law and order:

- community-based policing
- highly devolved administrative structures for the police services
- backed up by the centralised provision of intelligence, specialised armed units and weaponry and heavy equipment

The post conflict situation in Jerusalem as envisaged by an Open City has three important features which make policy transfer difficult. One possible model is a security zone that may or may not be congruent with the borders of a combined East Jerusalem municipal and West Jerusalem municipal area. The security zone will include Palestinian and Israeli sovereign territory and have an internal border running through it based upon 1967 borders but amended by land swaps. Entry into the zone will be a coordinated activity between Palestinian and Israeli security services with 3<sup>rd</sup> Party oversight. Exit controls will be the responsibility of the national government into which territory traffic is entering. Security cooperation will be based a Legal Convention and a Policing Convention signed by the two parties and there will be strong coordination and cooperation mechanisms drawn from the European Schengen Agreement model and the establishment of joint units for specific tasks. Third Party assistance will take the form of monitoring border controls and assistance in the introduction of administrative structures, the provision of training and the arbitration of disputes.

## **General Conclusion**

It is clear from the literature and documents reviewed in this study that much more integration of different perspectives and disciplines is required in devising a post-conflict

policing framework for Jerusalem. Planning considerations thrown up by the Open City zone concept are not well-coordinated with security concerns, while negotiating strategies which address issues of political acceptability ignore the impact of their proposals on the city as a functioning urban unit. The comparative case studies indicate that there is a significant expertise available both in the UN agencies and in the programme for security sector reform. Finally, the Schengen Agreement demonstrates that despite major obstacles in coordinating a multiplicity of policing regimes, a coherent system is possible, given a conducive political environment. This observation does ignore the considerable political impediments that currently exist.

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## **Module B1.2: The Changing Built Environment and Socio-Economic Structures of Belfast**

### **Module Report, June 2012**

*Liam O'Dowd*

*Milena Komarova*

#### **Introduction**

The possibilities for transformation offered by everyday life in 'post-conflict' Belfast are framed by three kinds of structural transitions taking place in the city over the past decade: economic, political and cultural. These are manifested in, and in turn given shape by, the physical and spatial environment. Various urban regeneration strategies have transformed the built environment and urban space. Both constitute a contested terrain and serve as tools and stakes in the ongoing structural transformation of the city.

#### **Research questions addressed**

The module examines the extent to which the evolution of the built environment in Belfast since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has interacted with 'ethno-national' conflict and divisions. We ask whether underlying structural dynamics manifested through physical regeneration practices are transforming conflict and territoriality in the city.

#### **Research methodology**

- Case studies of major regeneration schemes in Belfast: The Crumlin Road Gaol and Girdwood Barracks, Titanic Quarter and the Gasworks regeneration;
- 30 individual key informant interviews with planners, local and regional civil servants, community activists and academics;
- A roundtable discussion on the future of Belfast;
- A review of key documents associated with public consultations on individual regeneration schemes;
- Collation of media files on a variety of regeneration projects in Belfast;
- An extensive photographic database documenting changes in the built environment of the city throughout the lifetime of the Project.

#### **Key Findings**

- Structural context
  - Belfast is increasingly portrayed as having moved from a 'conflict' to a 'post-conflict' city preoccupied with economic development and regeneration. The centrality of economic development as a driver of conflict transformation is manifested in the

dramatic physical transformation of parts of the city which include sweeping, in scale and cost, regeneration schemes.

- However, in territorially contested parts of the city there is a huge tension between the 'fluid' logic of capitalist development and the antagonistic politics and culture of territorial fixity. There is a territorialist link between 'community' and 'place' which is firmly embedded in social housing.
  - Desegregation, while often inconceivable in terms of residential space at present, is possible and has to a degree been successful in terms of work and leisure spaces (although a number of leisure centres and parks remain segregated);
  - Both central and local government in effect play a fragmented and incoherent role in urban regeneration. The state's bureaucratic management of regeneration projects fails to challenge territorialism effectively and acquiesces with the logic of grassroots territorialism. This is partly because local politics is heavily focused on distributionist rather than productionist issues e.g. on ensuring that both territorial communities get their fair share of the cake which encourages zero-sum thinking. More than that though, existing governance structures tend to literally reflect grassroots territorialism because local political representation draws heavily on 'single-community' electorates.
  - Far from encouraging constructive engagement, elaborate institutional settings, through which painstaking public consultations on regeneration projects are conducted, facilitate traditional forms of inter-communal antagonism.
  - In practice, decisions over development of regeneration projects rest with the local Executive which represents the same political stalemate as that manifested in local contestations over space.
- Narrating Belfast: Between transformation and preservation
    - Our research suggests that discursive and material practices, relating to the built environment and regeneration of Belfast tend to be organised into spatial stories or narratives.
    - Such narratives are products of coalitions of interests of professional or localised groups. Narratives reveal the ways in which the economic, political and cultural dimensions of the city interrelate with everyday life practices and institutional power. They also reveal a power struggle over whose order is to be imposed on the city, to what effect and against what resistances.
    - We identify five key contemporary ontological narratives of urban regeneration in Belfast. Sometimes internally contradictory, the narratives engage in a dialogue with each other and even partially overlap. While they are each anchored in particular parts of the city all of them imply a degree of envisioning the city as a whole:



- *The New Capitalist City*

This narrative is put forth by property developers, bankers, public-private partnerships, businessmen, city officials and politicians and is visually manifested by ambitious regeneration schemes along Belfast's waterfront and in the city centre, such as Titanic Quarter and Victoria Square. Focused on the importance of

growing a dynamic and innovative economy as a way of 'normalising' the city, the narrative constitutes the ground for an unprecedented level of cross-party political agreement. Yet, it is contradictory: Belfast has only selectively undergone a process of 'neoliberalisation' and many of its communally segregated and socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods remain intact. The question remains whether the power and fluidity of capital can undermine the Old Belfast of ethno-national divisions and deprivation.

- *The Contested City*



This narrative is captured by 'peacewalls', residential segregation and political divisions, and is performed through contentious parades, protests and riots. It shows Belfast is still a city with high rates of ethno-national spatial divisions linked to deprivation and violence. Our research into a dispute over the residential development plans for a large regeneration scheme in

north Belfast shows territoriality is firmly embedded in social housing. The unprecedented level of political agreement over the importance and direction of economic development, demonstrated by the 'new capitalist city' narrative, falls apart once crystallised around particular places in the city where ethno-national divisions and territoriality, on which political affiliation itself is based, take primacy in discourse and action.



○ *The 'World We Have Lost'*

This narrative is an attempt to make sense of the relative decline of Belfast from the zenith of its economic and political power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Contributors to urban change have included: the long process of capitalist restructuring, de-industrialisation, physical planning, violent conflict, and regional power-sharing administration. The key urban symbols of this narrative are the site of the old Harland and Wolff Shipyards, Belfast City Hall and the Stormont Parliament Building. The narrative is

rooted within Protestant working class communities of Belfast, while elements of it are also articulated by local unionist politicians and policy practitioners.

The 'world we have lost' is characterised by a loss of a sense of Belfast as a place, and of the dissolution of the close-knit communal spirit of local neighbourhoods. Belfast's political future is looked upon with pessimism that reflects a sense of unionist political defeat. Despite commonalities with 'the contested city' narrative 'the world we have lost' is overwhelmingly unionist and expresses the loss of a privileged political and economic position (see also Religion Module report).

○ *The Shared City*



Focused on building cross-communal accommodation in the present the narrative looks to a more positive future for Belfast as a 'shared city'. It is promulgated most vigorously by the voluntary and community sector and by the administration of Belfast City Council. The narrative is centred around (but extends beyond) the notion of shared urban space. Visually, its best existing

representation is Belfast city centre.



The 'shared city' narrative is distinguished by its attempt to directly tackle the question of conflict transformation through the reshaping of urban space and its use, yet it bears all the difficulties associated with the broader search for a political settlement: Discursively it is imbued with various and, at times, contradictory meanings. Despite rhetorical commitment at a strategic policy level, it has had no consistent expression at the level of urban or regional policy; A variety of 'tactics of resistance' in everyday life resulting in the disuse or blighting of space have rendered the development of shared space in the city more applicable to commercial and work space, and confined it to the city centre and some of its immediate surroundings.

- *The City of Quarters*

This emerging narrative is visually, politically and culturally associated with a variety of spaces in Belfast, past and present. It is based on an internationally *en vogue* urban development and regeneration practice of 'quarterisation' reflecting a discourse of commodification of culture.



Although it could be seen as in essence another tale of the 'new capitalist city' this narrative incorporates at least two new discursive elements: it expresses concern for the welfare aspects of economic development; and is most vigorously promulgated by a coalition of business, local government and political representatives associated with a predominantly nationalist political and cultural elite. The narrative might be interpreted as a historically novel bid from nationalists for a role in the civic leadership in the city. Yet, there is a question about the extent to which it achieves something greater than the sum of its parts. The real difficulties it encounters have to do with its attempt to project versions of commodified culture onto a complex social, political and physical reality.

## **Conclusions**

The threads of structural economic, political and cultural change can be discerned in the evolution of the physical environment of the city. This change is manifested through various urban regeneration strategies which are influenced by, and in many ways may be the product of, the (sometimes conflicting) dynamics of structural change. Yet, both the changes in the physical geography of the city and the associated regeneration practices

themselves enable and/or constrain different political, economic and social practices. In this way they also serve as 'operational fields' for reproduction and/or transformation of ethno-national identities, divisions and relationships.

Narratives are not simply representations of urban development. They are tools for action constituting places, practices and meanings while informing wider discourses of power that aim for social and spatial change. They have varying power to transform urban spaces into territories and places. Narratives reveal the tension between the different structural logics of capital, politics and culture. They expose their strengths and weaknesses and highlight the fragmented and incoherent role of the state. While the 'new capitalist city' is promulgated as an overarching framework, it has also been the most visually transformative, finding an echo in all other narratives of the city. However, it threatens new forms of exclusion and remains politically and culturally limited by the territorialist resistance of the 'contested city' narrative.

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## **Conflict in Cities and the Contested State Project Report – June 2012**

**Title of the Research Project:** *Re(ad)dressing Mostar. Architecture and/of everyday life.*

### **Introduction**

The city of Mostar was repeatedly destroyed during the war in 1992 precipitated by the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its international recognition as a sovereign nation state. Firstly, the Serbian units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) attacked BiH and laid siege to Mostar for 3 months, until a Croat-Muslim counter-offensive defeated the aggressors (June 1992). A year later another war was again shattering the city. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) attacked the Muslim community in an attempt to make Mostar a Croat city, the capital of the envisioned Croat entity of Herzeg-Bosna. Heavy fighting occurred on the central Bulevar.

In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreements (DPA) brought to an end the conflict in BiH and began the process of its post-war reconstruction. The DPA included a new Constitution and institutional arrangements for BiH. A consociational system was envisioned as the best option then available. BiH, in contrast to all the other former-Yugoslav Republics, was declared a multi-national state constituting three distinct peoples: Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb. In turn, BiH was (re)imagined as a state comprising two geopolitical entities: the Federation of BiH (arranged into ten Croat or Bosniak cantons) and the Republika Srpska (with a large Serb majority). A special status was validated for the area of Brčko that, due to its strategic position, was declared a multi-ethnic District and administrated separately. As suggested by scholars such as Campbell (1999), the DPA reinforced nationalist claims for each nation’s right to self-determination by providing them with territorial authority, as well as the representation of identities on an ethno-national basis. The Dayton model failed to create an effective space for those who did not want or could not fit into one of the pre-determined ethno-national categories. In fact, minorities and non-nationals were conceived without constitutional validation and generally excluded from politics – undermining, as a side effect, the very same project that brought them into existence.

The peculiar (ethno)nationally mixed population of Mostar underwent a significant shake-up. Due to internal and external migration, west Mostar became a quasi-Croat enclave while the east became largely Bosniak/Muslim in composition; the number of

Serbs dropped dramatically to less than five per cent. Due to the violence that characterised the claim for territorial sovereignty (Bosnian-Croat and Bosniak), the European Union took charge of the administration of Mostar in 1994. With the aim of placating the internal fighting, the city was divided in 6 sub-districts (3 under Croat control and 3 under Bosniak control) and a central (*neutral*) zone (former buffer zone). Each area had relative autonomy in its decision-making. The idea was to separate intolerant communities as a means to fostering a dialogue between them at a higher level of governance. In 1997, the administration of the city passed to the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). In 2003, in an attempt to end the division of Mostar, the High Representative called for a special Commission to reform the city. Since the invited parties were not able to agree on a common vision for the future, the High Representative imposed reunification in 2004. Since then the city has been officially declared one single entity; however the process of reunification is still highly contested. Proof lies in the fact that Mostar was without a mayor for 13 months (October 2008-November 2009) due to the lack of political agreement among the elected councillors (the impasse was eventually solved by another direct intervention of the High Representative in November 2009).

### **The Project and its Research Questions**

This project critically engages with the process of (political) reconstruction of the city of Mostar. On the one hand, it looks at the ways in which the city is being physically reconstructed and, on the other hand, it explores its *everyday* to investigate the effects of the process of reunification on the social life of the city. Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre and, in particular, by critically engaging with his theory of the *production of space*, this project seeks to understand the ways in which space in Mostar is produced and reproduced. Importantly, this research understands spatial production as a process, which could – potentially – be subverted. Thus, the fact that Mostar is a divided city prompts the question: *how is Mostar a divided city?* Whereas existing analyses acknowledge the division in order to examine the *effects* of such divisions in the urban (social) space, the aim of this project is to imagine ways in which the city is/could be reproduced as less divided.

Space is here understood as a social product, and thus the result of a complex set of socio-relational dynamics, which combine normative discourses and directives with quotidian practices. Adopting the methodological tool of the *spatial triad* as elaborated by Lefebvre, space is understood as the relational outcome of policy-makers' and urban planners' praxis, which is refracted through the dominant political discourses (national and international). However, emphasis is given to everyday practices in order to shed light on how the use of urban space is consistent (or not) with spatial directives as designed by urban administrators. Central to this project is a critical engagement with

*heterotopias*, understood as “the liminal social spaces of possibilities where something different is not only possible, but foundational for defining of revolutionary trajectories” (Harvey, 2012: x). In fact, the project looks at the activities of existing organised groups of citizens, which attempt to disrupt the *normalised* cartography in order to imagine and produce social change.

## **Methods**

The project references a vast array of sources such as policy documents, interviews with officials, media clippings, site observations, mappings, photography, and fieldwork diaries, which were collected during a yearlong ethnography (2009-2010). The project benefited from my active involvement in the activities of Abart – a local platform for the production of critical art interventions. In fact, since December 2009 I have been collaborating with the group to design and implement art projects with the aim of tackling the division of the city, and to create a viable space where the highly contested *stories* of Mostar could be dissected, questioned, and debated in the public arena.

## **Findings**

Consistently with the results of other ethnographic projects conducted in the region, one of the outcomes of this spatial analysis is that ethno-national categories are not taken to be fixed or rigid, but flexible and negotiated in (and through) the quotidian. Although nationalist discourses and practices exist, the everyday of Mostar is no more characterised by *ethno-national violence* or restricted movement. The Bulevar, former buffer zone, has been the target of the main reconstruction projects and now hosts the new Municipality building and a brand new public square. The problem of Mostar as a divided city must be addressed by examining the ways in which the reunification has not been translated into effective reconciliation. The fact that the city was declared ‘as one’ led the main political actors to dismiss reunification as a process, and thus failing to imagine how the city could become one in practice. As a result, debates about the polarisations in the urban life are marginalised or silenced. Power is handled along the rigid rules of consociationalism, which guarantees political participation on the basis of fair ethno-national representations. However, those who cannot or do not want to identify themselves by means of ethno-nationality are *de facto* excluded from the sinews of power. In this way, the increasing public disillusionment with regards to *politics as such* is to be considered as pivotal in understanding the reasons why counter-movements are side-lined. In fact, the perceived political dysfunctions of Mostar and the authoritative presence of foreign actors in deciding the future of the city both contributed to the association of politics with what is *immoral* and *amenable*. The city is held captive by of immobility and stagnancy, which results in more or less conscious form of boycott. The central problems, such as the contested history of the city, the political impasses, and

the poor provision of basic services become accepted as consistent with the *naturalisation of dysfunction* in the city. Yet, possibilities of change are present. Grassroots activism exists and should be accounted for in the attempt to explore the social potential of initiatives born outside of official policy for the city. In fact, despite their numerical minority, activists are proposing platforms from where to renegotiate divisive practices and to imagine different futures freed from nationalist antagonisms. In particular, this project critically engages with the activities promoted by Abart and the Group for the Preservation of the Partisan Memorial in Mostar as the formative case studies.

### **General Conclusion**

In conclusion, the project argues that rather than solely looking into the reified ethno-national divisions, research concerning Mostar should begin by looking into the multifarious activities promoted by those actors who work outside institutionalised power channels. Indeed, substantial and meaningful change could come from precisely those who reject the *status quo*, and as such they should be given their due attention and visibility. Certainly, Lefebvre's idea of art as a revolutionary tool might seem naïve, but in fact creative praxis in Mostar is already proving itself capable of producing a viable and critical space where the future of the city has not yet been written in stone.

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## **DRAFT ONLY – Do Not Quote**

### ***J3. Agonistic Urbanism***

#### **Wendy Pullan**

This module focuses on a theoretical understanding of urban conflicts, primarily seen through spatial configurations and discontinuities and urban institutions. It is based on a series of research papers looking at the role of borders, frontiers and mobilities (see Research Report on J1.4 'The spatial qualities of contested cities') and upon the ongoing research for a book called 'Urban Agonistes'.

The book will be an argument for the presence of conflict in cities. It is based upon the premise that conflict is part of the urban condition and cannot be eradicated. Rather, in some places over time, people have found ways of channelling conflict in constructive ways. The ancient Greeks would have referred to it as *agon*. Many urban institutions have developed out of this channelling, for example, judicial systems and court procedures, sport, and markets. They are both contentious and creative. In political philosophy, the idea of agonistic politics has been developed in various ways by Connolly, Mouffe, Gray. But they tend to falter when faced with the alternatives of overly systematised procedures that maintain political order but cannot encompass conflict very well, or lack of procedure that verges on the anarchic, where conflict is intense enough to become dysfunctional. My argument is that agonism needs a more concrete base, rooted in places, physical institutions, and activities (which historically often became ritualised). Cities offer this in good measure because place-based institutions tend to be relatively open in scope, absorptive in terms of use and meaning, and flexible over time. It is a case of the concreteness of place being able to accommodate more than abstract rules or systems.

#### **Proposed Book Outline: 'Urban Agonistes: On the nature of conflict in cities'**

1. Intro: On the nature of conflict in cities
2. Agon in history
  - a. Greek agonism
  - b. The Constitution of Madina
  - c. Siena; Padova
  - d. Ritual, sport
  - e. Cities today – Arab Spring, Occupy movements
  - f. Representing agon- museums of struggle
3. Agon in political philosophy and law
  - a. Connolly, Mouffe, Laclau, Gray, Hayden, Mahmoud
  - b. The problem with agonism as a system
  - c. Unembodied agonism and the role of cities

4. Urban institutions and urban order
  - a. The city and polity – everyday life
  - b. Institutional space/public space
  - c. Privatisation and conflict in cities
  - d. Institutional settings at frontiers
  - e. Urban order/urban disorder
  - f. Channelling difference through agon
  
5. Urban conflict, resilience and resistance
  - a. Power and counter-power
  - b. Violence
  - c. Identity as difference, identity as commonality
  - d. Rights
  - e. Constructive resistance
  - f. Agon and resistance
  
6. Contested cities and their spatial qualities
  - a. Borders, buffer zones
  - b. Frontier urbanism
  - c. Agonistic space
    - institutions in place
    - difference and shared space
    - common ground and the capacities of urban space
  
7. Conclusions: agonistic urbanism